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This dissertation consists of three papers on health economics and labor economics.
The first chapter investigates how workplace breastfeeding laws that require firms to
provide a lactation room in the workplace affect the labor market outcomes of mothers
of infants. Summers (1989) predicts that such mandated benefits depress the demand for
mothers of infants and increase their supply and, thus, depress wages. However, I argue
that such mandated benefits can increase both the demand for and the wages of mothers
of infants who have a strong propensity to increase their work attachment. I exploit
the plausibly exogenous variation in the timing of state mandates on workplace lactation
support, analyzing data in the National Immunization Survey and the Current Population
Survey.
The second chapter investigates changes in the usage or preventive services among the
Medicare beneficiaries following the Affordable Care Act’s “Medicare Preventive Benefits”
reform, which eliminates cost-sharing for Medicare-covered preventive services that are rec-
ommended (rated A or B) by the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force. Following intuition
in Chetty et al. (2013) that individuals with no knowledge of certain policies behave as
they would in the absence of the policy, I identify the impact of the reform by comparing
the usage of all Medicare-covered preventive services across regions with different levels of
knowledge of the reform. Exploiting the sample of beneficiaries that move across HRRs, I
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find that the knowledge of the reform is driven by the demand side factors rather than the
supply side factors.
The third chapter investigates the causal impact of physician counseling on obesity,
exploiting the eligibility criterion of the Medicare’s Intensive Behavioral Therapy (IBT)
for Obesity program, using a fuzzy Regression Discontinuity (RD) approach. I using the
5% random sample of the Medicare historical claim data and I inventively collect the BMI
information using the ICD-9 diagnosis codes. I find that the intensive behavioral therapy
is not effective in reducing obesity, and we are able to rule out confounding factors such as
the use of bariatric procedures, massages, psychological therapy, smoking counseling, and
the diagnoses of chronic conditions.
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1.0 THE INCIDENCE OF WORKPLACE BREASTFEEDING BENEFITS
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The federal and state governments in the United States require employers to provide ma-
ternal benefits, including health insurance with comprehensive coverage of childbirth and
maternity leaves with protected job security. Nevertheless, the labor market impact of
these mandated benefits is controversial. Summers (1989) argues that these benefits de-
press wages because they increase the employers’ hiring cost for working mothers and
encourage working mothers to supply more labor. Moreover, there may be a decline in the
total labor input, wherein the increase in mothers’ labor supply is weaker than the fall in
demand.
Evidence about the impact of such mandated benefits is mixed. Gruber (1994) finds,
first, that the costs of state-mandated health insurance coverage of childbirth substantially
shift to the wages of the targeted group, and, second, that there is little effect on that
group’s total labor input. In a study of nine European countries from 1969 to 1993, Ruhm
(1998) finds that parental leave is associated with increases in women’s employment and
reductions in their relative wages at extended durations. Waldfogel (1999), who estimates
the impact of the 1993 Family and Medical Leave Act, finds that mandated maternity
leaves of up to twelve weeks have no significant negative effects on women’s employment
or wages. Waldfogel (1999) also finds that in large large firms wages are higher, which
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perhaps reflects intangible aspects of employment continuity, such as higher productivity
due to the firm-specific human capital and greater job satisfaction.
This paper investigates the impact of another type of maternal benefits mandated
at the workplace, breastfeeding support, and it provides a theoretical framework within
which predictions are consistent with the empirical results. From 1995 to 2012, about half
of the states enacted laws that require employers to provide the benefits.1 Although the
wording and detailed requirements on the breaks and space differ, most states mandate
that employers must provide daily unpaid break time at the nursing employee’s request
and make reasonable efforts to provide a private and clean non-bathroom location.
Workplace breastfeeding support is an attractive setting in which to examine the labor
market impacts of the mandated benefits because the reform lowers the workers’ relative
time costs of breastfeeding. This enables women with the most means and ability to work
longer hours, which, in turn, increases their attachment to the workforce. The amount
of breast milk output is determined by the frequency and thoroughness of milk removal;
having breastfeeding breaks daily, usually 20 to 30 minutes every 3 to 4 hours, increases
the duration of breastfeeding, allows young women to continue breastfeeding after they
resuming working, and prevents the early weaning of the child.
Exploiting the plausibly exogenous variation in state-level mandates, I start by esti-
mating the impact of workplace breastfeeding support. As I will argue subsequently, the
temporal and spatial variation of the law is plausibly orthogonal to a multitude of state-level
characteristics. I use two nationally representative data sets, the Current Population Sur-
vey and the National Immunization Survey. Breastfeeding outcomes include the initiation
(if the mother ever breastfeeds) and the duration (the number of weeks) of breastfeeding.
The labor market outcomes include outcomes during the reference week of the survey, such
as labor force participation, hours worked last week, whether hourly wages were received,
1With the exception of Utah, which passed the mandate in 2012, all of the other states that have passed
the mandate did so before 2010, when the Affordable Care Act mandated the workplace breastfeeding
benefits at the federal level.
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and the hourly wage if paid by the hour. I also examine outcomes during the previous
year of the survey, such as employment last year, whether the mother worked full time last
year, and last year’s hourly wage.
Using a difference-in-differences framework, I find that workplace breastfeeding benefits
increase the number of weeks of breastfeeding by 4.3%, although they have no impact on
the initiation of breastfeeding. Using a triple difference-in-differences framework with males
as the primary control group, I find that the labor force participation rate of mothers of
infants increased by 1.16 percentage points. The married mothers work for 5% longer
hours per day and receive a 4.6% higher wage; the single mothers do not work longer
and receive a 3.8% lower wage. There appears to be little sorting of the observational
characteristics, except that the married mothers in the treated states are less likely to be
high school dropouts and are more likely to come from households with higher incomes;
single mothers do not differ according to the treatment status. The results are robust to a
series of alternative specifications: using males who have infant children and females who
do not have children as alternative control groups; using the event-study frameworks for
the labor market outcomes; and using the hazard models for results on the duration of
breastfeeding.
The findings are consistent with a framework of Summers (1989) extended to allow two
separate labor markets for workers who have high and low productivity—i.e., the ability to
increase their work attachment by working longer hours. The differential changes of supply
and demand in the two markets drive several differential effects of breastfeeding support on
mothers who have high and low levels of work attachment. First, breastfeeding support at
the workplace increases the cost of hiring for both types, and it shifts the demand curves for
both types downward. Second, both types of workers value the breastfeeding benefits and
increase their labor supply. Third, the provision of longer hours of work (i.e., the increase of
work attachment) leads to an increase in the desirability of the relatively more productive
workers, which, in turn, leads to an upward shift of the demand curve for this high type.
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The upward shift of demand outweighs the downward shift of demand caused by higher
costs, and so the wages and the employment of the relatively more productive mothers
both increase. In contrast, the wages of less productive mothers decrease, although the
change of their employment is ex ante ambiguous; the empirical results for less productive
mothers seem to suggest that employment increases and that the shift of supply is larger
than the shift of demand.
I assume that the workplace breastfeeding benefits affect the high- and low-type mothers
differently, which is consistent with the literature on the differential compensating methods
used by firms for skilled- and nonskilled-workers and for the male and female workers. For
example, my assumption that workers differ in their ability to increase job attachment
mirrors Lazear and Rosen (1990)’s assumption that workers differ in their willingness to
leave firms. They argue that job promotion choices depend on the worker’s propensity to
remain on the job, which is important because any firm-specific learning is lost when a
worker leaves the firm.
To estimate the incidence of the benefits in cross-section and in time series, I next esti-
mate their spill-over effects (e.g., how workplace breastfeeding benefits affect the mothers
of older children), dynamic effects (whether several years postpartum we see an effect on
the labor market outcomes of mothers who had access to the benefits during the first post-
partum year), and lagged effects (whether in females with infant children the passage of
the workplace breastfeeding benefits created a one-time shock or a stable effects over many
years). I find that the spill-over effects track the pattern of the dynamic effects, partly
because of the mechanical result of the difference-in-differences specification. However, the
workplace breastfeeding support demonstrates a lagged effect that is different from the
dynamic and spill-over effects, and that persists for up to eight years after the enactment.
These findings suggest that workplace breastfeeding support has a durable impact on the
labor market outcomes of the mothers of infants.
Then, exploiting the heterogeneity in the details of the state mandates—whether state
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mandates allow longer years of benefits (three versus one year post-birth), allow breast-
feeding in addition to pumping, prohibit discrimination, or have whistle blowers and/or
retaliation protection—I estimate the heterogeneous effects of the workplace breastfeeding
benefits and compare these with the benchmark effects. I find that when the workplace
breastfeeding benefit is offered for more than one year or when discrimination against
employees who request breaks is prohibited, the employment of the mothers of infants
significantly improves. Allowing both breastfeeding and pumping does not have a signifi-
cant effect but having retaliation protection does. Simply encouraging the provision of the
workplace breastfeeding benefits may lead employers to hire fewer nursing mothers; but
when hired, those mothers work longer hours and receive higher wages. These findings
seem to imply that employers can discriminate against the less productive mothers on the
extensive margins.
Finally, to investigate the channels, I examine occupational differences in temporal
flexibility at the workplace, as defined in Goldin (2014), to see if the effects differ along
the five dimensions of flexibility: time pressure, contact with others, establishing and
maintaining interpersonal relationships, structural vs. unstructural work, and freedom to
make decisions. I find that the main impact of the workplace breastfeeding benefits is robust
to the additional control of the temporal flexibility at occupational level. In addition, in
occupations that have less flexibility, the increase in labor force participation is smaller, the
increase in hours of work is larger, and the increase in the probability of working full-time
is larger. These findings are consistent with Goldin (2014) who demonstrates that firms
reward individuals who are willing to work long hours and in particular hours: jobs that
provide less temporal flexibility often require higher human capital and are winner-take-all
positions. These are also positions for which considerable work hours lead to a higher
chance of promotion and a larger reward.
This paper contributes to three threads of literature. First, the paper contributes
to the literature that examines the factors that determine the initiation and duration of
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breastfeeding. For example, Jayachandran and Kuziemko (2011) find that the preference
for sons impacts the duration of breastfeeding; Chatterji and Frick (2005) show that the
timing and intensity of returning to work affects the probability of initiating and the
duration of breastfeeding. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to show that
breastfeeding support at the workplace causally affects the duration of breastfeeding.
Second, this paper contributes to the literature that examines the factors that determine
the employment and wages of women who have young children. Previous studies have found
that the female labor supply increases: if women have less commuting time (Black et al.,
2014); if the mother or mother-in-law lives nearby (Compton and Pollak, 2014) or works
(Ferna´ndez et al., 2004); if during the WWII the state drafted more males (Acemoglu et
al., 2004); where generous childcare subsidies or child care services are available (Baker
et al., 2008; Lefebvre and Merrigan, 2008; Cascio, 2009; Bauernschuster and Schlotter,
2015); if women spend less household expenditures on day care (Blau and Robins, 1988;
Connelly, 1992; Blau and Currie, 2006; Hardoy and Schøne, 2015); if women have generous
maternity leave (Baker and Milligan, 2008); and if women can hire foreign domestic workers
as affordable live-in help (Cortes and Pan, 2013). To the best of my knowledge, this paper is
the first to evaluate the causal impacts of the workplace breastfeeding support on women’s
employment and wages.
Third, this paper contributes to the literature that devises quasi-experimental legal
changes to identify the causal effects of labor market policies (Gruber, 1994; Angrist and
Evans, 1998; Klerman, 1999; Levine et al., 1999; Waldfogel, 1999; Bailey, 2006; Baker and
Milligan, 2008; Rossin, 2011; Blau and Kahn, 2013). For example, Bailey (2006) uses
plausibly exogenous variation in state consent laws to evaluate the causal impact of the
birth control pill on women’s labor force participation. Similarly, Baker and Milligan
(2008), who exploit a significant increase in Canadian maternity leave mandates, find very
large increases in mothers’ time away from work post-birth and in the attainment of critical
breastfeeding duration thresholds. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to
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evaluate the impact of state mandates on workplace breastfeeding support. My finding that
workplace breastfeeding benefits increase wages, is different from the predictions made
by Summers (1989) and Gruber (1994). My findings also contributes to the theoretical
understanding of the impact of the mandated benefits.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant background
information on breastfeeding and laws that affect workplace breastfeeding support. Section
3 outlines a simple theoretical framework, while Section 4 describes the data. Section
5 presents the empirical strategy and the results of breastfeeding outcomes. Section 6
presents the empirical strategy and the results for the labor market outcomes. Section 7
investigates the possible mechanisms and Section 8 presents additional results for the labor
market effects. Section 9 concludes.
1.2 BACKGROUND
1.2.1 Benefits of breastfeeding
Breastfeeding has been widely examined in both the medical and the economic literatures.
In the medical literature there is broad consensus about the health benefits of breastfeeding
for both the mother and the baby. For mothers, breastfeeding has been linked to a decrease
in postpartum bleeding, an earlier return to pre-pregnancy weight, and a reduced risk of
breast cancer, type 2 diabetes, and postpartum depression. The potential health benefits
for breast milk-fed children are extensive: reduced risk of ear, skin, stomach, and respi-
ratory infections; fewer cases of diarrhea; and less sudden infant death syndrome. Over
the longer term, breast milk-fed children have a reduced risk of obesity, type 1 and type 2
diabetes, asthma, and childhood leukemia (United States Breastfeeding Committee, 2010;
Rothstein, 2013).
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The results of economics examinations of the causal impacts of breastfeeding on health
and cognitive outcomes have been mixed. For example, Baker and Milligan (2008) found
that additional breastfeeding had no impact on maternal and child health outcomes, while
Belfield and Kelly (2012) found that breastfeeding protects against obesity and improves
cognitive outcomes at 24 months and 54 months. Rothstein (2013) found a small, positive,
and statistically significant effect of breastfeeding on the cognitive test scores of young
children, but within-sibling results are insignificant.
1.2.2 Historical trend of breastfeeding
During the 1800s, more than 95% of infants in the U.S. were breastfed, often for two to four
years (Andrews, 2012). An alternative is cow’s milk, which, if tainted, can lead to diarrhea
and other illnesses. With the pasteurization of milk and the sterilization of feeding vessels,
artificial milk became a safe and marketable option. During the 1920s, scientists also began
developing non-milk-based formulas for infants allergic to cow’s milk. The first soy flour-
based non-milk formula became available to the public in 1929 (Fomon, 2001). As formulas
evolved, manufacturers advertised directly to physicians. In 1929, the American Medical
Association formed the Committee on Foods, which approved the safety and quality of the
non-milk formula composition (Stevens et al., 2009). During the 1940s, formula-feeding
was the norm in the United States, and fewer than 30% of American babies were fed from
the breast (Andrews, 2012).
By the 1950s, physicians and consumers had come to regard formula as a well-known,
popular, and safe substitute for breastmilk, and breastfeeding steadily declined until the
1970s (Fomon, 2001). Figure A1 and Figure A2 are taken from Ryan et al. (2002), who
obtained the data from the Ross Laboratories Mothers’ Survey. They show trends in
breastfeeding initiation and duration from the 1960s through the early 2000s. Although
the popularity of breastfeeding decreased during the 1980s, since 1990 there has been a
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resurgence of breastfeeding. Figure A3 and Figure A4, which are based on data from the
National Immunization Survey, show that the initiation and duration of breastfeeding has
continued to grow into the 2000s. The American Academy of Pediatrics (United States
Breastfeeding Committee, 2010) currently recommends exclusive breastfeeding (only breast
milk, without water, formula or solid food) for the first six months of a child’s life and then
continued breastfeeding through at least the first year. In 2014, the percentage of mothers
who have breastfed is 79.2%. The percentage of mothers who are still breastfeeding at
various intervals after birth decreases quickly: 49.4% in the sixth month but only 26.7% in
the twelfth month (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014).
1.2.3 Federal laws regarding workplace breastfeeding support
In 1981, the U.S. Court of appeals, Fifth Circuit, ruled that breastfeeding is a consti-
tutional right that is linked to the protected liberties of “individual decisions respecting
marriage, procreation, contraception, abortion, and family relationships.” The court held
that a public employer’s interference with a woman’s decision to breastfeed must “further
sufficiently important sate interests and be closely tailored to effectuate only those inter-
ests.” However, the US supreme court has not yet examined the ruling, which is considered
an anomaly (Murtagh and Moulton, 2011).
Discrimination against breastfeeding is not equivalent to discrimination based on gen-
der, pregnancy, or disability. Breastfeeding is not protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender; nor is it protected by
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, which amended Title VII to protect against
discrimination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical con-
ditions.” Breastfeeding is a normal condition associated with pregnancy, and the courts
have consistently ruled that it is not a disability or protected by the Americans With
Disabilities Act (Murtagh and Moulton, 2011).
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By allowing eligible employees to take a total of 12 weeks of unpaid maternity leave, the
Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 indirectly promotes breastfeeding. To qualify, eligible
employees must have worked for at least the 12 previous months and for a minimum of
1250 hours, must reside within 75 miles of the place of work, and must work for businesses
that employ at least 50 people.
The first federal law to directly support breastfeeding at the workplace was the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010. Section 4207 of the Affordable Care Act, which
amends the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, requires employers to provide reasonable
break time and a private location other than a bathroom to express milk for a child aged
up to 1 year. The breaks are unpaid. Eligible employees are those covered by the Fair
Labor Standards Act’s overtime provisions. Prior to the Affordable Care Act of 2010, legal
support of breastfeeding was provided at the state-level only.
1.2.4 State laws that provide workplace breastfeeding support
Table A1 lists the years that various states passed the “Workplace law.” It summarizes
state laws that require employers to provide unpaid break time and a special space for
expressing breast milk. States that have passed state laws that support breastfeeding at
workplace, such as Hawaii, also are included. I summarized the data using the website of
National Conference of State Legislatures2, and tables in Andrews (2012) and Abdulloeva
and Eyler (2013). Texas was the first state to pass a version of the workplace breastfeeding
support law.
The details of workplace law differ from state to state. Some states specify the frequency
of the breaks; Oregon, for example, requires “unpaid 30-minute breaks during each four-
hour shift to breastfeed or pump.” Others, such as Georgia, simply require “daily, unpaid
break time.” Requirements about the duration of the benefits also differ. Colorado allows
2http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/breastfeeding-state-laws.aspx, accessed April 2015.
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for up to two years after the child’s birth, while Maine allows up to 3 years. Some states
do not specify the number of years that are protected. Details about the space also vary.
Illinois requires “a room or other location, other than a toilet stall, where an employee
can express her milk in privacy,” while Indiana goes so far as to require that the employer
“make reasonable efforts to provide for a refrigerator to keep breast milk that has been
expressed.”
Some state mandates specify that discrimination is prohibited. For example, Maine
stipulates that “the employer may not discriminate against an employee who chooses to
express breast milk in the workplace.” Other states allow for exemptions. Georgia, for
example, stipulates that “the employer is not required to provide break time if to do so
would unduly disrupt the workplace operations.”3
As for enforcement, some states establish a specific committee that collects information
about possible violations. For example, Rev. Stat. 367-3 requires the Hawaii Civil Rights
Commission to collect, assemble and publish data concerning instances of discrimination
involving breastfeeding or expressing breast milk in the workplace. Other states specify
penalties against violations. California requires that “(a) An employer who violates any
provision of this chapter shall be subject to a civil penalty in the amount of one hundred
dollars ($100) for each violation; (b) if, upon inspection or investigation, the Labor Com-
missioner determines that a violation of this chapter has occurred, the Labor Commissioner
may issue a citation.” Oregon specifies that “In addition to any other penalty provided by
law, the commissioner may assess a civil penalty not to exceed $1,000 against any person
who intentionally violates ORS 653.077 or any rule adopted thereunder.”
3In one case study, Henry et al. (2011) found that employers’ evaluation of feasibility was related to the
size of the business. According to anecdotal evidence that they provide, some employers found it hard to
define privacy in determining an appropriate space, and some employers reported that providing the breaks
disrupted the productivity and elicited protest from coworkers.
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1.2.5 Breastfeeding breaks at the workplace
Attitudes in the workplace about breastfeeding affect whether mothers initiate and con-
tinue breastfeeding for the recommended duration. Educational interventions as well as
counseling, support and training can improve the initiation rates during the hospital stay
and for the next few weeks. Mothers who do not breastfeed may not know the benefits of
breastfeeding, and those who stop early report difficulty with technique or express concerns
that their child is not getting enough food (Baker and Milligan, 2008). Most often, the
principal impediment to prolonging breastfeeding duration past the initial weeks is work.
Surveyed mothers say the need to return to work is one of the main reasons that they stop
breastfeeding at about six weeks and it is the principal reason that many do not breastfeed
for longer durations (Schwartz et al., 2002; Fein and Roe, 1998).
Breastfeeding breaks during workdays facilitate continuing breastfeeding. The breast
milk output is determined by the frequency and thoroughness of milk removal. An exclu-
sively breastfed baby (under six months) feeds between 8 and 14 times per 24 hours. If
mother and child are separated for more than a few hours, the woman herself must express
milk, both to maintain production and to ensure her own health and comfort. Milk left in
the breast beyond 3 to 4 hours signals the body to slow its rate of production and decrease
the woman’s total daily output, which leads mothers to stop breastfeeding and use formula
(United States Breastfeeding Committee, 2010). Using the 2008 Infant Feeding Practice
Survey, Fein et al. (2008) found that during the first month after returning to work, 31.8%
of the workers keep the infant at work and breastfeed during the work day; 7.9% go to
the infant to breastfeed during the work day; 2.9% have the infant brought to them to
breastfeed during the work day; 52.7% pump milk and save it for the infant; 0.6% pump
and discard the milk; and only 15.9% neither pump nor feed the infant during the work
day because they have stopped breastfeeding. As the proportion of women participating
in the labor force after giving birth has grown, workplace attitudes about breastfeeding
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have increasingly affected mother’s decisions about breastfeeding and whether or when to
return to work postpartum. In 2010, 58.8% of women with infant children were in labor
force; in 1990 that percentage was only 48.9% (the Current Population Survey).
Providing breastfeeding support at the workplace incurs a cost to the employer. Ac-
cording to estimates provided by the Minnesota Department of Health and the Texas
Department of Health, the costs of providing a special space and basic amenities, such as
a table, chair, sink, and storage, range from $145 for minimum accommodation to $525
for maximum accommodation. The costs will be higher if the employer provides addi-
tional benefits, such as coverage of the cost of pumps. An employee could use her own
manual/electric pump, or she could purchase and use an individual kit when her employer
rents a hospital-grade, heavy-duty multi-user pump.
1.2.6 The validity and relevance of the law as a natural experiment
For two reasons, the law regarding workplace breastfeeding support provides an ideal set-
ting to study the causal impact of work on breastfeeding. First, since the 1993 change of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the U.S. has not experienced any change in policies
that might affect breastfeeding decisions. In particular, state laws that regulate workplace
breastfeeding support, which were passed during the late 1990s and 2000s, provide an op-
portunity to examine changes in recent breastfeeding patterns.4 Second, only 24 states
and the District of Columbia passed a version of the law, and they passed it in different
years; this difference in timing creates variation in the degree of exposure to workplace
breastfeeding benefits, which, in turn, provides an opportunity to identify causal effects.
Figure A5 displays geographical variation in the timing of the workplace breastfeeding
law. There is no clear spatial pattern to the passage and timing of the law. The figure
4The first state law that mandated workplace breastfeeding support passed in 1995. Thus, the 1993
change in the FLSA affected all states, and its effects can be absorbed by the common year fixed effects,
which poses no threat to identifying the effects of the state laws.
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provides visual evidence that the passage of the law was spatially random.
One concern is that the passage of state laws might be correlated with prior levels of
breastfeeding; that is, states that already have high or low rates of breastfeeding might
pass the law to encourage or further increase the rate of breastfeeding. My inspection of
the institutional background indicates that both possibilities are plausible. For example,
Florida passed its law as “an endorsement of the importance of Florida infants being
breastfed and protect a mother’s right to breastfeed whenever and wherever she needs to,”
and because “Florida has one of the lowest breastfeeding rates in the nation...This bill
would...make women more secure in their right to breastfeed.”5 In contrast, Minnesota,
which passed a version of the law in 1999, has one of the highest breastfeeding rates in the
country.
State level mandates can be used as a quasi-experiment to identify the causal impact
of workplace breastfeeding benefits on women’s feeding and labor market outcomes only
if the mandates do not reflect pre-existing differences in state-level characteristics. Next I
provide empirical evidence that initial state-level characteristics cannot predict the passage
and the time lag of the regulation.
I examine state-level characteristics computed for all 50 states and the District of
Columbia using the 1990 IPUMS Census 1% sample. The variables include characteristics
of the total population of the state and women of child-bearing age. I also use the ideology
measures for individual states published in Berry et al. (1998). For example, characteristics
of the total population include the percentage of state population that: lives in the central
metropolitan area, is white, is in the labor force, and is employed. Also important is
average wage income; average welfare income from the government; average transfer income
received for the child; average firm size; and the percentage of women who are aged between
15-21, 22-30, and 31-44, are of child-bearing age (aged 15-44), are college graduates, are
single, are in the labor force, are employed, or have child/children. Ideology scores include
5http://www.flbreastfeeding.org/legislation.htm, accessed April 2015.
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those of the Republican Party, the Democratic Party, the governor of the state, the state
as a whole, and citizens. These variables are proxies for the degree of conservativeness of
the various states (Berry et al., 1998).
Table A2 shows that no systematic differences distinguish states that did or did not
pass the law. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the state
passed the law by 2010 and 0 otherwise. Each cell shows the point estimate and stan-
dard error of the state-level characteristics of interest from a regression of the dependent
variable on these characteristics. The regressions are weighted by each state’s population.
Only 2 of the 21 parameters are statistically significant, which suggests that passage of
the law is plausibly exogenous. The significant parameters suggest that certain scenarios
are particularly possible. For example, people who live in central metropolitan areas are
especially likely to work for large firms for whom workplace benefits are critical. In these
areas, workers are especially likely to push for passage of the workplace law. Similarly, if
a large percentage of the residents of a state are women aged 31-44, politicians might be
likely to appeal to these residents by passing the law. These characteristics cannot jointly
predict the passage of the law; the F-statistics is 1.51.
Table A3 demonstrates that the state level characteristics cannot predict whether some
states passed the law earlier than others. The dependent variable is the actual year a state
passed the law, minus 1995, which is the first year the law was passed—in other words,
the time lag of the passage of the law. Almost all of the parameters, except for one—the
average welfare income—are statistically insignificant, which indicates that the timing of
the passage of the law is independent from state-level characteristics. If regressing the time
lag on all characteristics, the joint F-statistics is 1.38, which, too, is insignificant.
Table A2 and Table A3 offer evidence that the issue of selection into passing the law is
not significant among the observed state level characteristics that one could test using the
above method. Like Altonji et al. (2005), I assume that if the degree of selection on the
observed characteristics provides insight about the degree of selection on the unobserved
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characteristics, it is reasonable to conclude that the state mandates on the workplace
breastfeeding benefits seem to be a valid quasi-experiment. To further control for the un-
observed state-level characteristics, I include in the empirical analysis state fixed-effects to
control for the unobserved state level characteristics that do not vary by year, state-specific
linear/quadratic time trends to control for the unobserved state level characteristics that
vary within each state by year linearly/quadratically, and in the robustness tests the census-
region-by-year fixed-effects to control for the unobserved region-specific characteristics that
vary by year.
Because of the limitations of the data, one cannot directly observe whether employers
actually provide the mandated benefits. According to the Employer Benefits Survey, the
percentage of employers that provide workplace breastfeeding benefits has gradually risen.
For example, the percentage of employers that provide workplace breastfeeding rooms
increased from 25% in 2009 to 34% in 2013. Thus, it is plausible to interpret the empirical
results as an “intention to treat” effect rather than a “treatment on the treated” effect
(Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, I discuss, first, the standard framework on the mandated benefits and, sec-
ond, how the model should be modified when we consider workplace breastfeeding benefits
and derive its implications.
Summers (1989) offers the standard framework for comparing the welfare implications
of public provision and mandated benefit programs. Figure A6 illustrates how mandated
benefits affect the wages of those who receive the benefits. Because it is costly to provide
these benefits, the demand curve shifts downward, by an amount equal to the monetary
costs of the benefits. If workers value the benefits, their supply curve should shift downward;
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the magnitude of the shift depends on how much workers value the benefits. Depending
on the relative magnitudes of the shifts in the supply and the demand curve, the new
equilibrium will always have a lower wage, although the change in employment can occur
in both directions.
Figure A7 illustrates my proposed model. Two types of workers—those with high and
those with low productivity—differ in their ability of increasing their work attachment by
working longer hours. Barriers separate the two markets, which I refer to as high-type and
low-type markets. Differential changes in supply and demand in the two markets drive
the differential effects of breastfeeding support on mothers who have high or low levels of
productivity.
First, breastfeeding support at the workplace increases the cost of hiring both types
because, as Oi (1962) proposes, the cost of employment includes both the wage and the
cost of hiring and training. The latter is, in effect, an investment by the firm in its labor
force, and it creates an element of capital in the use of labor.6 The additional costs of
hiring shift the demand curves for both types downward.
Second, both types of workers value the breastfeeding benefits and increase their labor
supply. It is reasonable to assume that the high-type workers increase their supply by
a larger amount than the low-type because it is easier for them to increase the work
attachment and increase the hours of work, although the relative magnitudes do not affect
the framework’s predictions.
Finally, the provision of longer hours of work—that is, an increase in the work attachment—
leads to an increase of the desirability of the relatively more productive workers, which, in
turn, leads to an upward shift in the demand curve for the high type only. Because this
6The assumption that labor is a quasi-fixed factor is essential in explaining short-run labor market
behaviors such as occupational differences in the stability of employment and wages. Oi (1962) argues that
because the firm incurs certain fixed employment costs, such as hiring and training costs, the amortization
of these fixed employment costs drives a wedge between the marginal value product and the wage rate. This
creates buffer absorbing short-run variations in product demands, which leads to occupational differences
in the stability of employment and wages.
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upward shift of demand outweighs the downward shift of demand the wages and employ-
ment of the relatively more productive mothers both increase. In contrast, the wages of
the less productive mothers decrease, although the change in their employment is ex ante
ambiguous.
My assumption, that the heterogeneous effects of workplace breastfeeding benefits af-
fect the high- and low-type mothers differently, is consistent with the literature on the
differential compensating methods that firms use for skilled- and nonskilled-workers and
for male and female workers. For example, Lazear and Rosen (1990) assume that more
productive jobs coexist with less productive jobs and that job promotion choices depend
both on the worker’s ability and her propensity to remain on the job, which is important
because any firm-specific learning is lost when a worker leaves the firm. My assumption
that workers differ in their ability to increase job attachment mirrors Lazear and Rosen’s
assumption that workers differ in their propensity to leave firms (females are more likely
than males to leave, and thus they receive a lower wage).
Similarly, Goldin (2014) argues that any explanation of the residual of gender-wage
gap should rely on a labor market equilibrium that has compensating differentials and, in
particular, examines how firms reward individuals who can work long hours and particular
hours. My assumption that productivity is the ability to increase the work attachment is
consistent with Goldin’s (2014) key idea that persistence and continuous time on the job
matter for the residual of the gender-wage gap.
In summary, following Summers (1989), I extend the standard framework on mandated
benefits by assuming that there are two types of workers who differ in their levels of produc-
tivity, which we can also describe as the ability to increase the work attachment. I derive
the following implications for mandated breastfeeding benefits: for the more productive
mothers, their wages and employment both increase; for the less productive mothers, their
wages decrease, although the change on employment is ex ante unclear. In the next few
sections I test these hypotheses empirically.
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1.4 DATA
I examine data from two nationally representative surveys. First, to estimate the effects on
the labor market outcomes, I use the March Current Population Surveys (CPS), 1990-2010,
which I downloaded from the IPUMS. I do not include years later than 2010 because on
March 23, 2010, the Affordable Care Act amended the Fair Labor Standards Act and made
the provision of reasonable break time and space for an employee to express breast milk
a federal mandate. To the extent that women’s labor market outcomes depend on their
marital status or, in the case of married individuals, their partner’s characteristics, I merge
partner’s characteristics using the spouse location variable. The spouse characteristics
include age, levels of education, race, and labor force participation status.7 The main
sample of interest consists of people aged 18-44. Because our identification comes from
state level mandates, and to reduce confounding factors that are linked to migration, I
drop individuals whose migration status one year ago was moving between states, moving
from abroad, or unknown. My sample includes individuals who during the previous year
of the survey have continued to reside in the same house, have moved only within their
county, or have moved between counties but have remained in the same states.
Second, to estimate the effects on the breastfeeding outcomes, I use the National Immu-
nization Survey (NIS) waves of 2003-2013; the sample consists of babies born between 2001
and 2010.8 The NIS is conducted jointly by the National Center for Immunizations and
Respiratory Diseases, the National Center for Health Statistics, and the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention. It is the only source of nationally representative repeated cross-
sectional data about the initiation and duration of breastfeeding. The NIS has collected
7The CPS’s spouse location variable also defines non-married partners as spouses. Therefore, one can
have a spouse without being married.
8The NIS data do not report the baby’s year of birth, but they do report the babies’ age as a categorical
variable: 19-23 months, 24-29 months, and 30-35 months. I estimate the year of birth on the basis of the
year of the survey and the age categories. First, I subtract from the survey year of the babies in these three
age categories by 1.75 (=(19+23)/24), 2.21 (=(24+29)/24), and 2.71 (=(30+35)/24), respectively. Then,
to find the actual years of birth I round the numbers up or down.
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information on breastfeeding behavior since 2003. The feeding outcome variables of inter-
est are determined by the answers to the following two questions: 1. Was [FILL CHILD’S
NAME] ever breastfed or fed breast milk? 2. How old was [FILL CHILD’S NAME] when
[FILL CHILD’S NAME] completely stopped breastfeeding or being fed breast milk? These
answers are generated from recalled memory. Because the measurement error of the de-
pendent variable can be absorbed by the disturbance of the regression and ignored as long
as the regressors are measured properly (Greene, 2008, p.326), one need not be concerned
about the measurement error of these recalled variables.
1.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS ON BREASTFEEDING
1.5.1 Econometric frameworks
Because the unit of observation in the NIS for breastfeeding outcomes is each baby, the
main framework is a difference-in-differences, or a DD specification:
yist = α+ βWorkplacest +X
′
istΓ + θs + θt + θs · t+ ist, (1.1)
where the outcome variable is one of the following variables: EverBfist, a dummy variable
that equals one if the baby is ever breastfed, or 0 otherwise; log(WeeksBfist), the log of
the number of weeks of breastfeeding, where the number of weeks is censored at 104 weeks.
The variable Workplacest is a dummy variable that equals one if the state s passed
a version of the workplace breastfeeding support mandates during year t; otherwise it is
0. The parameter β, which is the parameter of interest, can be interpreted as the causal
impact of providing workplace breastfeeding benefits on the outcome variables, under the
identifying assumption that access to the law is orthogonal to the unobserved characteristics
that also affect the baby’s feeding pattern at the individual level. Therefore, one needs to
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control for the observed baby and mother characteristics, state (θs) and year fixed-effects
(θt), and state-specific time trends (θs · t). Xist, which is the vector of covariates, includes
the following characteristics: baby’s gender; race categories (Hispanic, black, and other;
white is the omitted category); a dummy variable that equals one if the child ever receives
benefits from the WIC (the Women, Infant, and Child program); a dummy variable that
equals one if the baby is a first-born; age categories of the mother (less than 19 years old,
greater than 30 years old, and the omitted category is aged between 19-30); level of the
mother’s education (high school dropout, high school graduate, and some college, with
college graduates the omitted category); a dummy variable that equals one if the mother
is married; the number of children in the household; and the ratio of household income
to the poverty line. ist is a random error term. I use the OLS model for the impact on
EverBfist and a Tobit model for the impact on log(WksBfist).
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To test for the existence of anticipation effects (whether the effects started before the
actual enactment of the law) I include PreLawst, which is a dummy variable that equals 1 if
the state s during year t+1 has the law (otherwise it is 0). The goal is to determine whether
the outcome variables change significantly just before the enactment of the workplace
breastfeeding law.
In some specifications, I also include three dummy variables that indicate the pas-
sage of three other state-level mandates related to breastfeeding (AnyP lacest, Juryst and
Indecencyst). These variables control for the culture of and attitude about breastfeeding
at the state level. The variable AnyP lacest equals one if state s during year t passed a
version of the mandate that allowed nursing mothers to breastfeed in any public and pri-
vate space. The variable Juryst equals one if state s during year t passed a version of the
mandate that exempted nursing mothers from jury duty. Indecencyst equals one if state s
during year t passed a version of the mandate that exempted breastfeeding in the public
9The estimates of the marginal effects on EverBfist when a probit model is used resemble those obtained
when the OLS is used. Thus, to ease interpretation, I use the OLS model. The results using the probit
model are available upon request.
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from being classified as public indecency. Table A20 in the appendix summarizes these
three other state level breastfeeding-related mandates.10
Table A4 provides the summary statistics for the NIS data. The first two columns
present summary statistics for the babies born in states that never passed the workplace
breastfeeding law. Columns 3 and 4 present summary statistics for babies born in states
that have passed the law, but during the period before the law was passed. Columns 5
and 6 present summary statistics for babies born in states that have passed the law, but
during the period after the law was passed.
1.5.2 Main results on breastfeeding
Table A5 panel A shows the OLS estimates for equation (1.1) regarding the initiation of
breastfeeding. Column 1, the base line result, is positive but statistically insignificant. In
column 2, there seems to be no anticipation effect: the estimate for the one-year-before-law
dummy, or PreLawst, is almost zero and it is statistically insignificant. In column 3, the
estimate for the workplace breastfeeding support law (which is of a similar magnitude)
remains statistically insignificant; the jury exemption law seems to increase the probability
of breastfeeding. Column 4 controls for region-by-year fixed effects and column 5 does
not weigh the observations using the replication weight; in each case the estimates remain
insignificant. In summary, the workplace breastfeeding support law does not seem to
promote the initiation of breastfeeding.
Table A5 panel B shows the Tobit estimates for equation (1.1) on the log weeks of
breastfeeding. The estimate for Column 1, 0.0434, is statistically significant at the 5% level,
which suggests that the workplace breastfeeding support increases the latent (uncensored)
duration of breastfeeding by about 4.34%. Given that the average duration of the observed
(censored) duration of breastfeeding is about 20.3 (exp(3.01)) weeks, the impact is about 6
10The information is summarized according to the website of National Conference of State Legislatures,
Andrews (2012), and Abdulloeva and Eyler (2013).
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days (0.88 weeks, or 20.3×4.34 weeks). The estimate in column 2 is smaller but it remains
statistically significant at the 10% level. The estimate for the one-year-before-law dummy is
very small and statistically insignificant, which suggests that there is no anticipation effect.
The estimate in column 3 is statistically significant, while the estimates for the other three
types of state laws are statistically insignificant, suggesting that the causal impact of the
workplace breastfeeding support law is robust after controlling for cultural shifts towards
breastfeeding. Column 4 controls for the region-by-year fixed effects and column 5 does
not weigh the observations using the replication weights; the estimates remain similar and
statistically significant. In summary, the workplace breastfeeding support law increases
the duration of breastfeeding by about 4.3%.
1.5.3 Alternative explanations for breastfeeding outcomes
As an alternative to the Tobit model, we can estimate the impact of workplace laws on
the duration of breastfeeding using hazard model specifications. This approach allows me
to determine whether access to workplace breastfeeding support impacts the likelihood of
stopping breastfeeding.
Figure A8 plots the nonparametric Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for babies born
during state-years who did and did not have access to workplace breastfeeding benefits.
The x-axis, which is the number of weeks of breastfeeding, ranges from 0 to 104 weeks (the
duration is censored at two years). The y-axis is the percentage of babies that, among all
babies are ever breastfed, still are breastfed each sequential week after birth. Figure A8
shows that babies born in states that offer the workplace breastfeeding benefits are more
likely to be breastfed each week after birth. The difference is statistically significant at the
5% level.
Table A6 shows the results of the duration of breastfeeding using the hazard model
specifications. The first column employs the exponential proportional hazard model of the
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following specification:
λt = α exp[γt + β1Workplacest + β2Motherist
+β3Workplacest ×Motherist +X ′istΓ + θs + θt + θs · t+ ist]. (1.2)
Columns 1 to 3 of Table A6 show the estimate of exp(β3), assuming that ist has
exponential, Weibull or Gompertz distributions. Column 4 shows the result using the Cox
proportional hazard model. The estimate in column 1, -0.036, is statistically significant at
the 10% level, which suggests that access to workplace breastfeeding benefits reduces the
probability of stopping breastfeeding by 3.6 percentage points. The estimates in columns 2
to 4 are of a larger magnitude and are statistically significant at the 5% level, implying that
access to workplace breastfeeding benefits consistently reduces the probability of stopping
breastfeeding by about 4 percentage points.
1.5.4 Subsample estimates for breastfeeding outcomes
Table A7 and Table A8 show, respectively, the subsample results of the effects of the work-
place breastfeeding benefits on the initiation and duration of breastfeeding. The character-
istics of interest include: levels of education (high school dropouts, high school graduates,
some college, and college plus), age (younger than 19, 19-30, and older than 30 years old),
marital status, race (White, Black, Hispanic, and other), and household income level (due
to top coding I report the estimate for each of the first 5 deciles and I group the top 5
deciles together as the top 50%).
Table A7 shows that only among single mothers and mothers aged 19-30 do we see
a statistically significant increase in the initiation of breastfeeding. This result suggests
that these two groups probably lack the knowledge and support that would allow them to
start breastfeeding the most, as the initiation of breastfeeding happens at the hospital and
within the first few hours of giving birth. For the other groups, workplace breastfeeding
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benefits have no impact on their initiation decisions.
Table A8 shows that workplace breastfeeding benefits increase the duration of breast-
feeding among mothers who are high school dropouts yet it decrease the duration among
mothers who have some college education. Among mothers aged 19-30, mothers who are
Hispanic, and mothers who belong to the top half of the household income distribution,
the duration of breastfeeding increases significantly. Workplace breastfeeding benefits may
reduce the racial inequality among nursing mothers yet increase financial inequality. In
addition, married mothers enjoy a statistically significant increase in duration, but the in-
crease among single mothers is not statistically significant; this difference between women
of different marital statuses also appears in the effects on labor market outcomes.
1.6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES
1.6.1 Econometric frameworks
To estimate the effects on labor market outcomes, I use a differences-in-differences-in-
differences, or a DDD specification of the form
yist = α+ β1Workplacest + β2Mother of infantsist
+β3Workplacest ×Mother of infantsist +X ′istΓ + θs + θt + ist. (1.3)
The variable Workplacest is a dummy variable that equals one if the state s during year t
passed a version of the workplace breastfeeding support law; otherwise it is 0. The variable
Mother of infantsist is a dummy variable that equals one if the individual is a mother of
an infant child or if her youngest child is less than one year old. I consider several ways
of defining the control group. My preferred control group is the sample of males, because
they are not eligible for the benefits.
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The outcome variable yist is one of the following variables. lfpist is a dummy variable
that equals one if individual i living in state s during year t is in the labor force; otherwise
it is 0. empist is a dummy variable that equals one if, conditional on in the labor force, the
individual is currently employed; otherwise it is 0. AtWorkist is a dummy variable that
equals one if, conditional on being employed, the individual is working during the reference
week of the survey; otherwise it is 0. log(HoursWorkist) is the log weekly working hours
if the individual worked during the reference week. PartT imeist is a dummy variable
that equals one if the individual worked less than 35 hours during the reference week,
conditional on working during the reference week; otherwise it is 0. HourlyPaidist is a
dummy variable that equals one if the individual was paid by the hour during the reference
week, conditional on working during the reference week. log(HourlyWageLastWeekist) is
the log real hourly wage if the individual was paid by the hour during the reference week,
conditional on working during the reference week.11
The parameter of interest is the parameter before the interaction term, β3. My identify-
ing assumption is that following the establishment of the workplace breastfeeding support
mandates, there should be no systematical differences in outcome variables in the treated
and the control group. Thus, β3 can be interpreted as the causal effects of workplace
breastfeeding benefits on the outcome variables. Because states passed different versions of
the mandate over a period of years, it is difficult to identify alternative explanations that
could invalidate this assumption. Nonetheless, it is meaningful to use alternative control
groups and perform placebo tests. The control group should not be affected by workplace
breastfeeding support mandates; thus, males are the best control group. I devise two al-
ternative control groups: males who have infant children and females who do not have
children.
11Note that all the variables are defined conditionally in order to give them a more accurate meaning.
The results—for example, lfpist and empist—can be multiplied to derive the unconditional result (the
employment-to-population in this case). The selection issue is resolved by the balance checks that are
reported in the next section.
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Xist is a vector of individual characteristics, which includes age, age squared, a dummy
variable that indicates non-white status, marital status, female, an interaction term be-
tween female and marital status, levels of education (high school graduates, some college,
and college graduates, with the high school dropouts as the omitted category), and dum-
mies for industry (the omitted category is the no-industry-information dummy). θs and θt
are state and year fixed-effects, respectively. ist is a random error term.
Because the marginal effects of interaction terms in non-linear models are difficult to
interpret, I use OLS models for the DDD specification. The regressions are weighted by
the personal supplemental weights of the CPS. The robust standard errors are clustered at
the state level.
So far, the outcome variables, which measure the “flow” of the labor market changes,
are all measured during the reference week of the survey. Alternatively, the CPS includes
variables that describe the individuals’ labor market outcomes during the previous year of
the survey, and they measure the “stock” of the labor market changes. Therefore, I also
estimate the following equation:
yist = α+ β1Workplaces,t−1 + β2Mother of 1-year-oldist
+β3Workplaces,t−1 ×Mother of 1-year-oldist +X
′
istΓ + θs + θt + ist. (1.4)
where the variable Mother of 1-year-oldist is a dummy variable that equals one if the indi-
vidual is a mother whose youngest child is 1 year old. The variable Workplaces,t−1 equals
1 if state s during the previous year (t − 1) had already passed the workplace breast-
feeding mandate. The outcome variables under this framework are: EmpLastY earist, a
dummy variable that equals one if the individual was employed last year (not conditional
on being in the labor force last year, based on how the variable is defined in the CPS);
FullT imeLastY earist is a dummy variable that equals one if the individual is employed
full time, conditional on being employed last year; and HourlyWageLastY earist, a log of
real hourly wage (it includes both the salary and wage earners’ hourly wages). The intu-
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ition is that for mothers of 1-year-olds, the variables that describe labor market outcomes
during the previous year of the survey measure the labor market outcomes when they were
within one year postpartum. These outcomes are likely to be affected by the workplace
breastfeeding benefits, if the state passed the mandate one year ago.
1.6.2 Summary Statistics of the CPS data
Table A9 provides the Summary statistics for the covariate variables in the CPS sample for
samples of males and females who have infant children, both before and after the enactment
of the workplace breastfeeding support law. The upper panel presents individual level
characteristics, while the lower panel presents spouse characteristics for married individuals
only (excluding cohabiting couples). For both the treatment and control groups, access
to workplace breastfeeding benefits is associated with more people who are non-white and
have college or more advanced degrees. There are no significant differences along the lines
of age, marital status and household incomes.
Table A10 presents the Summary statistics of the outcomes of the treated and the
primary control samples, both before and after the enactment of the workplace breast-
feeding support law. The upper panel presents the outcome variables collected during the
reference week of the survey; these describe the contemporaneous, or flow, outcomes of
interest. Thus, the treated sample consists of females who have infant children. The lower
panel presents the outcome variables that describe the labor market outcomes during the
previous year of the survey; these describe stock outcomes of interest. In other words, the
treated sample consists of the females whose youngest child is 1-year old. For both panels,
the control group consists of all males.
Because access to workplace breastfeeding benefits started in different states during dif-
ferent years, the effects of the workplace breastfeeding benefits on labor outcomes are hard
to interpret from simple comparisons of sample means. Therefore, we need to investigate
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this impact using the DDD frameworks.
1.6.3 Main results on labor market effects
Table A11 presents the basic estimates from equation (1.3), which includes a full set of
state and year dummies for outcome variables during the survey’s reference week, when the
mothers of infant children were the main treated group. The primary control group consists
of all males, while the alternative control group consists of males who have infant children.
Of concern is the possibility that having an infant child could affect the new fathers’ labor
market outcomes; by identifying males who have infant children as the control group, one
can control for the common shocks that affect the parents of infants. Columns 1-4 and 5-8
show the results using the primary and alternative control group, respectively. The first
column shows the estimate of equation (1.3), while the second column shows the estimate
for the sample of singles. The next two columns show the estimates of equation (1.3) for
the married sample, with (column 4) and without (column 3) the spouse characteristics
as additional controls. The spouse characteristics include the spouse’s age, race, level of
education, and labor force participation status.
Panel A shows that workplace breastfeeding benefits increased the labor force partici-
pation of females who have infant children by 1.16 percentage points, and it is statistically
significant at the 1% level. This suggests that workplace breastfeeding benefits have a
significant and positive impact on the extensive margin. The effects are significant for
both singles and whose who are married; adding spouse characteristics, the estimate is still
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The estimate is larger (1.42 percentage
points) when males who have infant children are the control group.
Panel B shows that workplace breastfeeding benefits do not affect, and perhaps de-
crease, the probability of being employed, conditional on being in the labor force. The
results are highly similar across all columns. The combined results of Panel A and B sug-
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gest that workplace breastfeeding benefits increase the employment-to-population ratio of
females who have infant children.
Panel C shows that, among the married, and conditional on having a job, workplace
breastfeeding benefits do not affect the probability that females who have infant children are
working during the reference week of the survey; the estimates are positive but insignificant.
This might imply that workplace breastfeeding benefits do not affect the length of the
maternity leave that married mothers take. This is not surprising, given that the U.S. has
no paid maternity leave policies and that mothers can only take a maximum of 12 weeks’
unpaid maternity leave. Workplace breastfeeding benefits do not cause mothers to take
shorter or longer maternity leaves. Column 6 indicates that among singles, the probability
of working during the reference decreased by about 3.2 percentage points; the estimate is
statistically significant if males who have infant children are the control group. The fact
that labor force participation increased by about 1 percentage points (column 6 panel A)
and that the employment rate (column 6 panel B) did not change indicates that fewer
singles mothers with infant children worked during the reference week.
Panel D shows that, conditional on working during the reference week, females with
infant children worked 3.38% more hours during that week. The mean hours of work for
females who have infant children but no access to the workplace breastfeeding benefits
is 28.53 (= e3.351); workplace breastfeeding benefits increase mothers’ hours of work per
week by about 1 hour (= .96 = 28.53 × 3.38%). The effect is negative and not significant
for singles, but is very positive and significant for the married sample. When spouse
characteristics are controlled for, workplace breastfeeding benefits increase the hours of
work per week for the married mothers of infant children by 5.04%. When males with
infant children are the control group, the increase is about twice as great—6.49% more
hours.
Panel E shows that, conditional on working during the reference week, females who
have infant children are less likely to work part-time if they have access to workplace
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breastfeeding benefits. The probability that the mothers of infant children would work less
than 35 hours per week decreased about 3.13 percentage points. Before passage of the law,
the mean probability that these women would have a part time job was 43% (column 2
of Table A10); after passage of the law, the probability of their being employed part-time
decreased by about 7.3% (= 3.13/43.0 × 100%). The results are driven by the married
sample, and in the estimates in which males who have infant children are the control group
the results are very robust. Single mothers are more likely to work part-time, although
when males with infant children are the control group the results are not significant.
Panel F shows that workplace breastfeeding benefits do not increase or decrease the
probability that the females who have infant children were paid hourly wages if they worked
during the reference week. Although all estimates are negative, only the one in column
5 is statistically significant (at the 10% level), and its magnitude is small (1.1 percentage
points decrease).
Panel G shows that workplace breastfeeding benefits do not significantly affect the
hourly wage of females who have infant children, if they were paid hourly during the
reference week. All estimates are positive, but none are statistically significant at the 10%
level; the large standard errors are the results of the small sample sizes of the number of
individuals who earn hourly wages.
These results from Table A11 show the effects on the flow variables when females
with infant children are the treated group. Derived from estimating equation (1.4), Table
A12 shows the results on the stock variables when the treatment group is females whose
youngest child is 1-year old. In Table A12, columns 5-8 are estimated with the alternative
control group—that is, males whose youngest child is one year old.
Panel A of Table A12 shows that workplace breastfeeding benefits decreased the proba-
bility that females with 1-year olds were employed during their first postpartum year. The
effects are driven by the married sample: the probability decreased by about 2 percent-
age points (column 4) and it is statistically significant at the 1% level; when males whose
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youngest child is 1 year old are the control group the results are similar.
How can this result be reconciled with those in the Panel A and B of Table A11? The
intuition is that workplace breastfeeding benefits are not only associated with an increase
in the probability that nursing workers are employed at a typical point during the first
postpartum year; they also are associated with a lower probability that nursing workers
are employed during the first postpartum year.12 Workplace breastfeeding benefits allow
nursing mothers to increase their employment.
Panel B of Table A12 shows that workplace breastfeeding benefits increased the prob-
ability of being employed full-time (working longer than or equal to 35 hours, conditional
on being employed) by about 3.9 percentage points, which is statistically significant at the
1% level. Among mothers whose youngest child is one year old, and in the absence of the
breastfeeding law, the mean of the probability of being employed full-time is 0.643. When
workplace breastfeeding benefits are introduced the probability of having a full-time job
increased by 6.1% (= 3.9/64.3× 100%). The estimates are similar when the control group
consists of males whose youngest child is one year old.
Panel C shows a striking result: workplace breastfeeding benefits increased the hourly
wage that married mothers received during their first year postpartum by about 4.6%
(column 4, statistically significant at 1% level), but they decreased the hourly wage that
single mothers received during first year postpartum by about 3.8% (column 2, statistically
significant at 10% level). The results are more significant when the control group consists
of males whose youngest child is one year old. Combining results in panels B and C, we see
that the increase in the hourly wages can be explained by the increase in the probability of
working full-time. For married mothers, the magnitudes of the increase in the probability
of working full time and the magnitude of the increase in wages are comparable (4.3% and
12Mathematically, the former is the derivative of the latter with respect to time. Their relationship can
be described as dE(t)
dt
= lfp × emp(t), where E(t) is the amount of employment (unconditional on labor
force participation) during the first postpartum year and lfp× emp(t) is the unconditional probability that
the individual is looking for a job at time t. The estimated results suggest that workplace breastfeeding
benefits are associated with higher lfp× emp(t) but lower E(t).
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4.6% respectively, column 4), although in the case of single mothers other factors might
explain the greater drop in wages (0 and -3.8% respectively, column 2). In the case of
married mothers, the change in the probability of working full-time or part-time explains
the change in hourly wages that occurs when workplace breastfeeding benefits are in place.
The fact that the effects of workplace breastfeeding benefits differ according to mar-
ital status warrants further consideration. Marital status does not affect the impact of
breastfeeding benefits on the extensive margins (panels A, B, C, F and G in Table A11 and
panels A in Table A12), but affects the impacts on the intensive margins (panels D and E
in Table A11 and panels B and C in Table A12). Workplace breastfeeding benefits appear
to have the greatest impact on the number of hours worked per day and, thus, on wages.
The latter, of course, affect overall labor market outcomes. Within the group that consists
of the mothers of infants, workplace breastfeeding benefits might also increase inequality
according to marital status.
Marital status can serve as a proxy for high- and low-type workers. The empirical
results show that the effects of the workplace breastfeeding benefits differ according to
marital status: after passage of the workplace breastfeeding benefits law, wages increased
for married mothers and decreased for single mothers. These findings are consistent with
those of Pal and Waldfogel (2016). Pal and Waldfogel (2016) found that the most striking
effect of the law is a change in the family gap in pay, which is defined as the differential
in hourly wages between women who have children and women who do not have children.
Between 1967 and 2013, the family gap declined for married mothers and was replaced a
positive wage differential. Among unmarried mothers, the wage gap persisted.
Appendix Table A21 shows the estimates of equations (1.3) and (1.4) in the case of a
third control group: females without children. The concern is that females without children
may control for the common labor market shocks that affect females in general: because
they have no children, they are not directly affected by the workplace breastfeeding law.
The results are qualitatively similar to those just described, although most of the time the
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estimates are of a smaller magnitude than those shown in Table A11 and Table A12. This
is so because females without children are potentially affected if they and their employers
anticipate that they would have children in the future, which would attenuate the treatment
effects.
In summary, during the first postpartum year, workplace breastfeeding benefits in-
creased the extensive margins (an increase in labor market participation and no change
in conditional employment) of both married and single mothers, and they increased the
intensive margin (hours of work) of married mothers but not the intensive margin of single
mothers (hours of work). However, in the case of stock outcomes during the first year
postpartum, workplace breastfeeding benefits: decreased the extensive margin (uncondi-
tional employment) of both married and single mothers; increased the intensive margin
(full time) and hourly wage of married mothers; did not affect the intensive margin (full
time) of single mothers; and decreased the hourly wage of single mothers. Therefore, in the
case of married mothers, workplace breastfeeding benefits increase their hours of work, and,
consequently, increased their wages; in the case of single mothers, workplace breastfeeding
benefits do not increase their hours of work, and, consequently, decreased their wages.
1.6.4 Robustness checks
Table A13 checks the robustness of the main results for the four outcome variables that
are statistically significant and for the married sample. Column 1 is the baseline—that
is, the results of column 4 in Table A11. To determine whether the results are driven by
certain observations that have extreme values, Column 2 estimates without using weights.
To control for the labor market shocks that affect each state each year, Column 3 adds two
additional state level covariates that vary by year: the unemployment rate and the growth
rate of the GDP. To further control for unobserved factors that affect each state linearly in
time, Column 4 adds the state-specific time trends θs · t. To control for unobserved shocks
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that are common for each region each year, Column 5 includes the region-by-year fixed
effects, where regions are defined as the Census divisions.
Also of concern is the possibility that other labor policies, such as paid family leave,
might be driving the results. California was the first state in the nation to start a paid
family leave program (in 2004). The program includes six weeks of partially paid leave to
the parents of a newborn or a recently-placed foster or adoptive child. The leave has a
wage replacement of 55% up to a ceiling that is based on the state’s average weekly wage.
Mothers of infant children can use this paid family leave immediately after their maternity
leave, which gives them more time for breastfeeding, and many mothers remain on the
job to take advantage of the benefit. To determine whether the main effects are driven
by the paid family leave law, Column 6 drops the observations obtained in California.
As expected, all estimates remain statistically significant, although they have somewhat
smaller magnitudes, which is reassuring.
Another concern is that the effects might reflect a change in bargaining power within
couples; for example, a female might experience an increase in bargaining power relative to
that of her spouse. This might lead to the spouse becoming more involved in childcare and
other domestic responsibilities, which could give the mother of the infant children more
incentive to work. Consequently, in the subsample of married couples in which both the
husband and the wife report an hourly wage, I calculate the wage gap (the ratio of the
wife’s wage to the husband’s wage) and include it as an additional covariate. Column 7
reports the estimates. The effect of the probability of being paid an hourly wage becomes
negative and is statistically significant; the real hourly wage during the previous year
becomes statistically insignificant. It would seem that bargaining power within couples
affects part of the effects on wages.
Yet another concern is the possibility that the cultural shift during the past two decades
in culture in favor of breastfeeding might explain the results. Column 8, which shows the
robustness check, adds dummy variables that indicate three other state-level mandates re-
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lated to breastfeeding (AnyP lacest, Juryst and Indecencyst) and their interaction terms
with the Motherist in equation (1.3). In the case of labor force participation (panel A), the
estimate for workplace benefits is positive but not significant; the effects are picked up by
the other three laws, which suggests that at least part of the effect of workplace breastfeed-
ing benefits coincides with effects from these three other mandates. Adding the combined
effects of all four benefits, the labor force participation still increases statistically, which
suggests that the breastfeeding mandates together have increased the extensive margin of
the flow outcomes. In the case of the hours of work (panel D), the estimate for workplace
breastfeeding benefits remains positive and is statistically significant, which suggests that
the effects on the intensive margin are robust to the inclusion of the other three mandates.
In the case of employment last year (panel H), the estimate for workplace breastfeeding
benefits remains negative and is statistically significant, which suggests that the effects on
the extensive margin of the stock variable are robust to the inclusion of the other three
mandates. In the case of full-time employment last year, the estimate of workplace breast-
feeding benefits is no longer significant; it seems that its effect is picked up by the “Any
place” mandate, although all four breastfeeding mandates increased the intensive margin
of the stock variable. Similarly, the effects on the log hourly wage last year are picked up
by the “Any place” mandate, and the four breastfeeding mandates significantly increased
last year’s hourly wage. In summary, in the case of certain outcome variables, the effects
of workplace breastfeeding coincide with the effects of the three other state-level breast-
feeding mandates. Yet because of the correlation of the passage of the four mandates, the
direction and magnitude of the effects on the outcome variables are robust.
1.6.5 Threats to identification of effects on labor market outcomes
1.6.5.1 Existence of pre-trends: alternative specifications using event-study
frameworks Because the main specification of a DDD framework might not capture the
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dynamic impact of the benefits—for example, anticipation effects might precede the imple-
mentation of the law, or it might take years for the labor market impact to he expressed—I
use in this section another framework, the event-study framework, with leads and lags of
the law dummies, to investigate the dynamic impact of workplace breastfeeding benefits.
Also, using the event-study frameworks, I present visual evidence of the effects of work-
place breastfeeding benefits. In this section the sample includes only married individuals
because the married sample drives the main results.
The event-study specification is of the form
yist = α+Motherist +
−1∑
τ=−5
Workplaceτ,st +
8∑
τ=1
Workplaceτ,st
+
−1∑
τ=−5
δτWorkplaceτ,st ×Motherist +
8∑
τ=1
ητWorkplaceτ,st ×Motherist
+X
′
istΓ + θs + θt + ist, (1.5)
where the variable Workplaceτ,st equals 1 if during year t, state s occurs τ years after the
enactment of the breastfeeding law and if τ ranges from −5 to 8. The year of the enactment
(τ = 0) is the omitted category and the effect is zero. x = −5 denotes the years 5 or more
than 5 years before the enactment of the workplace breastfeeding law. x = 8 denotes the
years 8 or more than 8 years after the enactment of the law. For example, Workplace−3,st
means that state s during year t is three years prior to the enactment of the breastfeeding
law. The definition of Motherist remains the same; it equals 1 if the individual is a female
who has an infant child and it equals 0 if the individual is male.
Figure A9 plots the event-study estimates of the yearly effects of the workplace breast-
feeding support law on the extensive margin of the flow outcomes. The x-axis denotes the
number of years since the passage of state-level workplace breastfeeding mandates. The
y-axis plots the estimates of the δ’s and η’s in equation (1.5) for labor force participation.
Before the enactment of the breastfeeding law, although the estimate of δ−5 is both nega-
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tive and statistically significant, the effects of the law are close to zero. From the fact that
the curve is relatively flat I conclude that there is no existence of a pre-trend. During the
first year after the law’s enactment, the effect became much larger, and four years later it
became statistically significant. Five years after passage of the law, the effect is negative,
although it is estimated with a much larger standard error. The effects for η7 and η8 are
positive and statistically significant at the 95% level. After enactment of the law, there is
an increasing trend in its annual impacts.
Similarly, Figure A10 plots the event-study estimates of the yearly effects of the work-
place breastfeeding support law on the intensive margin of the flow outcomes. In the case
of log hours work and the log hourly wage if paid hourly, the marginal effects before the law
are small and close to zero, but after the law the effects show a clear pattern of growth. In
the case of the probability of working part-time, the marginal effects prior to the passage
of the law are positive, but after the law all of the effects are negative.
Finally, Figure A11 plots the event-study estimates of the yearly effects of the workplace
breastfeeding support law on stock outcomes. The most striking results are the estimates of
the effects on the probability of being employed last year: after the mandates a significant
reduction occurs.
1.6.5.2 Selection on pregnancy and other observables In an alternative expla-
nation, the estimated results could be driven by a compositional change in the sample
of females who have infant children. We wish to know whether females who have infant
children and who live in state-years with and without workplace breastfeeding benefits
are characterized by a statistically significantly difference in their observed individual level
characteristics. To this end, we estimate the following equation:
xist = α+ βWorkplacest + θs + θt + ist. (1.6)
The dependent variable is one of the following individual-level characteristics: age, non-
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white, education (high school dropouts, high school graduates, some college, and college
graduates), married status, the log of real household income, spouse’s age, the spouse’s
education levels, whether spouse is in the labor force, whether the spouse is non-white,
and whether the infant is a first child. The explanatory variable is the WorkplaceLawst
dummy. Year- and state-fixed effects are included in order to control for the common
shocks for each year and for each state.
To determine whether the results of the flow variables are driven by selection, Table A14
shows the balance check of the observed characteristics of females who have infant children.
To determine whether there is a selection for living in a state that has the law, Panel A
checks the balance among all females who have infant children. To determine whether
among those participating in the labor force there is a selection for living in a state that
has the law, Panel B includes females who have infant children and are in the labor force.
To determine whether among women who resume working post-birth there is a selection
for living in states that have the law, Panel C looks at females who have infant children
and whose hours of working per day during the reference week are known. To determine
whether among those who earned hourly wages during the reference week there is a selection
for living in a state that has the law, Panel D looks at females with infant children whose
hourly paid wages are known.
Across panels, the estimates for the variable “high school dropouts” are both negative
and statistically significant, which suggests that fewer mothers who have the least education
participate in the labor market when the breastfeeding law is in effect. Similarly, in all
panels except for the last one, mothers who live in states that have breastfeeding mandates
are associated with a higher level of household income, which is not surprising: mothers
from wealthier households are more likely to work, but they are less likely to receive hourly
paid wages.13
13In the main results, the covariates do not include household income. The results are largely the same
when income is included as an additional covariate. Appendix D shows the results.
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Other types of sorting also affect the extensive margin and the intensive margin. In
panel A, mothers who live in states that have breastfeeding laws are associated with a
higher probability of having received a high school degree. This is plausible given that
workplace breastfeeding benefits increase labor force participation rates. In panel D, how-
ever, mothers who live in states that have breastfeeding laws and receive an hourly paid
wage are associated, first, with a higher probability of being non-white and, second, of be-
ing married to a non-white spouse. Given that the negative selection bias affects the hourly
wages downward, the true effects of workplace breastfeeding benefits on hourly wages (paid
by the hour) should be more positive and larger. Across the panels, there seems to be no
selection with regards to age, the child’s status as a first child, the spouse’s age, or the
spouse’s labor force participation status.
In summary, females who have infant children and in live in states that offer the breast-
feeding benefit are less likely to be high school dropouts and are more likely to be new
mothers. Those who have a higher than average attachment to the labor force tend to
come from households that have higher real incomes.
To see if the results on the stock variables are driven by selection, Table A15 shows the
balance check of the observed characteristics for females whose youngest child is one year
old. The main dimensions of sorting remain the same, though there appears to be more
selection among this sample of females whose youngest child is one year old than among
the sample of mothers of infants. That the selections are same across the samples defined
conditionally for all outcome variables, suggest that the interpretation about the effects on
the conditional variables should be similar to the interpretation about the effects on the
unconditional variables.
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1.7 CHANNELS
1.7.1 Detailed requirements of state mandates
To investigate the potential channels of the impact of workplace breastfeeding benefits
on labor market outcomes, I exploit in this section inter-state variation in the degree
of specificity of the benefit regulations. Table A16 shows the results using alternative
definitions of the workplace breastfeeding law (Workplacest), as specified in equation (1.3).
In Table A16, each panel examines a different dimension of the mandate. In all regressions,
Workplacest equals 1 if state s during year t passed a “stronger” version of the workplace
breastfeeding mandate; if these states have not yet passed the law, and in states that have
never passed a version of the mandate, Workplacest equals 0.
Most states require that the benefits should be provided for one year. However, five
states (Colorado, Maine, New York, Oregon, and Vermont) require a longer period (from
18 months to 36 months). In all panels Column 1 compares labor market outcomes in
these states and in states that have never passed the law; the objective is to see how
these estimates differ from the estimates provided in my main results. A striking result,
shown in Panel B, is the estimate of the probability of being employed conditional on the
labor force. Here the estimate is positive and statistically significant at 1 percent level,
which suggests that when mothers are entitled to breastfeeding breaks at the workplace
for more than one year, the impact on the probability of being employed conditional on
the labor force increases by about 1.43 percentage points. This insignificant impact on
the main results could indicate that the duration of the benefits is too short. In Panel E,
the estimate of the increase in the log hours of work (increased by about 9.8%) is almost
double that of the main effect (5.04%). In Panel G, the hourly wage (if paid hourly)
increased by about 2%; in the main results the increase was insignificant. In Panel H, the
employment (stock) does not decrease; this finding contrasts with the main results, which
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show that employment last year did not decrease significantly. Finally, in Panel J, the
hourly wage last year increased by about 8.12%; in the main results the increase is only
4.6%. In summary, giving women the workplace breastfeeding benefit for more than one
year significantly improved the labor market outcomes of nursing mothers, particularly in
the case of employment outcomes, during both the reference week and the first postpartum
year.
In most states women are only allowed to pump breast milk and only during break time,
but four states (Connecticut, Oklahoma, Oregon and Rhode Island) allow both pumping
and breastfeeding. As shown in Column 2, the effects are not statistically significant except
in the case of labor force participation (a smaller magnitude than the main results) and
the log hourly wage last year (a much larger magnitude than the main results). This result
would seem to indicate that allowing both breastfeeding and pumping has little effect on
outcomes because most nursing workers use breaks for pumping.
Some states clearly state that employees who request breastfeeding breaks at the work-
place should not suffer discrimination. The states are Connecticut, D.C., Hawaii, Maine,
Mississippi, Montana, New York, Vermont and Washington. The results are shown in
Column 3. In contrast to the main results, Panel B shows that when discrimination is
prohibited, and conditional on in the labor force, the probability that females with infant
children will be employed increases by about 1.05 percentage points. Panel H shows that
employment last year decreased by about 1.06 percentage points, which is about half of
the decrease seen in the main results. In other words, prohibiting discrimination against
nursing employees at the workplace increases employment both during the reference week
and during the first postpartum year. Moreover, the hourly wage last year also increased
by a modestly larger percentage than the base line results.
Some states provide retaliation protection for whistle-blowers who report discrimination
and violation of the law (Maine, Minnesota, New York, Tennessee and Vermont). Column
4 compares labor market outcomes in these states to states that have never passed the
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law. Most striking are the results for (1) the probability of working during the reference
week, conditional on having a job (panel C), and (2) the probability of receiving an hourly
paid wage (panel F). The results suggest that when workplace breastfeeding rights are
protected by law, women who have infant children (1) will be about 1.57 percentage points
less likely to work during the reference week (i.e., perhaps more likely to take a longer
maternity leave) and (2) will be about 3 percentage points more likely to receive hourly
paid wages. This probably is the product of two processes. First, employers who are likely
to discriminate against nursing employees or who violate the law tend to provide shorter
maternity leaves. Second, prohibiting discrimination has the unintended consequence of
forcing more nursing workers to find hourly jobs.
Finally, some states that do not require the provision encourage employers to provide
the benefits or allow the employer to include “baby-friendly” or “infant-friendly” designa-
tions in their promotional materials. Such states include North Dakota, Texas, Virginia,
Washington and Wyoming. The results are shown in Column 5. Compared to my main
results, the breastfeeding benefit in these states is associated with a significant reduction
of the probability of being employed (panel B), a significant reduction in the probability
of receiving hourly paid wages (panel D), a substantial increase in the hourly paid wage
(panel G), and a somewhat smaller increase in the hourly wage last year (panel J). This
result is consistent with another finding: that where providing breastfeeding benefits are
voluntarily, employers are more likely to hire fewer workers. This, in turn, suggests that if
employers can legally avoid paying the additional costs, they will respond in the extensive
margin. Yet in keeping with our model, and conditional on hiring these workers, employers
still pay a significantly higher wage. This, too, constitutes clear evidence of the differential
responses to workplace breastfeeding benefits, whether on the extensive or the intensive
margins.
In summary, requiring that workplace breastfeeding benefits be provided for more than
one year and prohibiting discrimination against employees who request breaks significantly
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improves the employment of nursing mothers, both during the reference week and during
the first postpartum year. Allowing both breastfeeding and pumping does not seem to have
much of an effect on female labor force participation. However, in terms of their effects,
the difference between requiring retaliation protection and simply encouraging voluntary
workplace breastfeeding benefits is very significant: employers may wish to hire fewer
nursing workers, but conditional on hiring, those females who do work tend to work longer
hours and receive higher wages.
1.7.2 Temporal flexibility of occupations
In this section, I look at the features of the workplace environment in order to explore
the possible channels of the impact. Consider the costs of providing the benefits across
different occupations. Whether a woman can take any breastfeeding break or two to three
breaks of 20 to 30 minutes each depends on the temporal flexibility of her job. As Goldin
(2014) argues, how flexible an occupation is with respect to the number of hours worked, the
precise times worked, and the predictability and ability to schedule one?s own hours affects
whether it is relatively easy for the worker to be excused from work without interrupting
the work flow or disturbing the coworkers. To proxy how costly it is for the employer
to provide the workplace breastfeeding benefits, I use five characteristics of occupations
categorized in version 20.3 (released April 2016) of the Occupation Information Network
(O*NET) database.
The O*Net dictionary includes hundreds of occupational characteristics. I adopt the
five characteristics in the categories of “work context” and “work activities”, following
Goldin (2014): time pressure, contact with others, establishing and maintaining interper-
sonal relationships, structured versus unstructured work, and freedom to make decisions.14
14The following definitions describe the five characteristics: (1) Time pressure: How often does this job
require the worker to meet strict deadlines? (2) Contact with others: How much does this job require
the worker to be in contact with others—i.e., face-to-face, by telephone, or otherwise—in order to perform
it? (3) Establishing and Establishing and maintaining interpersonal relationships: Developing constructive
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The variable LessF lexibilityi is defined as the average of the five characteristics for each
occupation. I merge the occupational characteristics for individuals whose occupational is
known in the CPS sample. Table A17 shows the Summary statistics of the occupational
characteristics.15 Table A17 shows that in the case of women who have an infant child,
the workplace under breastfeeding benefits seems to be associated with more flexibility (a
mean of .137 versus .0725); the same holds in the case of women whose youngest child is
one year old. However, in the case of males, the workplace under breastfeeding benefits
seems to be associated with less flexibility (a mean of -.035 versus -.050).
To determine whether the impact of the workplace breastfeeding benefits moves through
the channel of the temporal flexibility of occupations, I estimate the following equation
yist = α+ β1Workplacest + β2Motherist + β3LessF lexibilityi
+β4Workplacest ×Motherist + β5Workplacest × LessF lexibilityi
+β6Motherist × LessF lexibilityi
+β7Workplacest ×Motherist × LessF lexibilityi
+X
′
istΓ + θs + θt + ist, (1.7)
where parameter β4 captures the main effects of the workplace breastfeeding benefits.
The parameter of interest is β7, and it can be interpreted as whether within each
industry difference in the temporal flexibility of occupations affects the impact of the
workplace breastfeeding benefits on the female workers’ labor market outcomes. Because
the occupations are primarily determined by an individual’s human capital, workers are not
and cooperative working relationships with others, and maintaining them over time. (4) Structured versus
unstructured work: To what extent is this job structured for the worker; i.e., does it allow the worker to
determine tasks, priorities, and goals? (5) Freedom to make decisions: How much decision making freedom,
without supervision, does the job offer.
15The occupation variable in the CPS is “occ2010.” I use the crosswalk between “occ2010” and “2010SOC”
to link the occupation to its characteristics in O*NET. Because O*NET occupations are cross-referenced by
industry, I weigh the detailed occupation characteristics by the number of observations in each occupation.
This allows me to match the characteristics to the CPS occupations. Then, following the approach outlined
by Goldin (2014), I normalize the characteristics to arrive at a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1.
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likely within one year of giving birth to sort across occupations on the basis of unobserved
factors that also affect their labor market outcomes. Controlling for industry-fixed effects
(included in the vector Xist), the variable LessF lexibilityi is plausibly orthogonal to the
error term ist. If β7 is statistically significant, the workplace breastfeeding support will
affect workers’ labor market outcomes through the temporal flexibility of their occupations.
Table A18 shows the estimates for β4 (the main impact of workplace breastfeeding
benefits) and β7 for different labor market outcomes. The regressions are estimated for
the sample of the married with the covariates of the spousal characteristics. Column 1
shows the estimates of equation (1.7) for different outcomes. To better understand which
dimension of the flexibility drives the results, I replace the LessF lexibilityi in equation
(1.7) with each of the five characteristics. The estimates of β4 and β7 are shown in columns
2-6.
In Panel A, the estimates of the parameter precedes Workplacest × Motherist are
positive in all columns, which is reassuring. The estimate for β7 in Column 1 is negative
and is statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that a one-standard deviation
in the dimension of “less time flexibility” decreases the impact of workplace breastfeeding
benefits on labor force participation by about 1.11 percentage points; this is about half the
reduction of the main effects (2.13, estimate for β4 in row 1). The estimates in columns
2-6 show that the effects seem to come from the “time pressure,” “contact with others,”
and “structured workplace.”
Similarly, in Panel D, the estimates for β4 are positive in all columns, which is reas-
suring. The estimate for β7 in Column 1 is positive and statistically significant at the 5%
level. This finding suggests that a one-standard deviation in the dimension of “less time
flexibility” increased the impact of workplace breastfeeding benefits on the log hours of
work by an additional 3.1%, which is about two thirds of the increase that comes from the
main effects (4.26%, estimate for β4 in row 1). This result confirms Proposition 2’s predic-
tion that if the employer faces a higher cost of providing the benefits (less time flexibility),
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the effects of the benefits on the hours of work will be larger still (a 3.1% larger increase
on the hours of work). The estimates in columns 2-6 show that the effects seem to come
from the dimension of “establishing relationships.”
In Panel H, the estimates for β4 once again are positive in all columns; although the
estimate for β7 in Column 1 is not statistically significant, the estimate for β7 in column 6
is positive and it is statistically significant at the 5% level. This result suggests that a one-
standard deviation in the dimension of “freedom of making decisions” increased the impact
of workplace breastfeeding benefits on the log hourly wage last year by an additional 2.24%,
which is about a half of the increase that comes from the main effects (4.38%, estimate for
β4 in row 1). This result shows that although the theory makes no prediction about the
comparative statics for the hourly wage with respect to the cost of providing the benefit,
the effects of the benefits on the hourly wage will be larger still if the higher cost is due to
the freedom to make decisions.
In summary, in the case of occupations that have less flexibility, the increase in labor
force participation is smaller, the increase in hours of work is larger, and the increase in the
probability of working full-time is larger, than the changes when the occupations have more
flexibility. That these findings are consistent with those of Goldin (2014) demonstrates that
firms reward individuals who are willing to work long hours and particular hours. Jobs that
entail less temporal flexibility often require higher human capital and are winner-take-all
positions; they also are positions for which considerable work hours lead to a higher chance
of promotion and a larger reward.
1.7.3 Alternative channels
Other characteristics at the workplace might have affected the impacts of workplace breast-
feeding benefits. Among these is the concern that firm size (the number of employees in
the firm) might affect the cost of providing benefits. Still another is the concern that firm
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location—for example, whether the firm locates in a central city—could affect costs. Fur-
thermore, an employer’s willingness to provide workplace breastfeeding benefits might be
affected by whether the workplace has a high turnover (whether the worker has more than
one employer during the last year). To rule out these alternative explanations I examine
whether their interaction term with Workplacest ×Motherist is significant. To this end,
I replace LessF lexibilityi with individual-level variables that capture other dimensions of
the workplace environment. The dummy variable LargeF irmi equals 1 if the individual’s
firm has more than 99 employees; the dummy variable CentralCityi equals 1 if the indi-
vidual lives in a central city (conditional on whether the metropolitan status information
is known); and the dummy variable ChangeEmployeri equals 1 if during the last year
the individual has had more than 1 employer (conditional on her having had at least one
employer).
Yet another concern is that the results might be driven by unobserved shocks on child
care costs, which would affect the opportunity costs of using breastfeeding breaks at the
workplace. I estimate whether the effects differ in accordance with childcare costs, which
are proxied by the number of individuals in the CPS sample who work in childcare occupa-
tions (variable “occ1990” equals 468) and the number of workers who work in the childcare
industries (variable “ind1990” equals 862 or 863), by state-year level.
Table A19 shows the estimates for the married sample with spouse covariates. For a few
outcomes, the interaction term β7 could be significant, but the estimates, such as random
estimates for β4, are not robust. It is plausible to conclude that these dimensions do not
capture the main effects of the workplace breastfeeding benefits.
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1.8 ADDITIONAL EFFECTS OF THE BENEFITS
1.8.1 Lagged effects
Several years after the law’s initial enactment, does the law still affect females who have
infant children? That is, are the effects simply a one-time shock or do they permanently
change the interaction between nursing workers and firms? I use the following specification
to estimate the lagged impact of the workplace breastfeeding benefits:
yist = α+ β1Workplaces,t−k + β2Mother of infant childist
+β3Workplaces,t−k ×Mother of infant childist +X ′istΓ + θs + θt + ist, (1.8)
where the dummy variable Workplaces,t−k equals 1 if state s during year (t − k) passed
the workplace breastfeeding mandate (otherwise it is 0) and where k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 7}. The
dummy variable Mother of infant childist equals 1 if the youngest child of individual i is
0 years old, and it equals 0 if the individual is male.16 The parameter of interest is β3,
which can be interpreted as the lagged effects of the workplace breastfeeding benefits k
years after the state has enacted the mandate.
1.8.2 Spill-over effects
The spill-over effects can be estimated using the following specification:
yist = α+ β1Workplacest + β2Mother of k years oldist
+β3Workplacest ×Mother of k years oldist +X
′
istΓ + θs + θt + ist. (1.9)
16To conserve space in the equation of the lagged, spill-over and dynamic effects, I only present the
specification for the flow outcome variables; the specification for the stock variables is adjusted accordingly,
and it is omitted here.
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where the parameter of interest is β3; it can be interpreted as the spill-over effects of
workplace breastfeeding benefits for females whose youngest child is k years old.
Through several channels we may observe the spill-over effects in the case of women
whose youngest child is older than 0 year old. First, the worker may anticipate that in
the future she will enjoy the benefits if she has another child, and this may lead her to
be less likely to give up work. Second, the employer, too, can anticipate the change and
treat females who have older children in the same manner that they treat females who are
breastfeeding. Finally, because of the general equilibrium effects, other workers, too, will
experience some effects, although the specific directions and magnitudes of these effects
have yet to be established through empirical research.
1.8.3 Dynamic effects
Equation (1.3) identifies the contemporaneous effects of workplace breastfeeding benefits
on females who have infant children—that is, the effects on females during their first
postpartum year. One might be curious about whether the effects persist—for example,
does having access to workplace breastfeeding benefits during the first postpartum year
continue to affect the labor market outcomes of females two or three years after giving
birth?
I use the following specification to estimate the dynamic impact of workplace breast-
feeding benefits:
yist = α+ β1Workplaces,t−k + β2Mother of k years oldist
+β3Workplaces,t−k ×Mother of k years oldist +X
′
istΓ + θs + θt + ist, (1.10)
where the dummy variable Workplaces,t−k equals 1 if state s during year (t−k) has passed
the workplace breastfeeding mandate; otherwise it is 0. k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. The dummy
variable Mother of k years oldist equals 1 if the youngest child of individual i is k years
50
old and it equals 0 if the individual is male. The parameter of interest is β3, which can
be interpreted as the effects of workplace breastfeeding benefits k years after the state
enacted the mandate. The hypothesis is that having access to workplace breastfeeding
support during the first postpartum year (k years ago, when the female was still nursing
her child) impacts a mother’s labor market outcomes during later years (when her child is
k years old). Note that when k = 0, equation (1.10) is the same as the equation (1.3); the
latter describes the contemporaneous effects of the benefits.
Why might we observe dynamic effects several years after the law has been imple-
mented? Several explanations come to mind. First, several years after implementation of
the law the productivity of workers could be higher because firm-specific human capital
has been acquired. Second, due to the sticky wage effect, firms might adjust wages later.
Finally, some psychological and health benefits might emerge only over the long term. It
is reasonable to expect dynamic effects because of path-dependence.
1.8.4 Comparing the spill-over, dynamic and lagged effects
Figure A12 to Figure A21 show the relative magnitudes of the spill-over, dynamic, and
lagged effects on all outcome variables of interest. With regards to spill-over effects, the y
axis denotes the estimates for β3 in equation (1.9) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}; for the long-term
effects, the y axis denotes the estimates for β3 in equation (1.10) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}.
The x-axis denotes the k in the variable Workplaces,t−k and Mother of k years oldist, k ∈
{0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. For the lagged effects, the y axis denotes the estimates for β3 in equation
(1.8) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. The x-axis denotes the k in the variable Workplaces,t−k,
k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. For example, Figure A12 shows that a positive and stable effect of
the lagged effects lasts for years. The spill-over and the dynamic effects track each other:
both are significantly smaller than the lagged effects but both decrease in k. Similarly,
A19 shows that a negative and stable effect of the lagged effects persists across the years.
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The spill-over and the dynamic effects track each other: both are significantly less negative
than the lagged effects, and the magnitudes of both decrease in k.
In summary, the dynamic effects of the law account for at least some of the spill-over
effects. In the case of the extensive margin (labor force participation and employment last
year) we can clearly separate the main effects of the mandates from the spill-over effects:
certain shocks that are specific to the mothers of infants (rather than females with older
children) remain statistically significant for up to eight years after the law’s enactment.
1.9 CONCLUSION
This paper looks at how workers’ employment and wages in the U.S. have been affected
by workplace breastfeeding benefits that have been mandated by law. From 1995 to 2009,
about half of all states passed mandates that require employers to provide unpaid break
time and a special private space so that nursing employees can express milk at the work-
place. Mothers enjoy this benefit for a period of one to three years after giving birth.
I argue that workplace breastfeeding benefits increase the cost to firms of hiring and
reduce the cost to young mothers of breastfeeding. A simple extension of the standard
framework indicates that if firms are willing to increase the labor demand for mothers who
are most productive, mandated benefits can increase the demand for and the supply of the
mothers of infants, which, in turn, increases the wages of and, in all likelihood, the work
attachment of these women.
Consistent with these expectations, the empirical results suggest that workplace breast-
feeding benefits increase the duration of breastfeeding, although the impact on the initi-
ation of breastfeeding is insignificant. The labor force participation of mothers of infants
increases. Married mothers work longer hours and receive a higher wage, although single
mothers do not work longer and receive a lower wage. The results are robust to alternative
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specifications, including the event-study framework for the labor market outcomes and
hazard models for the duration of breastfeeding. Analyzing the detailed requirements of
the state mandates, I show that the effects work through the differential interactions of the
extensive and intensive margins, and I find evidence of discrimination. I present evidence
that the effects work through occupational differences in temporal flexibility.
The empirical results suggest that workplace attitudes about breastfeeding causally
affect the duration of breastfeeding and the extensive and the intensive margins of labor
market outcomes. My finding that workplace breastfeeding benefits increase the hourly
wages of females who have infant children runs counter to the general theory that states
that mandated benefits depress wages (Summers, 1989; Gruber, 1994).
My findings do not address the efficiency and welfare consequences of workplace breast-
feeding benefits. My model is a partial-equilibrium model: the workers consist only of the
mothers of infants. Although the model provides no prediction about the general equi-
librium effects, the empirical results show that spill-over effects are limited: workplace
breastfeeding benefits also affect the labor market outcomes of females who have older
children, perhaps because of the existence of the dynamic effects, including anticipation
effects. Nonetheless, analysis of workplace breastfeeding support reveals that the impact
of labor market outcomes on the mothers of infants persists for up to eight years after
enactment of the law.
That fact that providing workplace breastfeeding support can be mutually beneficial to
both the employee and the employer suggests that public policies are needed to educate and
incentivize employers to be more willing to provide that support. Because it allows more
nursing employees to work more and receive a higher wage, workplace breastfeeding benefits
would seem to constitute a step towards the promotion of gender equality in the corporate
world. Women might be able to “have it all” (more breastfeeding and more working)
if employers provided a more supportive environment at the workplace. The empirical
evidence suggests that providing these benefits for more than one year and prohibiting
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discrimination and retaliation improves the labor market outcomes of nursing workers.
My findings predict that in states that have not yet passed comparable mandates the
Affordable Care Act would improve the breastfeeding and labor market outcomes of women
who have infant children. To estimate the impact of the ACA’s workplace breastfeeding
support mandate, researchers could use these states as the treated group, and they could
use states that have already passed versions of the mandate as the control group. To
study the impact of these benefits on employers, future researchers might want to analyze
matched employer-employee data.
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2.0 PATIENT COST-SHARING AND HEALTHCARE UTILIZATION:
EVIDENCE FROM THE ACA’S MEDICARE PREVENTIVE BENEFITS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
How do prices paid by consumers affect their health care utilization? Economic theories
of health insurance has shown that because of the moral hazard, people would behave
riskier and increase the health care usage, if they bear a lower cost of health services. The
famous RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) found that higher patient payments
significantly reduced medical care utilization. However, the HIE evidence is in the eighties
and excludes the elderly from the experiment (Chandra et al., 2010). Therefore, this paper
investigates the effects of prices on health care usage among the elderly.
The empirical literature has found evidence of price sensitivity in the use of office visits,
emergency room use, prescription drug use, and overall spending, among the elderly. For
example, Chandra et al. (2010) examined the copayment changes of the California Public
Employees Retirement System, and found that both physician office visits and prescription
drug utilization are modestly price sensitive among the elderly, and they find significant
“offset” effects in terms of increased hospital utilization in response to the combination of
higher copayments for physicians and prescription drugs.
However, the previous research has not covered a key component of the health care
utilization: preventive care. Preventive care includes health services like screenings, check-
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ups, and patient counseling that are used to prevent illnesses, disease, and other health
problems, or to detect illness at an early stage when treatment is likely to work best.
Because preventive services detect early signs of more serious illness and improve people’
health, using more preventive services, though increase the costs, would significantly de-
crease the future medical costs, thus is beneficial to the society on the whole. There has
been relatively little evidence about the moral hazard in preventive services.
Therefore, this paper studies the effects of patient cost-sharing on the usage of pre-
ventive services in this cohort, exploiting the removal of copayment and coinsurance of
Medicare-covered preventive services that are recommended by the US Preventive Ser-
vices Task Force, as a part of the reform of Affordable Care Act (ACA). On January
1, 2011, about ten types of preventive services to Medicare beneficiaries became free for
the patients. These preventive services, which are rated A or B by the US Preventive
Services Task Force, include several cancer screening, major chronic condition screening
and self-management training, etc. At the same time, the Medicare began to cover some
new preventive services, with newly created procedure codes, such as the depression coun-
seling, tobacco use cessation counseling, and annual wellness visit (Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services, 2015). Before the implementation of Medicare Preventive Benefits
(hereafter MPB), Medicare beneficiaries paid 20% coinsurance of the Medicare-approved
rate for preventive services covered by Medicare Part B.
The empirical challenge to study the MPB is that the policy change applies to all Medi-
care beneficiaries; there exists no comparison group. However, the knowledge of the new
benefits and the preference of using preventive services vary across individuals. Following
the intuition in Chetty et al. (2013) that individuals with no knowledge of certain policies
behave as they would in the absence of the policy, we categorize individuals on the basis of
their potential knowledge of this new Medicare benefits reform. In particular, we calculate
the take-up rate of a new service started at the same time of the implementation of the
MPB: the Annual Wellness Visit (hereafter AWV), for each of the 306 Hospital Referral
56
Regions (hereafter HRRs).1
The take-up rate of the AWV service is a good proxy for the awareness of the policy
change, because during a wellness visit, a beneficiary can develop or update a personalized
prevention plan based on his/her current health and risk factors. This visit includes a health
risk assessment, a review of medical and family history, some routine measurements, and
a screening schedule for appropriate preventive services.2 Therefore, it is reasonable to
assume that in a region where people are more likely to use this newly available (same
starting time as the time preventive services become free) service that evaluates the overall
health of a beneficiary, the people in the region is also more likely to know about the MPB
reform, and respond by using more preventive services, due to the “Law of Demand”.
It is better to measure the take-up rate of the AWV at the area level instead of using
whether the individual used the AWV to predict the usage of the other preventive services,
because our goal is to evaluate the responsiveness of the preventive care with respect to
the removal of patient costs, and not about the relationship between the general (AWV)
and specific preventive care usages per se. By proxying the knowledge of the reform using
the HRR level take-up rates of the AWV, we can causally evaluate how removing patient
cost-sharing affects the usage of preventive service, under the identifying assumption that
people in regions with no knowledge of the reform act as control groups to the people in
regions with higher knowledge of the reform.
To further understand the source of the knowledge of the MPB, i.e., whether it comes
1Hospital referral regions represent regional health care markets for tertiary medical care that generally
requires the services of a major referral center. The regions were defined by determining where patients
were referred for major cardiovascular surgical procedures and for neurosurgery. Each HRR has at least
one city where both major cardiovascular surgical procedures and neurosurgery are performed. See more
details at http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/data/region/.
2The AWV includes a personalized prevention plan of service (PPPS). The AWV is not a “routine
physical checkup that some seniors may get every year or so from their physician or other qualified non-
physician practitioner. (Medicare does not cover routine physical examinations.) The AWV does not
include any clinical laboratory tests, but a referrals for such tests can be made as part of the AWV, if
appropriate. Medicare waives both the coinsurance or copayment and the Medicare Part B deductible for
the AWV.
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from the beneficiaries’ health, preferences and behavior such as reading newspapers (demand-
side factors), or from the changing attitudes or practice of the physicians, hospitals and
local neighborhoods (non-individual factors, hereafter referred to as the supply-side fac-
tors), we isolate the demand-side factors (at individual level) from the supply-side factors
(at the HRR level) using the sample of beneficiaries who moved between HRRs after the
implementation of the MPB. Consider the average change of usage among beneficiaries
who move from a low-knowledge HRR to a high-knowledge HRR: if the usage increases to
the level of usage at the destination HRR, the knowledge comes from supply-side; if the
usage remains similar to that at the origin HRR, the knowledge comes from the demand-
side. Therefore, we exploit the sample of beneficiaries who stayed in the same HRR during
2011 and 2012, but moved to a different HRR in 2013. We track the change of AWV (and
other preventive services) usage between 2012 and 2013, and see whether the change can
be explained by the origin HRR’s AWV take-up rate or the destination HRR’s AWV rate.
Our results show that for most of the services, the change of usage is explained by the
origin HRR’s AWV rates, therefore, the knowledge is driven by the demand-side factors.
We then estimate the effects of removing patient cost sharing on the usage of preventive
services, using the 2008-2013 5% random sample of the historical claims of all Medicare
beneficiaries, three-year pre and three-year post policy change. The sample includes ben-
eficiaries who are 65 years and older, who have continuous enrollment of Part A and Part
B, and 0 months of HMO, and who are alive as of December 31, 2013. Using a difference-
in-differences framework, we find that the price sensibility varies in different preventive
services. In particular, the most price-sensitive service is the abdominal aortic aneurysm
screening (or aaa screening), screening mammogram and two types of tests for colorec-
tal cancer (colonoscopy used among beneficiaries with average risks for colorectal cancer,
and the fecal occult blood test, or FOBT). Furthermore, the out-of-pocket payments do
not seem to be the major barrier of usage for the bone mass measurement, medical nutri-
tional therapy, hepatitis B vaccination, pap tests, pelvic tests, and other types of colorectal
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screening tests such as flexible sigmoidoscopy. Several explanations are possible for the lack
of increases in many preventive services; characteristics of the preventive care, the disease
they target, the beneficiaries, the providers, and the insurance coverage may all create
other barriers preventing the increase of the preventive care.
This paper contributes to four strands of literature. The first strand of literature studies
the impact of removing cost-sharing for Medicare-covered preventive services on the use
of preventive services. The findings are mixed. Goodwin and Anderson (2012) studies
the Congress’s elimination of Part B deductibles for the mammograms and pap smears in
the 1990s using the 5% Medicare Beneficiary data, and found that the Medicare Part B
deductible waivers are an effective strategy for increasing preventive service use. Jensen et
al. (2015) and Chung et al. (2015) study the same federal benefit change as ours, but they
compare the changes of preventive service utilization before and after the ACA’s Medicare
preventive benefits across insurance coverage groups, using and survey and administrative
data only from California.
The second strand of literature uses the behavior responses to proxy the knowledge of
the reform to identify the impact of social reforms. For example, Chetty et al. (2013) uses
the extent to which self-employed individuals manipulate their incomes to benefit from the
EITC to proxy the knowledge of the EITC benefits at the neighborhood level. Our paper
is the first to use the differences in behavioral response across regions to characterize the
impact of federal level changes on health care utilization.
The third strand of literature studies the geographic variation of the usage of health
care services. For example, Gottlieb et al. (2010) argue that usage, not price differences,
drives the regional variation in Medicare payment. Our paper argues that differences in
knowledge about the prices of Medicare services across HRRs drive the variation in the
usage of medical services.
The last strand of literature uses migration to isolate the neighborhood level influence
from the individual preferences or tastes. For example, Finkelstein et al. (2014) exploit
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Medicare patients migration and found that 40-50 percent of regional difference in health
care utilization is due to the demand-side factors, rather than the place-specific supply
factors. Molitor (2014) compared the practices of cardiologists who move between regions
and find that environment factors are twice as important as physician-specific factors.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 offers a theoretical framework.
Section 3 outlines the empirical strategy. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 discusses
the proxy of the knowledge of the reform. Section 6 presents the main results. Section 7
discusses the findings.
2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
We build upon the model of Chetty et al. (2013) and provide a framework for the analysis
on the main impact of the MPB on the usage of preventive services, in the sample of
beneficiaries who did not move during the years of study.
Individual i chooses whether to use a preventive service , si. Her utility is quasi-linear
in income, Ci, or a numeraire consumption good, and the preventive service:
u(Ci, si, αi) = Ci + v(si, αi). (2.1)
Here, αi denotes an individual i’s health or preference about preventive services. Assume
αi is an exogenous parameter. For example, the person’s personal and family history is
exogenously determined when she makes the choice of preventive service.
Let the price of the preventive service be p ≥ 0. The price p affects the marginal
incentive of individual i’s usage of the service si.
Assume there are N cities indexed by z = 1, · · · , N . People cannot move to a different
city. Cities differ in their residents’ knowledge about the reform of Medicare for exogenous
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reasons.
In city z, a fraction of λz of residents are aware of the changes of the price, thus for
them, p = 0. The remainder of the residents are not aware of the benefits and still perceive
a price of p > 0.
Cities may differ in the distribution of preference αi, denoted by a smooth c.d.f. Gz(αi),
and in the fraction of compliers, i.e., the fraction of the people who switch to use the
preventive service following the reform conditional on being aware of the reform, θz.
Denote the empirical distribution of the total usage of preventive service s in a city as
F (s). Let Fz(s|p) denote the empirical distribution of the usage of preventive service in
city z with a price p.
The objective is to characterize the impact of the MPB as it is currently perceived by
individuals on the aggregate usage of preventive services:
∆F = F (s|p = 0)− F (s|p > 0). (2.2)
The first term is the current (post 2011) distribution of the usage of preventive services
under zero-costs of the service, and the second term is the potential distribution of the
usage with costs of preventive services not waived.
We use the cities with no knowledge of the MPS (λz = 0) to identify this second term:
F (s|p > 0, λz = 0) = F (s|p = 0, λz = 0) (2.3)
We measure λz as the fraction of individuals who following the MPB start to use a
newly available service: annual wellness visit (AWV hereafter), φz. Note that because
φz = θzλz, (2.4)
i.e., the percentage of AWV users equals the percentage of people who are aware of MPB
(λz) times the probability that they would actually go and take the AWV conditional on
61
knowing the reform (θz). Therefore, φz is only a proxy for the λz.
Assumption 1. (Knowledge) Individuals in neighborhoods with no AWV users are not
aware of the MPB: φz = 0⇒ λz = 0.
Under Assumption 1, the empirical distribution Fz(s) in cities with no AWV users
reveals the counterfactual distribution without the MPB. However, estimating treatment
effect in ( 2.2) requires one to identify the mean usage of preventive services across all cities
in the absence of MPB, F (s|p > 0) = 1NFz(s|p > 0). Thus we need two more assumptions.
Assumption 2. (Cross-Sectional Identification) Individuals’ health or preferences do not
vary across cities with different levels of knowledge about the MPB:
G(αi|λz) = G(αi), ∀λz.
Thus
ˆ∆(F ) = F (s|p)− F (s|p, φz = 0)
Intuitively, the impact of MPB on the usage of preventive service could be identified by
comparing the unconditional distribution of the usage with the distribution in cities without
AWV users. This identification strategy requires that the usage or preventive services in
cities without AWV users is representative of the distributions in other cities without
the MPB. We could relax this assumption by using a panel data of the individuals and
only require that the health or preferences of individuals in different cities do not trend
differently around the MPB.
Assumption 3. (Panel Identification) Changes in individuals’ health or preferences fol-
lowing the MPB do not vary across cities with different levels of knowledge about the MPB:
Gt(αi|λz)−Gt−1(αi|λz) = Gt(αi)−Gt−1(αi), ∀λz.
Now, we can identify ∆(F ) using a difference-in-differences estimator that compares
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the usage of preventive service across cities before and after the MPB reform:
ˆ∆(F )DD = [Ft(s|p)− Ft(s|p, φz = 0)]− [Ft−1(s|p)− Ft−1(s|p, φz = 0)] .
The difference-in-differences estimator ˆ∆(F )DD nets out the common factors that affect
the usages of the preventive service across all cities.
2.3 DATA
We use 2008-2013 Medicare historical claims data from a 5% random sample of all Medi-
care beneficiaries from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. The data contains
demographic information, 5-digit zip codes of the residence of the beneficiaries, and all
details such as the medical procedures, diagnoses, payments, for each usage of healthcare.
Our study sample consists of all fee-for-service beneficiaries who were older than 65 in
2008 and alive as of December 31, 2013. For the main analysis, we use the sample of ben-
eficiaries who lived in the same HRR during 2008-2013.3 The usage of preventive services
is determined by both the demand-side (for example health or preference of the individ-
ual) and the supply-side (for example the training of the physicians and the technology
of the local hospitals) factors. For a non-mover, we assume that the supply-side factors
(other than the price and information provided from the hospital regarding the colorectal
screening service) are fixed, thus the majority of the unobserved characteristics of the local
environment is fixed, allowing us to attribute the changes of the switching behavior to the
3The crosswalk between the 5-digit zip code each year and the HHR each year is downloaded from
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/tools/downloads.aspx?tab=39. Because the mapping between 5-digit zip
codes and HRRs vary each year, the person might move between zip codes but stay in the same HRR.
Because the same 5-digit zip code could be assigned to a different HRR region in different years, and there
are around 890 3-digit Zip codes, and 306 HRR regions, mechanically, there would be more non-movers
using the HRR definition than that using the 3-digit Zip definitions. The results using the 3-digit zip codes
as the geographic units are highly similar, and are provided as robustness checks.
63
MPB.
Table B1 summarizes the demographic information of the beneficiaries in the non-
movers’ sample. On average, about 4,881 beneficiaries are observed in each HRR region;
the average year of birth is 1933, or about 75 years old in 2008; about 62.6% are females
and the majority are white (88.7%).4
2.4 PROXY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE REFORM
We use the take up rate of AWV as a proxy to measure the knowledge of the general
new prevention benefits. During a wellness visit, a beneficiary can develop or update a
personalized prevention plan based on his/her current health and risk factors. Specifically,
this includes a health risk assessment, a review of medical and family history, some routine
measurements, personalized health advice, a list of personalized risk factors and treatment
options, and a screening schedule for appropriate preventive services. As a part of the new
Medicare prevention benefit under the ACA, the annual wellness visit is offered for free
every 12 months to all Medicare beneficiaries.
To exclude the effects of moving between HRRs on the definition of the take-up rate,
the sample of beneficiaries includes only non-movers, or beneficiaries who lived in the same
HRR during 2008-2013. Among the non-movers, we calculate the percentage of beneficiaries
in each HRR that used the initial AWV visit in 2011. Figure B1 shows the histogram of
the take-up rate. There is sufficiently large variation in the take-up rate across HRRs. The
number of observations is 306. The mean is 7.3%; the standard deviation is 4.4%; the min
4The Medicare data exhibit inconsistencies between a patient’s sex and any diagnosis or procedure on
the patient’s record. For example, a male patient with cervical cancer (diagnosis) or a female patient with
a prostatectomy (procedure). In both instances, the indicated diagnosis or the procedure conflicts with
the stated sex of the patient. Therefore, either the patient’s diagnosis, procedure or sex is presumed to be
incorrect. I do not adjust the sex using sex-specific ICD codes. This conflict is reflected in the main results
where it is possible to see an increase in the usage of mammograms among males.
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is 0.4% and the max is 24.3%.
Figure B2 shows the spatial variation in the λ across the 306 HRRs in the United
States. The 306 HRRs are ranked in 10 deciles according to the percentage of beneficiaries
using AWV initial service among the sample of non-movers. Each shade indicates a decile,
and a darker shade means a higher knowledge of the reform. Inspecting the map, there
is substantial dispersion in the usage of the AWV across HRRs. The HRRs with higher
usages of AWV tend to be in the New England, the East North Central, Colorado, Arizona,
and the northern part of the South Atlantic region.
We wish to investigate whether the knowledge of the reform is driven by the demand-
side factors or the supply-side factors. We can exploit the effects of moving between HRRs
of different knowledge about the reform on the change of the movers’ knowledge, to see if
the change can be explained by the origin or the destination HRR’s knowledge.
We define a sample of movers, which includes beneficiaries living in the same HRR
during the first two years post-reform, but moved to a different HRR during the third year
post-reform. We use the first year post-reform to determine the origin HRR’s ranking, and
use the first and second year post-reform to make sure there is no pre-move sorting (as
opposed to defining the movers’ sample as the one who moved to a different HRR from
2011 in 2012 and then remain at the same HRR in 2013), but this leaves with only one year
post-move, which is a limitation due to the data availability. Therefore, the beneficiary is
a mover, if he/she lives in the same HRR in 2011 and 2012, but moves to a different HRR
in 2013.
Table B2 summarizes the sample of movers. There are 15,225 beneficiaries in the sample
of movers. There is a growing trend of the usage of the AWV: about 8.9% of beneficiaries
used the AWV service in 2011, while the percentage increased to 11.4% in 2012 and 13.4%
in 2013. The variable ∆Usei is defined as the dummy “AWV use in 2013” minus the
dummy “AWV use in 2012”. For example, if a beneficiary i used AWV in 2012, but did
not use it in 2013, the “change of AWV use” would be −1.
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The variable ∆Decilei is defined as individual i’s destination HRR’s AWV usage rate
decile (in 2013) minus i’s origin HRR’s AWV usage rate decile (in 2012). For example,
if a beneficiary moved from an HRR ranked in the 5th decile of the AWV usage rate in
2012, to another HRR ranked in the 8th decile in 2013, the “change of ranking” would be
3; if the beneficiary moved between HRRs but remain in the same decile, the “change of
ranking” would be 0.
We wish to know whether moving to different HRRs ranked by the take-up rates of
AWV affects the usage of AWV. We estimate the following specification:
∆Usei = α+ β∆Decilei +
10∑
k=2
γkOriginDecilei,k
+
9∑
k=2
δkDestinationDecilei,k +Xi + i, (2.5)
where ∆Decilei denotes the “change of decile”. The variable OriginDecilei denotes the
origin fixed effects, and the variable DestinationDecilei denotes the destination fixed ef-
fects (note that the omitted category is living in the first decile before move). Under the
identifying assumption that the unobserved factor that determines the change of usage of
preventive services is uncorrelated with the decision of moving (∆Decilei), the parameter
of interest, β, can be interpreted as the causal impact of moving to an area with more
knowledge of the reform on the change of preventive care usages.
Alternatively, the outcomes can be OriginUsei (whether individual i used the service
in year 2012) or DestinationUsei (whether individual i used the service in year 2013) to
see if moving to an area with higher or lower knowledge of the reform explains the usage
of the service at the origin and the destination HRRs, respectively.
The vector Xi denotes the vector of individual covariates, which includes gender, race
categories (White, Black, Asian, Hispanics, North American natives, other races, and the
omitted category is the unknown), and year-of-birth fixed effects. The equation is estimated
using OLS, with robust standard errors.
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Table B3 demonstrates the effects of moving to different HRRs on the take-up rates
of the AWV service. The outcome variable for the first three columns is ∆Usei. In the
first column, we estimate equation (2.6) without the origin fixed effects, destination fixed
effects and the individual covariates. Column 1 shows that if only regressing the change of
usage on the change of decile, the estimated parameter of interest, β, is positive, but very
small and insignificant, suggesting that moving to an HRR with higher usage of AWV is
not associated with more usage of AWV.
However, after controlling for the origin fixed effects and the destination fixed effects,
the estimate in column 2 becomes larger and statistically significant at 5% level. Fur-
thermore, the parameters in front of the origin fixed effects are positive and statistically
significant at 1% level: living in an HRR of a higher ranking before move is associated with
a significant increase of the usage after the move. On the contrary, moving to an HRR with
a higher ranking does not predict more usage of AWV after the move: only the parameter
in front of the 8th decile in column 2 is statistically significant, and it is actually negative,
suggesting that moving to the 8th decile actually is associated with less use of AWV after
move.
What’s most striking is the relative magnitudes of the γk’s and β: the effects of the
origin deciles are about 7 (= .0256/.0037) to 13 (=.0491/.0037) times as large as the effect
of the ∆Decilei. Given that the mean of ∆Decilei is .13 and the standard deviation 3.3,
on average, the effects of the origin decile is much larger that of ∆Decilei.
Finally, adding the individual-level covariates Xi, the estimates in column 3 are very
similar to those of column 2, suggesting that there is little bias from the selection on the
observed individual characteristics, which is reassuring. Therefore, the estimates seems to
suggest that it is the origin HRR’s knowledge, rather than the destination HRR’s knowl-
edge, that affects the change of the AWV usage.
To have a better understanding of the explanatory power of ∆Decilei, the columns 4-6
replace the outcome variable with the dummy variable denoting AWV usage before move
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(OriginUsei), and repeat the analyses in the first three columns. Column 4 shows that, if
having no origin and destination decile fixed effects, moving to a new HRR with a higher
knowledge is correlated with a reduction of usage. However, it is obvious that this is due to
the omitted variable bias, and in column 5 β becomes positive and highly statistically, as
expected. What’s more, all estimates of the origin deciles (γk’s) are positive and statistically
significant at 1% level. Again, adding the individual covariates do not change the estimates
(in column 6).
The dependent variable in columns 7-9 is the dummy variable denoting AWV usage
after move (DestinationUsei). The estimates show that the parameters for the origin
deciles are very significant, while the parameters for the destination deciles are not. For
example, column 9 suggests that, comparing to living in the 1st decile, living in the 5th
decile before move is associated with a 11.7 percentage point higher probability of using
AWV after move in 2013, while living in the 10th decile before move is associated with a
striking 25.9 percentage point higher probability of using AWV after move.
To summarize, although moving to an HRR with a higher knowledge is indeed associ-
ated with a higher usage of AWV, the magnitude of the increase due to a larger knowledge
difference between the destination and the origin HRR is very small, compared to the in-
crease of usage associated with living in an HRR with a higher knowledge ranking before
moving. The evidence seems to suggest that the factors determining the knowledge of the
reform mainly come from the demand-side factors other than the observed demographic
characteristics (age, race, and gender), such as preferences, tastes, and health, etc.
2.5 ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK
To estimate the effects of the MPB, which removes the copayment/coinsurance and de-
ductibles for the preventive services that are recommended by the US Preventive Services
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Task Force, the main specification uses a difference-in-differences framework:
Usageizt = α+ β1Postt + β2AWVz × Postt + θi + θt + izt, (2.6)
where the outcome variable is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the individual i in
HRR z in year t uses one of the preventive services that are affected by the MPB,
and 0 otherwise.56 The outcome variables of interest include: AAAizt, abdominal aor-
tic aneurysm screening; Hbvizt, Hepatitis B vaccination; Mntizt, nutrition therapy services
(medical); Papizt, pap test; Pelvizt, pelvic exams; Mammizt, screening mammogram;
Bnmssizt, Bone mass measurement (bone density); and a series of tests for colorectal can-
cer: ClrctLowRiskizt, colonoscopy screening among beneficiaries with low risks of colorec-
tal cancer, ClrctHighRiskizt, colonoscopy among beneficiaries with high risks of colorectal
cancer, Sigizt, Colorectal cancer screening, flexible sigmoidoscopy, FOBTizt, Colorectal
cancer screening, fecal occult blood test, and Bloodizt, Colorectal cancer screening, blood,
occult. There are two other screening tests for colorectal cancer screening, that are treated
with a less intensity: the copayment/coinsurance applies, but the deductible is waived:
SigBariumizt, Colorectal cancer screening, screening sigmoidoscopy, Barium Enema, and
ColBariumizt, Colorectal cancer screening, screening colonoscopy, barium enema.
The Postt is a dummy variable which equals one for years 2011, 2012 and 2013. θi and
θt are individual and year fixed effects, respectively. izt is a random error term.
The parameter of interest is β2, and under the identifying assumption that the unob-
served factors that also affect the decision of preventive services usage at the individual
level is orthogonal to the take up rate AWVz, β2 can be interpreted as the effect of the
MPB on the usage of the outcome variable, per AWV rate. The key identifying assumption
is: people in low-AWV-rate regions believe that the MPB does not affect their marginal
5The Medicare-covered preventive services can be found here: https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/
Prevention/PrevntionGenInfo/Downloads/MPS-QuickReferenceChart-1TextOnly.pdf.
6The usages are extracted according to the HCPCS codes (HCPCS denotes the Healthcare Common
Procedure Coding System, which is based on the American Medical Association’s Current Procedural
Terminology) shown in Appendix C.
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incentive in determining whether to take preventive services.
Because some preventive services are not affected by the MPB, some already have no
out-of-pocket costs before the MPB, the other still have out-of-pocket costs after the MPB,
these services serve as the placebo outcome variables. The services that already have no out-
of-pocket costs before the MPB include: Fluizt, flu shots; and Pneumizt, pneumonia shots;
ClrctDiagnosticizt, diagnostic colonoscopy (including screening with polyps detected ex
post) and Dbtsscrnizt, diabetes screening. The services which copayment/coinsurance and
deductibles remain are: Prsttizt, prostate cancer screening; Cardizt, cardiovascular dis-
ease screening tests; Glucmizt, glaucoma; and DbtsSlfMgmtizt, diabetes self management
training.
Table B4 shows the summary statistics of the services that are affected by the MPB, in
each year of 2008-2013, among the sample of the non-movers. Table B5 shows the summary
statistics of the services that are affected by the MPB.
2.6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
2.6.1 Motivating Figures
First, to provide some motivating graphs, we use the individual-month panel, to capture
a more detailed capture of the trends of the usage. For the regression results, we still use
the individual-year panel as specified in equation (2.6).
The next few figures show the de-trended usages of the preventive services that are
affected by MPB, for beneficiaries living in the 1st (blue, dotted), 5th (dark green, dashed),
and 10th (black, solid) decile of the AWV take-up rate, at each month from January 2008 to
December 2013. The y-axis is the residual of a regression of the usage on the gender, race,
birth year fixed effects, and monthly dummies, separately for the pre and post period. The
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x-axis denotes the number of months since January 1, 2011. The 95% confidence intervals
are shown as well.
For example, Figure B3 shows the graph of the smoothed and de-trended usage of the
abdominal aortic aneurysm screening, where before the reform, the usage of the beneficia-
ries living in the 1st, 5th, and 10 deciles of the knowledge index are flat and very similar;
after the reform, however, the beneficiaries living in the 10th decile become much more
likely to know about the removal of the out-of-pocket costs and increase the likelihood of
using the service, while beneficiaries living in the 5th and the 1st deciles are less likely to
know about the reform, and are relatively less likely to use the service. The fact that the
three groups display flat and similar trends before the reform, and that the three groups
display a diverging trend after the reform, is a visual demonstration that the effect of the
MPB affects the usage of the abdominal aortic aneurysm screening, through the various
degrees of knowledge of the reform. Similarly, Figure B3 to Figure B11 show the de-trended
usages of the other preventive services by the knowledge deciles.
2.6.2 Main Results on the preventive services affected by MPB
Table B6 shows the effects of removing patient costs on the usage of impacted preventive
services. The first column shows the simple comparison of the usages before and after the
reform (pre- and post-2011). The second column is the estimate of the main specification
(2.6), and the estimate of the interaction term Postt × Knowledgez is the parameter
of interest. It can be interpreted as the causal effects of removing patient costs on the
usage, given a knowledge rate of 100%. The third and fourth column estimates the main
specification for males and females, respectively.7
For AAA screening, column 1 is significant, suggesting that the simple pre-and post-
MPB comparison shows an increase in the usage of AAA screening. The column 2 is
7Note that there exists conflict situations where the males may perform female-specific procedures, such
as mammograms, and vice versa. Though
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positive and statistically significant at 1% level. Given that the mean of the Knowledgez
is 7.26%, and the average usage of AAA is .0066 during 2008-2011, for an HRR with a
typical knowledge of the reform, removing the patient costs on average increases the usage
of AAA by about 78.7% (=.726 ∗ .00715/.0066) from the pre-MPB level. The effects are
driven by the males.
For bone mass measurement, the simple pre- and post-MPB comparison shows a de-
crease in the usage. The estimate on the interaction term Postt ×Knowledgez is insignif-
icant for the whole sample; interestingly, it is positive and statistically significant for the
males, but negative and statistically significant for the females. To use the bone mass
measurement service, the beneficiary should be at risk for osteoporosis and meet one or
more conditions.8 Therefore, the significant decrease for the females seems to suggest that,
because individuals who are likely to use the AWV visit are likely to be healthier and have
a lower risk for osteoporosis, the higher knowledge of the reform may associate with fewer
females who are qualified for the bone mass measurement service.
For medical nutritional therapy, the interaction term Postt ×Knowledgez is insignif-
icant, though the simple pre- and post-MPB comparison shows an increase following the
reform.9
For the hepatitis B vaccination, the effects are very small and not significant. The likely
explanation seems to be the same as that for the bone mass measurement: the qualification
criterion. Only the beneficiaries at high or medium risk for Hepatitis B are covered.10
Table B6 shows the effects on three preventive services that are used by females: screen-
8The conditions are: a woman whose doctor determines she’s estrogen deficient and at risk for osteo-
porosis, based on her medical history and other findings; a person whose X-rays show possible osteoporosis,
osteopenia, or vertebral fractures; a person taking prednisone or steroid-type drugs or is planning to begin
this treatment; a person who has been diagnosed with primary hyperparathyroidism; and a person who is
being monitored to see if their osteoporosis drug therapy is working.
9People with Part B who meet at least one of these conditions: Have diabetes; Have kidney disease Have
had a kidney transplant in the last 36 months; People with Part B must get a referral from their doctor or
qualified non-doctor practitioner for the service.
10The risk for Hepatitis B increases if having hemophilia, End-Stage Renal Disease, diabetes, or certain
conditions that lower the resistance to infection.
72
ing mammography, pap tests, and pelvic tests. The estimate of Postt × Knowledgez is
statistically significant only for screening mammography, and the usage of pap and pelvic
tests actually decreased, though insignificantly. Given that the mean of screening mammog-
raphy usage is .227 during 2008-2010, then on average, removing the patient costs increased
the usage of screening mammography by about 0.6% (=.073 × .0186/.227). These results
are similar to the findings in Goodwin and Anderson (2012), who found that the usage
of mammograms increased following the waive of deductible and the usage of pap tests
did not. The reason could be that the risk of developing breast cancer increases with age,
whereas the risk of developing cervical cancer decreases with age. In addition, screening
mammography are usually recommended for women aged 40 and over who are not in poor
health, while cervical cancer screening can be discontinued in elderly women who have had
two to three normal test results in a nine- or ten-year period. Furthermore, the change
of guideline recommendations to less frequent screening and later starting age for cervical
cancer and breast cancer around the same time period may have in part offset any impact
of the ACA provision Han et al. (2015).
Table B6 also shows the effects on various tests for the screening of colorectal cancer.
The MPB increased the usage of colonoscopy by beneficiaries with average risks of colorectal
cancer, and the usage of FOBT test. Given that the average of the low risk usage is .00669
during 2008-2010, removing the patient prices increased the usage by about 6.6% (=.073×
.00606/.00669) on average. Given that the average of the FOBT usage is .0181 during 2008-
2010, removing the patient prices increased the usage by about 18.2% (=.073×.0452/.0181)
on average. The MPB did not affect the usage of colonoscopy by beneficiaries with high
risks of colorectal cancer significantly; the comparison between the results for the average-
and high-risk screening seem to confirm the assumption that people who are at high risks
are not on the margin of the reform, i.e. they would use the service anyway and the
out-of-pocket payments are less likely to be barrier of usage.
Table B7 shows the results for services not affected by MPB. Note that the usage of flu
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vaccination increased, the usage of diabetes self management training services decreased,
and the usage of diagnostic colonoscopy changes decreased. For the flu vaccination, it is
possible that learning about the reform and using the AWV services increased the awareness
and likelihood of taking flu shots. For the diabetes screening test, it is possible that the For
the diagnostic colonoscopy, it is possible that the physicians code the diagnostic colonoscopy
as screening to help reduce the cost of the patients.
2.7 DISCUSSION
Though the MPB increased the usage of certain preventive services, such as the aaa screen-
ing, mammograms, colonoscopy by average-risk beneficiaries, and the FOBT for colorectal
cancer, the usage for many other affected preventive services did not increase as expected.
In addition to the qualification criterion, incidence and seriousness of the target disease,
costs and other service-specific reasons, there are some broader reasons as well.
First, when the MPB reform took effect the vast majority of seniors already carried
insurance beyond traditional Medicare that would have eliminated or greatly reduced any
out-of-pocket copays they faced for these services (Han et al., 2015). Second, there exists a
lack of appropriate counseling by physicians regarding the need for the usage of preventive
services. The providers might not have the opportunity to evaluate and refer the benefi-
ciaries for more preventive care. Third, there are other barriers to usage, such as presence
of patient co-morbidities, poor functional status, physicians’ focus on acute care issues,
physicians’ lack of time with patients, etc. Fourth, exactly because of the low take-up rate
of the AWV service, the increase of the usage of many preventive services are slow. Previ-
ous research has shown that the low WMV take-up rate (on the same order of the AWV
take-up rate) was insufficient to increase rates of cancer screening (Petroski and Regan,
2009). Finally, the data only includes 3 years after the reform, and the impacts may need
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longer time to show.
2.8 CONCLUSION
This paper studies the effects of the removal of out-of-pocket payments on the usage of
the Medicare covered preventive services following the Affordable Care Act’s Medicare
Preventive Benefits. We find that usages of many preventive services increased, in regions
with higher awareness of the reform, measured as a higher take-up rate of the “Annual
Wellness Visits” service newly created by the reform. However, there are other barriers
that prevent beneficiaries to fully utilize the preventive care, such as the lack of referral
and counseling from the providers. In the future, one might wish to study the impact of
the increasing usage of preventive services on the beneficiaries’ health outcomes; a welfare
analysis of the increasing usage of preventive services as a result of the removal of patient
cost-sharing is also meaningful.
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3.0 PHYSICIAN COUNSELING AND OBESITY: RD EVIDENCE FROM
THE MEDICARE INTENSIVE BEHAVIORAL THERAPY PROGRAM
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Obesity is a leading health problem in the U.S. In 2009-2012, 69.1% of the population aged
20 years and older are overweight, i.e. with a body mass index (BMI) greater than or equal
to 25 (kg/m2). Lifestyle management is critical in obesity management, where the advice
and support from health care professional matters (Bardia et al., 2007). This paper asks
the question: Does physician counseling reduce obesity?
The difficulty in answering this question is due to the omitted variable bias: the patients
who seek advices and help from the physicians differ in their motivation, degrees of obesity
and other perspectives from the patients who do not, which affect the outcome. One way
to address this bias is to use randomized controlled trials, and previous studies have found
that physician counseling increases the patients’ adoption and duration of physical activity
(Lewis et al., 1991; Pinto et al., 2008). However, the samples of observations are usually
small (211 and 100 in the previous two studies, respectively) and the results speak to a
specific group of patients in a specific local healthcare provider.
In this paper, we estimate the effect of physician counseling on obesity using a (fuzzy)
regression discontinuity (RD) design. We exploit the policy change that Medicare started
a new physician counseling program, the Intensive Behavioral Therapy (IBT) for Obesity,
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in late 2011 as part of the Affordable Care Act, for Medicare beneficiaries whose BMI is
greater than or equal to 30. Beneficiaries with a BMI greater than or equal to 30 can
choose whether or not to participate in the IBT, and the probability of participation is
increasing in the BMI, allowing for a fuzzy RD design. Because the beneficiaries’ observed
and unobserved characteristics are likely to trend smoothly around the BMI-30 cutoff, the
difference in the outcomes, such as the change of body weight within a year or the policy
can be attributed to the IBT.
We use the 5% random sample of the Medicare historical claim data from the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to estimate the impact of IBT on obesity within
the first two years of the implementation of the policy. Using the diagnosis codes, we came
up with a sample of 13,113 beneficiaries, whose BMI range from 25.45 to 39.45. Although
62.9% of the beneficiaries were eligible for the service, less than 571 beneficiaries used the
service. We find that the IBT program is not effective in reducing weights. The weight
reduction observed for the obese beneficiaries is due to the selection bias, or other factors
not related to the usage of IBT program. The likely reason is that beneficiaries are not
using enough of the service: although they are entitled to receive up to 22 free counseling
each year, the beneficiaries who ever used the IBT program only used it for about 4 times.
The lack of interest from the beneficiaries and the physicians may explain.
This paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, we investigate
the causal impact of physician counseling on obesity using administrative data that are
nationally representative and with a much larger sample size those in the previous studies.
Second, this is the first paper to evaluate the effectiveness of the IBT, which has important
policy implications. Because the IBT is required to be provided by the primary care
physicians or other primary care practitioners, the opportunity costs of the service are
potentially much higher than the monetary costs (the IBT counseling is of zero-costs to the
beneficiaries, and the Medicare pays about $26 per 30-minute physician counseling). The
low usage rates have prompted the proposal from non-primary-care practitioners to broaden
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the scope of the program and allow it to be provided by practitioners like nutritionists and
therapists as well. This paper would provide estimates for the arguments.
3.2 BACKGROUND
Effective for claims with dates of service November 29, 2011, and later, The CMS released
a decision memo stating “the evidence is adequate to conclude that intensive behavioral
therapy for obesity, defined as a body mass index (BMI)≥ 30kg/m2, is reasonable and
necessary for the prevention or early detection of illness or disability and is appropriate for
individuals entitled to benefits under Part A or enrolled under Part B and is recommended
with a grade of A or B by the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF).”
The IBT is available for Medicare beneficiaries with obesity, who are competent and
alert at the time that counseling is provided and whose counseling is furnished by a qualified
primary care physician or other primary care practitioner and in a primary care setting,
CMS covers: a) One face-to-face visit every week for the first month; b) One face-to-
face visit every other week for months 2-6; and c) One face-to-face visit every month
for months 7-12, if the beneficiary meets the 3kg (6.6 lbs.) weight loss requirement as
discussed below.1 At the six month visit, a reassessment of obesity and a determination
of the amount of weight loss must be performed. To be eligible for additional face-to-
face visits occurring once a month for an additional six months, beneficiaries must have
achieved a reduction in weight of at least 3kg (6.6 lbs.) over the course of the first six
months of intensive therapy. This determination must be documented in the physician
office records for applicable beneficiaries consistent with usual practice. For beneficiaries
1Effective July 2, 2012, for claims processed with dates of service on or after November 29, 2011, Medicare
will pay for G0447 with appropriate ICD-9 code no more than 22 times in a 12-month period. We find that
the largest number of the usage per beneficiary during November 29, 2011 and December 31, 2013 is 51.
Some of the services have zero payments from Medicare (rejected), and it is possible to have more than one
sessions on one day (longer than 30 minutes per visit, as each line denotes a 30-minute session).
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who do not achieve a weight loss of at least 3kg (6.6 lbs.) during the first six months of
intensive therapy, a reassessment of their readiness to change and BMI is appropriate after
an additional six month period.2
The IBT consists of the following three components: a) Screening for obesity in adults
using measurement of BMI calculated by dividing weight in kilograms by the square of
height in meters (expressed in kg/m2); b) Dietary (nutritional) assessment; and c) Intensive
behavioral counseling and behavioral therapy to promote sustained weight loss through
high intensity interventions on diet and exercise.
The IBT should be consistent with the 5-A framework: a) Assess: Ask about/assess
behavioral health risk(s) and factors affecting choice of behavior change goals/methods; b)
Advise: Give clear, specific, and personalized behavior change advice, including information
about personal health harms and benefits; c) Agree: Collaboratively select appropriate
treatment goals and methods based on the patient’s interest in and willingness to change
the behavior; d) Assist: Using behavior change techniques (self-help and/or counseling),
aid the patient in achieving agreed-upon goals by acquiring the skills, confidence and
social/environmental supports for behavior change, supplemented with adjunctive medical
treatments when appropriate; and e) Arrange: Schedule follow-up contacts (in person or
by telephone) to provide ongoing assistance/support and to adjust the treatment plan as
needed, including referral to more intensive or specialized treatment.
Medicare covers IBT for obesity provided in a primary care setting. For the purpose of
the IBT, a primary care setting is defined as one in which there is a provision of integrated,
accessible health care services by clinicians who are accountable for addressing a large
majority of personal health care needs, developing a sustained partnership with patients,
and practicing in the context of family and community, such as an independent clinic, an
outpatient hospital, a physician’s office, or a state or local public health clinic.3
2https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/
MLNMattersArticles/downloads/MM7641.pdf
3The following are not considered primary care settings under this definition: Ambulatory surgical
79
The HCPCS code for the IBT for obesity is G0447 (Face-to-Face Behavioral Counseling
for Obesity, 15 minutes), and G0447 must be billed along with one of the ICD-9 codes for
BMI 30.0 and over (V85.30-V85.39, V85.41-V85.45).4 The Medicare coinsurance and Part
B deductible are waived for this service. The national average Medicare payment is $26.
3.3 ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK
We can first estimate the reduced-form results using the following specification:
Yi = α0 + ρZi + β0g (Ri) + 0i. (3.1)
Variable Yi is the outcome variable, which is the ratio of the last observed BMI to
the first observed BMI during November 29, 2011 and December 31, 2013, minus 1, or
the percentage change of the body weight during the time period. The reason that the
outcome variable is the percentage change instead of the simple difference between the two
BMIs is that a simple difference would re-scale the change of body weight by the height of
the beneficiary.5 If using the simple difference, the weight change is deflated for the taller
beneficiaries, but inflated for the shorter beneficiaries. Thus we use the percentage change
of the body weight (the ratio of BMIs) during the sample period as the outcome variable.
centers, Emergency departments, Hospices, Independent diagnostic testing facilities, Inpatient hospital
settings, Inpatient rehabilitation facilities, and Skilled nursing facilities.
4The type of service (TOS) for G0447 is 1. ICD-10 codes will be Z68.30-Z68.39, Z68.41- Z68.45. Ad-
ditional Services on Same Date of Service: Obesity counseling is not separately payable with another en-
counter/visit on the same day. For services that contain HCPCS code G0447 with another encounter/visit
with the same date of service, the service line with HCPCS G0447 will be denied. This intensive behavioral
therapy service is considered to be included in the payment/allowance of other encounter services provided
on the same date of service. This does not apply for Initial Preventative Physical Examination (IPPE)
claims, claims containing modifier 59, and 77X claims containing Diabetes Self-Management Training and
Medical Nutrition Therapy services.
5BMI is defined as weight/height2. The difference = BMI2 − BMI1 = weight2/height2 −
weight1/height
2 = weightchange/height2. The percentage change = BMI2/BMI1 − 1 =
weight2/weight1 − 1.
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The running variable, Ri denotes the first observed BMI during November 29, 2011 and
December 31, 2013. The variable Zi is a dummy variable indicating whether the beneficiary
is eligible for the IBT program after November 29, 2011, i.e., it is a step function of the
running variable Ri:
ZR =

0, if R < 30
1, if R ≥ 30.
(3.2)
A beneficiary with a BMI greater than or equal to 30 may or may not participate in the
IBT, but a beneficiary with a BMI less than 30 cannot participate in the IBT program.6
Even though the probability that a beneficiary with a BMI greater than or equal to 30
participates in IBT is not 1, the probability is increasing in the BMI. Therefore, our RD
strategy satisfies the monotonicity requirement, and is a fuzzy RD approach. Because the
fuzzy RD is effectively an instrumental variable approach (Zi as the instrumental variable),
we can use the following 2SLS specifications to identify the causal effects of qualifying for
the IBT on obesity. g (·) is a function of the running variable, and we include up to the third
order polynomial of Ri. Alternatively, we can include the polynomials of the deviation of
the running variable from 30, and the interaction terms of the polynomials and the ZR.
The results are similar and shown in the appendix.
The first-stage specification of the 2SLS model is
Di = α1 + φZi + β1g (Ri) + 1i, (3.3)
The dependent variable, Di, is the treatment status, which is a dummy variable indicating
that the beneficiary used the IBT for at least once during November 29, 2011 and December
31, 2012. Because the patient can take multiple IBT sessions during the year, we can
6There are 45 people in the sample whose first observation is less than 30, but used the IBT service later
on. This is not impossible as their weight became heavier later on and are eligible for the service. Because
the fuzzy RD requires monotonicity in the probability of being treated and the qualification status, we drop
these observations.
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alternatively define the Di as a continuous variable indicating the total count of the usages
of the IBT during November 29, 2011 and December 31, 2013, or the intensity of the IBT
treatment. The parameter φ captures the change in the probability of enrolling in the IBT
program.
The second stage captures the causal effect of the IBT program on the reduction of
obesity:
Yi = α2 + λDˆi + β2g (Ri) + 2i, (3.4)
The parameter λ is the causal effect of the IBT program, and the variable Dˆi is the first-
stage fitted value produced by estimating equation (3.3).
3.4 DATA AND MOTIVATING GRAPHS
We use the 5% random sample of the CMS Medicare historical data in years 2011-2013.
We look at the sample of beneficiaries with 24 consecutive months of Part A and Part B
coverage, and 0 months of HMO coverage, during January 1, 2011 and December 31, 2013.
First, we extract the observations with ICD-9 codes of V85.25-V85.39, which denote
the adult BMI between 25.0 and 39.9, from the carrier claim data. Because each ICD-
9 code denotes a range of BMI, I calculate the average of the lower and upper bound
as the corresponding BMI. For example, an ICD-9 code of V85.21 denotes BMI between
25.0-25.9, and we assign 25.45 as the corresponding BMI. The BMI information of the
ICD-9 codes and the assigned BMI level is shown in Table 1.7 Second, we extract the
observations with HCPCS code of G0447 from the carrier line data, and merge with the
7The ICD-9 codes contain BMI information larger than 39.9 as well. For example, ICD-9 OF V85.41
denotes a BMI between 40.0-44.9. However, because the range of BMI is much larger, and the average of
the lower and upper bound would be a much noisier proxy of the true BMI, we do not use these BMI codes
in our analysis.
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BMI information. Next, we keep the beneficiaries for whom we know their BMI at least
twice during November 29, 2011 and December 31, 2013.
Table C1 provides the summary statistics. The sample includes 13,113 beneficiaries,
whose BMI range from 25.45 to 39.45. About 62.9% of the beneficiaries have a BMI of
greater than or equal to 30, or are eligible for the IBT. 312 beneficiaries received at least
one IBT, and the largest number of IBT received is 15. The usage rate of IBT is very low,
and nationally only about 5,000 beneficiaries used the program in 2013.8
Table C2 provides the summary statistics for the non-qualified (BMI<30) and the
qualified sample (BMI≥30) separately. Among the beneficiaries with a BMI greater than
or equal to 30, less than 9.8% of them use the IBT services. The users and non-users do
no differ in their initial BMI (the first BMI during the sample period), the probability of
being female, and their ages. The users are less likely to be white.
Why do beneficiaries’ BMI information appear in the claims? Table C13 lists the
top procedures (Line HCPCS Common Procedure Coding) taken in the claims where we
identify ICD-9 codes of V85.25-V85.39. The top procedures taken are established office
visits (11.79%), blood tests of various kinds, comprehensive metabolic panel, therapeutic
exercises to develop strength and endurance, range of motion, and flexibility, glycosylated
(A1c), flu shots, chest x-rays, new patient visits and ophthalmological services, etc.
What characterize the users of the IBT program? Table C14 provides the ICD-9 codes
that account for 50% of all diagnoses appeared in the IBT users’ claims in 2011-2013.
The most often seen diagnosis is hypertension, and the second often is diabetes. The IBT
8Weight loss specialists place the blame for poor awareness of the new benefit on the federal gov-
ernment’s decision to limit counseling to primary care offices. “The problem with using only primary
care providers,” says Bonnie Modugno, a registered dietician in Santa Monica, California, “is that they
completely ruled out direct reimbursement for the population of providers who are uniquely qualified
and experienced working with weight management. I think that was a big mistake.” She was referring
to registered dietitians like herself, as well as specialists such as endocrinologists, who might be man-
aging a person’s diabetes, and cardiologists, who monitor patients with heart disease. Both conditions
can be caused by or made worse by excess weight.http://www.webmd.com/health-insurance/20150223/
few-seniors-benefiting-from-medicare-obesity-counseling.
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users are also associated with atrial fibrillation (an irregular, often rapid heart rate that
commonly causes poor blood flow), high amounts of cholesterol and fat particles in the
blood, and under-active thyroid. They often have Vitamin D and B-complex deficiency;
pain in the neck, shoulder, chest, abdomen, low back (lumbago), joints and limbs. They feel
malaise and fatigue easily. Many have chronic airway obstruction, and shortness of breath.
Many have infection in the urinary tract, and fungal infection of nails (dermatophytosis).
Many take routine medical exams; many have long-term (current) use of anticoagulants
or other medications. Some have anemia. Many have congestive heart failure and chronic
airway obstruction. They might have degeneration of lumbar or lumbosacral intervertebral
disc, or lumbosacral neuritis. They might have edema, or an excess of watery fluid collecting
in the cavities or tissues of the body. Many have difficulty in walking and abnormality of
gait, myalgia and myositis myalgia. Some cough, or have dizziness and giddiness.
In sum, the beneficiaries in our sample appear to be overweight/obese with various
types of co-morbidities.
Table C15 lists the specialty of the providers of the IBT services. Because the Medicare
only pays for the service in a primary care setting, it is possible that the providers receive
zero payments from Medicare if they are not recognized as primary care providers. Ta-
ble C15 suggests that about 60% of IBT services are provided by physicians in the internal
medicine department, and another 28.5% is provided by family doctors.
Table C16 lists the top 20 states where beneficiaries use the IBT programs. The usage
of the IBT is pretty concentrated in a few states. For example, users in Florida accounts
for 13.58% of all usages, and those in New York 11.19%. Together with California, Texas
and New Jersey, the top five states account for about 50% of all usages, and the top 20
states about 90%.
Figure C1 motivates the reduced-form analysis. The x-axis is the BMI that determines
the eligibility of the IBT (the first observed BMI since Nov 20, 2011). The y-axis is the
mean percentage change of the body weight during November 29, 2011 and December
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31, 2013, for each BMI rate. Figure C1 suggests that although having a higher BMI is
associated with negative changes of body weight, being eligible for the IBT program is
associated with a tiny increase of the percentage change body weight: the change from just
to the left to the just to the right of the BMI=30 cutoff is positive.
One concern is that the sample of beneficiaries whose BMI is recorded might not be
a random sample. For example, Bardia et al. (2007) found that older and male patients
were significantly less likely to be diagnosed as having obesity, whereas those with a BMI
greater than 35, diabetes mellitus and obstructive sleep apnea were significantly more
likely to have the diagnosis made. Therefore, it is a concern that our sample is likely to
oversample the young and females, as well as those with obesity-related illness. Figure C2
to Figure C4 show the average age, the percentage of beneficiaries that are female, and
average number of co-morbidities the beneficiaries have, for each BMI category. One can
see that beneficiaries with a higher BMI are younger, are of about the same number of
co-morbidities, and are more likely to be females. We can control for these characteristics
in our analysis, as well as race categories, and the dummy variables indicating ever and
new diagnosis of all 27 chronic conditions.
Another concern is that the duration of the period for which we observe the BMIs are
different for different individuals. Figure C5 draws the density graph of the number of
weeks between the first and last BMI, or the duration for which the percentage change of
BMI is defined. In our analysis, we can control for the fixed effects for the number of weeks
elapsed between the two BMIs, thus this is not a concern.
3.5 MAIN RESULTS
Table C3 shows the main results. Column 1 shows the reduced form results from estimating
equation (1). Being qualified for the program is associated with a weight gain of about
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0.9%. Column 2 reports the naive OLS regression between the usage and the weight change.
Similarly, using the IBT at least once is associated with about 0.9% of weight gain. Column
3 reports the IV results, using the qualification status to instrument the dummy variable
indicating ever using the IBT. The first-stage t-statistics of the instrumental variable is
reported as well. The first stage is strong, and the IV estimate is much larger than the
OLS one, and is statistically significant at 5% level: using the IBT is associated with a 9%
increase of BMI. Column 4 reports the IV results on the effects of the total number of IBT
usages on BMI change, using the qualification dummy as the instrument. The estimate is
positive and statistically significant at 5% level. Each IBT usage is associated with about
2.3% of weight gain. Given that on overage beneficiaries who ever used IBT used it for 4
times (mean is 3.99), the IBT usage is associated with a total of 10% (=4 × 2.5%) gain
body weight, which is pretty similar to the estimate from column 3.
The next four columns repeat the analysis but with a series of control variables, such as
gender, race categories, age fixed effects (to control for the unobserved factors affecting the
weight changes for beneficiaries with different ages), HRR fixed effects (to control for the
common factors that affect the weight changes of beneficiaries living in the same Hospital
Referral Region), the total number of co-morbidities, and dummies variables indicating ever
diagnoses of 27 types of chronic conditions and new diagnoses of these conditions. The
estimate remains similar and statistically significant, which is reassuring that the covariates
do not significantly change the results and the identified estimates indeed come from the
variation between the outcome variable just to the left and just to the right of the cutoff
point.
Why is the estimate using the IV approach much larger than the estimate using the
OLS approach? The reason is that the IBT service is not effective in reducing weight for the
beneficiaries whose BMI is just above the cut-off: their weight actually increases following
the service. However, from the motivating graphs, we do see a decrease in the BMI among
the beneficiaries whose initial BMI is much higher than 30: there weights reduce after the
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usage of the IBT service. However, because the identifying power of the IV approach, or
the Regression Discontinuity approach, only comes from the variation among beneficiaries
just below and just above the cutoff points, we cannot attribute the weight loss of the very
obese beneficiaries to the IBT program. Therefore, although the conclusion is that the IBT
service is not effective in reducing weight, we do observe a reduction of the weight among
beneficiaries who are with a much higher BMI.
This intuition is demonstrated in the Table C4 and Table C5, which show the subsample
results by gender, race and age groups. In Table C4, the IV estimates are only significant
among the males and the whites. Because the beneficiaries with larger BMIs are less likely
to be males and whites (Figure C4 and Table C2), it seems that part of the reduction of
weights observed are due to selection bias: female beneficiaries and non-white beneficiaries
are more likely to reduce weight.
Similarly, in Table C5, the IV estimates are only significant among the males and the
whites. Because the beneficiaries with larger BMIs are less likely to be males and whites
(Figure C2 and Table C2), it seems that part of the reduction of weights observed are due
to selection bias: female beneficiaries and non-white beneficiaries are more likely to reduce
weight.
3.6 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
Because the IBT users might also take other procedures that might reduce or increase
weight during the period, we look at four alternative services that the beneficiaries might
take and see if the weight change could be explained by those services.
We look at the use of smoke counseling, psychological counseling, massage, and bariatric
procedures. Table C6 to Table C11 estimate the effects using the baseline specifications
(column 3 and 4 in Table C3) for the users and non-users of the above procedures separately,
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and for the beneficiaries who have used none of the alternative procedures.9 All specifica-
tions have the covariates, HRR fixed effects, the co-morbidity index, the dummy variable
indicating ever- and new-diagnosis of chronic conditions, and the number-of-weeks-elapsed
fixed effects.
The take-away message is that IBT program is associated with weight gain among both
the users and non-users of most of these procedures, except that among the users of psycho-
logical therapy, using IBT is associated with weight reduction, although the impact is not
statistically significant, possibly due to the small sample size (the number of psychological
therapy users is 272).
To sum, the alternative procedures do not seem to impact the conclusion that the IBT
is not effective in reducing weight. Interestingly, if combined with the use of psychological
therapy, the IBT seems to be effective in reducing obesity, although we need a larger sample
for a more reliable estimate.
3.7 DISCUSSION
Why is there a lack of usage of the free services? The reason is that it is not free for
the physicians: the payments physicians receive from providing IBT is not enough to
compensate for the physicians’ time. The IBT is only allowed to be provided by the
primary care physicians, and is not allowed to be provided by nutritionists, physician
assistants, or other therapists. The average hourly wage of a primary care physician in the
U.S. in 2015 is $90. However, for each half-an-hour service of the IBT, the physicians only
receive a reimbursement of $26, which is less than a third of the opportunity cost of their
time.
9Note that in Table C10, we cannot do the analysis for the sample of users of the bariatric proce-
dures, because only patients with a BMI greater than 30 are allowed to use take the procedure. We need
beneficiaries with a BMI below 30 in the sample to conduct the IV estimation.
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In addition, the previous literature has shown that primary care physicians have a
tendency to discriminate against obese patients; there is obesity stigma in clinical care.
For example, primary care physicians have less respect, are less patient in communication,
are less likely to build rapport, and are less likely to offer more services, when facing obese
patients. See literature review in Phelan et al. (2015). For example, Gudzune et al. (2014)
found that weight loss discussions between patients and primary care physicians may lead
to greater weight loss in relationships where patients do not perceive judgment about their
weight.
There are a few concerns about the validity of the study. First, the sample for which we
observe a BMI coding is not random for non-IBT users. However, as long as there exists
no break in the trend of selection along BMIs—it is observationally difficult to tell whether
the beneficiary has a BMI of 29 or 30 (6.6 pounds’ difference) ex ante when the physicians
ask the patients to weigh their body weight—the Regression Discontinuity method would
take care of this issue, and we have internal validity.
Another concern might be the method of identifying BMI information using the claim-
based procedure. There are three reasons why it is a valid approach. First, Lloyd et al.
(2015) found that the claims-based diagnosis of obesity underestimates the true prevalence
in the older Medicare population with a low sensitivity (18.4%); however, this method has
a high specificity (97.3%) and is accurate when it is present. Therefore, in our sample,
the BMIs provide relatively correct information about the beneficiaries’ weight and height.
Second, Lloyd et al. (2015) found that the use of the obesity ICD-9 code increased over
the study period and was more prevalent in later years and that the use of obesity codes
will most likely continue to increase, due to increased use of these codes by physicians
associated with treatment for individuals with the most severe obesity (Kuhle et al., 2011),
such as bariatric surgery or the IBT for obesity program. Because our sample period is
2011-2012, the sensitivity in our sample may be much higher. Third, Lloyd et al. (2015)
found that combining a claims-based obesity diagnosis with co-morbidities improves obesity
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identification among older adults. We control for the number of co-morbidities in our
regressions, thus again this is not an issue.
Finally, there might be concern that our sample is not a representative sample of the
whole Medicare population. Breault et al. (2002) noted that obesity is not usually a billable
diagnosis, so clinicians often do not list it or do so sporadically.10 However, because we only
have the “flow” data on obesity from the Medicare claims in 2011-2012, it is impossible to
fully identify the “stock” of obese population.
3.8 CONCLUSION
This paper investigate the causal impact of physician counseling on obesity exploiting the
eligibility criterion of the Medicare’s Intensive Behavioral Therapy for Obesity program,
using a fuzzy Regression Discontinuity design. We find that the IBT program is not effective
in reducing weights. The weight reduction observed for the obese beneficiaries is due to
the selection bias, or other factors not related to the usage of IBT program. The likely
reason is the lack of interest from both the beneficiaries’ and the physicians’ perspectives.
This paper contributes to the policy debates that we should broaden the scope of the
IBT program, and allow non-primary-care practitioners, such as the registered dietitians
or other nutrition professionals, to provide the IBT service. In our sample, the nurse
10Breault et al. (2002) documented that despite the ease of determining BMI, surveys have indicated
that only 38 to 66 percent of overweight or obese patients have received diagnoses of overweight or obesity,
and less than half of obese patients report that their physicians have advised them to lose weight and/or
provided specific information about how to lose weight. According to the most recent data from the U.S.
National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey, almost 50 percent of clinic visits lack complete height and
weight data needed to screen for obesity using BMI. Of those visits where BMI was determined to be ≥30
kg/m2, 70 percent of patients were not given a diagnosis of obesity and 63 percent did not receive any
counseling for weight reduction. Even among those who suffer from obesity-related co-morbidities, only 52
percent were screened for obesity, 34 percent were diagnosed with obesity, and 46 percent were counseled
about their obesity. When overweight American adults were surveyed, only 24.4 percent of obese Americans
were referred by their physician to a dietician or nutritionist and 11 percent were recommended to a formal
diet program; less than 10 percent of those who were overweight were referred for these nutritional services.
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practitioners provided 4.64% of all IBT services, and the physician assistants provided
1.03%. If more eligible beneficiaries use the IBT service and use it for a longer period
of time, we expect to see reduction of obesity and a more efficient use of the Medicare
resources.
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Figure A1: Trend of In-Hospital Breastfeeding Initiation Rates, 1965-2001
Source: Ryan et al. (2002)
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Figure A2: Trend of The Percentage of Babies Breastfed at Month 6, 1971-2001
Source: Ryan et al. (2002)
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Figure A3: Breastfeeding Initiation, 2000-2010
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Source: Author’s calculation using National Immunization Survey, 2003-2013.
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Figure A4: Breastfeeding at Month 6, 2000-2010
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Source: Author’s calculation using National Immunization Survey, 2003-2013.
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Figure A5: The Years of Passage of State Laws Regarding Workplace Breastfeeding Sup-
port
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Figure A6: Theoretical Framework, Mandated Benefits in General
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Figure A7: Theoretical Framework, Workplace Breastfeeding Benefits
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Figure A8: Effects of Workplace Breastfeeding Benefits Mandates on the Duration of
Breastfeeding
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Notes: The figure shows the Kaplan-Meier survival curves for the number of weeks of breastfeeding with
and without access to the workplace breastfeeding law. The y-axis is the fraction of babies who are still
breastfed at each week after birth. The difference between the two groups is statistically significant at the
5% level.
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Figure A9: Labor Market Effects of the Workplace Breastfeeding Benefits Mandates, Extensive Margins
Notes: The y-axis plots the estimate and the 95% confidence intervals for the interaction term of the Women with infant children dummy
and the dummy variable denoting k years post the enactment of the state level mandate. Note that k = −5 denotes that the year is 5
or more than 5 years before the state mandate, and k = 8 denotes the year is 8 or more than 8 years following mandate. The covariates
include the state specific time trends.
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Figure A10: Labor Market Effects of the Workplace Breastfeeding Benefits Mandates, Intensive Margins
Notes: The y-axis plots the estimate and the 95% confidence intervals for the interaction term of the Women with infant children dummy
and the dummy variable denoting k years post the enactment of the state level mandate. Note that k = −5 denotes that the year is 5
or more than 5 years before the state mandate, and k = 8 denotes the year is 8 or more than 8 years following mandate. The covariates
include the state specific time trends.
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Figure A11: Labor Market Effects of the Workplace Breastfeeding Benefits Mandates, Outcomes in the previous year
Notes: The y-axis plots the estimate and the 95% confidence intervals for the interaction term of the Women with infant children dummy
and the dummy variable denoting k years post the enactment of the state level mandate. Note that k = −5 denotes that the year is 5
or more than 5 years before the state mandate, and k = 8 denotes the year is 8 or more than 8 years following mandate. The covariates
include the state specific time trends.
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Figure A12: Long-Term, Spill-Over, and Lagged Effects on Labor Force Participation
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Notes: The figure shows the relative magnitudes of the long-term effects and the spill-over effects. For the long-term effects, the y axis
denotes the estimates for beta3 in equation (1.10) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. For the spill-over effects, the y axis denotes the estimates for
beta3 in equation (1.9) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. The x axis denotes k, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. For the lagged effects, the y axis denotes the
estimates for beta3 in equation (1.8) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}.
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Figure A13: Long-Term, Spill-Over, and Lagged Effects on Probability of Being Employed
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Notes: The figure shows the relative magnitudes of the long-term effects and the spill-over effects. For the long-term effects, the y axis
denotes the estimates for beta3 in equation (1.10) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. For the spill-over effects, the y axis denotes the estimates for
beta3 in equation (1.9) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. The x axis denotes k, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. For the lagged effects, the y axis denotes the
estimates for beta3 in equation (1.8) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}.
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Figure A14: Long-Term, Spill-Over, and Lagged Effects on Probability of Working
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Notes: The figure shows the relative magnitudes of the long-term effects and the spill-over effects. For the long-term effects, the y axis
denotes the estimates for beta3 in equation (1.10) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. For the spill-over effects, the y axis denotes the estimates for
beta3 in equation (1.9) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. The x axis denotes k, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. For the lagged effects, the y axis denotes the
estimates for beta3 in equation (1.8) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}.
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Figure A15: Long-Term, Spill-Over, and Lagged Effects on Hours of Work
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Notes: The figure shows the relative magnitudes of the long-term effects and the spill-over effects. For the long-term effects, the y axis
denotes the estimates for beta3 in equation (1.10) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. For the spill-over effects, the y axis denotes the estimates for
beta3 in equation (1.9) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. The x axis denotes k, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. For the lagged effects, the y axis denotes the
estimates for beta3 in equation (1.8) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}.
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Figure A16: Long-Term, Spill-Over, and Lagged Effects on Probability of Working Part Time
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Notes: The figure shows the relative magnitudes of the long-term effects and the spill-over effects. For the long-term effects, the y axis
denotes the estimates for beta3 in equation (1.10) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. For the spill-over effects, the y axis denotes the estimates for
beta3 in equation (1.9) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. The x axis denotes k, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. For the lagged effects, the y axis denotes the
estimates for beta3 in equation (1.8) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}.
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Figure A17: Long-Term, Spill-Over, and Lagged Effects on Probability of Being Paid Hourly
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Notes: The figure shows the relative magnitudes of the long-term effects and the spill-over effects. For the long-term effects, the y axis
denotes the estimates for beta3 in equation (1.10) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. For the spill-over effects, the y axis denotes the estimates for
beta3 in equation (1.9) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. The x axis denotes k, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. For the lagged effects, the y axis denotes the
estimates for beta3 in equation (1.8) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}.
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Figure A18: Long-Term, Spill-Over, and Lagged Effects on Hourly Wage (if Being Paid Hourly)
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Notes: The figure shows the relative magnitudes of the long-term effects and the spill-over effects. For the long-term effects, the y axis
denotes the estimates for beta3 in equation (1.10) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. For the spill-over effects, the y axis denotes the estimates for
beta3 in equation (1.9) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. The x axis denotes k, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. For the lagged effects, the y axis denotes the
estimates for beta3 in equation (1.8) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}.
110
Figure A19: Long-Term, Spill-Over, and Lagged Effects on Employment Last Year (Unconditional)
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Notes: The figure shows the relative magnitudes of the long-term effects and the spill-over effects. For the long-term effects, the y axis
denotes the estimates for beta3 in equation (1.10) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. For the spill-over effects, the y axis denotes the estimates for
beta3 in equation (1.9) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. The x axis denotes k, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. For the lagged effects, the y axis denotes the
estimates for beta3 in equation (1.8) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}.
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Figure A20: Long-Term, Spill-Over, and Lagged Effects on Probability of Being Employed Full Time
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Notes: The figure shows the relative magnitudes of the long-term effects and the spill-over effects. For the long-term effects, the y axis
denotes the estimates for beta3 in equation (1.10) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. For the spill-over effects, the y axis denotes the estimates for
beta3 in equation (1.9) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. The x axis denotes k, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. For the lagged effects, the y axis denotes the
estimates for beta3 in equation (1.8) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}.
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Figure A21: Long-Term, Spill-Over, and Lagged Effects on Hourly Wage Last Year
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Notes: The figure shows the relative magnitudes of the long-term effects and the spill-over effects. For the long-term effects, the y axis
denotes the estimates for beta3 in equation (1.10) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. For the spill-over effects, the y axis denotes the estimates for
beta3 in equation (1.9) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. The x axis denotes k, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}. For the lagged effects, the y axis denotes the
estimates for beta3 in equation (1.8) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 7}.
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Table A1 – Continued
State Year Words for Reasonable Lengths Words for Employer Reasonable
break break time space definition effort
Vermont 2008 shall Y 3 years shall Y
Virginia 20024 encourage Y Infant encourage Y
Washington 20015 designation
Wyoming 20036 encourage whenever flexible infant encourage whenever feasible
Notes: The table, which lists the years different states passed the “Workplace law”, summarizes state laws that require employers to
provide unpaid break time and a special space for expressing breast milk. States that have passed state laws supporting breastfeeding at
workplace are also included, such as Hawaii. The information is summarized on the website of National Conference of State Legislatures7,
Andrews (2012), and Abdulloeva and Eyler (2013). Y denotes yes, N denotes no.
7http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/breastfeeding-state-laws.aspx, accessed April 2015.
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2Hawaii only “Disallows employers to prohibit an employee from expressing breastmilk during any meal period or other break period
required by law to be provided by the employer or required by a collective bargaining agreement. (HB266 CD1)” http://www.capitol.
hawaii.gov/session1999/status/hb266_his_.htm
3North Dakota only regulates the designation of “infant friendly” employers: An employer may use the designation “infant friendly” on
its promotional materials if the employer adopts a workplace breastfeeding policy that includes the following: a. Flexible work scheduling,
including scheduled breaks and permitting work patterns that provide time for the expression of breast milk; b. A convenient, sanitary,
safe, and private location, other than a restroom, that allows privacy for breastfeeding or expressing breast milk; c. A convenient clean
and safe water source with facilities for washing hands and rinsing breast-pumping equipment located in the private location specified in
subdivision b; and d. A convenient hygienic refrigerator in the workplace for the temporary storage of the mother’s breast milk.
4Texas only regulates businesses designated as “mother-friendly”. Sec. 165.003. Business Designation as “Mother-Friendly”. (a) A
business may use the designation “mother-friendly” in its promotional materials if the business develops a policy that supports the practice
of work-site breastfeeding by addressing the following: (1) work schedule flexibility, including scheduling breaks and work patterns to
provide time for the expression of milk; (2) the provision of accessible locations that allow privacy; (3) access to a nearby clean and safe
water source and a sink for washing hands and rinsing out any needed breast-pumping equipment; and (4) access to hygienic storage
alternatives in the workplace for the mother’s breast milk. (b) The business shall submit its breastfeeding policy to the department. The
department shall maintain a list of “mother-friendly” businesses covered under this section and shall make the list available for public
inspection. Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 600, Sec. 1, eff. Aug. 28, 1995. See http://www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/Docs/HS/
htm/HS.165.htm#165.003
5Virginia encourages employers to recognize the benefits of breastfeeding and to provide unpaid break time and appropriate space for
employees who need to breastfeed or express milk for their infant children. http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?021+sum+
HJ145S
6Washington regulates “infant-friendly” employers: (1) An employer may use the designation ”infant-friendly” on its promotional
materials if the employer has an approved workplace breastfeeding policy that addresses at least the following: (a) Flexible work scheduling,
including scheduled breaks and permitting work patterns that provide time for the expression of breast milk; (b) A convenient, sanitary,
safe, and private location, other than a restroom, that provides privacy for breastfeeding or expressing breast milk; (c) A convenient
clean and safe water source with facilities for washing hands and rinsing breast-pumping equipment that is located in the private location
specified in (b) of this subsection; and (d) A convenient hygienic refrigerator in the workplace for the mother’s breast milk. http:
//app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=43.70.640
7Wyoming: “That the Legislature encourages breastfeeding and commends employers, both in the public and the private sector, who
make accommodations for breastfeeding mothers whenever feasible.” http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2003/enroll/hj0005.pdf
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Table A2: 1990 State-level Prediction of the Passage of the Workplace Breastfeeding Support Laws
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pct of pop Pct in Mean Mean Mean Mean
living in Pct white labor Pct wage welfare child firm
central force employed income income welfare size
metro areas income
Point Est. 1.485*** -0.835 -1.288 -1.913 2.39e-05 0.00240 -0.00385 -0.372
S.e (0.547) (0.683) (2.325) (2.343) (4.07e-05) (0.00198) (0.00582) (0.327)
R-squared 0.143 0.020 0.008 0.018 0.009 0.061 0.011 0.040
Pct of Pct of Pct of Pct of women Pct of women Labor force Employment Pct of women
women women women who are aged 15-44 participation of rate among aged 15-44
aged 15-21 aged 22-30 aged 31-44 college grads who are single women women that are
aged 15-44 aged 15-44 mothers
Point Est. 9.510 3.490 7.608** 3.915 2.394 -1.458 -1.458 -0.00158
S.e (8.461) (5.390) (3.517) (2.607) (2.586) (1.884) (1.884) (3.818)
R-squared 0.043 0.012 0.068 0.069 0.025 0.017 0.017 0.000
Ideology score Ideology score Ideology score Ideology score Ideology score
of Rep party of Dem party of the governor of the state of all citizens
institution
Point Est. 0.00517 0.0168 0.00348 0.00473 0.00457
S.e (0.00888) (0.0113) (0.00390) (0.00371) (0.00563)
R-squared 0.007 0.044 0.017 0.033 0.014
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the state ever passed the law by 2010, and 0 otherwise. Each estimate is the
parameter of the variable of interest in a separate regression of the dependent variable on the state-level characteristics of interest. The number of
observation is 51 in panel A and B, and 50 in panel C (D.C. is excluded). All regressions are weighted by the population weights. The F-statistics of
the regression of the passage on all characteristics is 1.51. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: 1990 Census. Berry et al. (1998).
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Table A3: 1990 State-level Prediction of the Time Lag of the Passage of the Workplace Breastfeeding Support Laws
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pct of pop Pct in Mean Mean Mean Mean
living in Pct white labor Pct wage welfare child firm
central force employed income income welfare size
metro areas income
Point Est. 7.506 -1.239 -14.69 -19.72 0.000157 0.0279* 0.0197 -3.432
S.e (7.670) (6.876) (23.85) (23.01) (0.000370) (0.0159) (0.0484) (2.828)
R-squared 0.040 0.000 0.011 0.020 0.004 0.091 0.003 0.037
Pct of Pct of Pct of Pct of women Pct of women Labor force Employment Pct of women
women women women who are aged 15-44 participation of rate among aged 15-44
aged 15-21 aged 22-30 aged 31-44 college grads who are single women women that are
aged 15-44 aged 15-44 mothers
Point Est. -22.23 2.892 36.49 37.90 19.41 -10.82 -10.82 2.268
S.e (83.00) (43.96) (40.53) (26.05) (28.25) (18.38) (18.38) (28.20)
R-squared 0.003 0.000 0.017 0.071 0.018 0.010 0.010 0.000
Ideology score Ideology score Ideology score Ideology score Ideology score
of Rep party of Dem party of the governor of the state of all citizens
institution
Point Est. 0.0867 0.151 0.0316 0.0146 0.0358
S.e (0.108) (0.111) (0.0438) (0.0489) (0.0572)
R-squared 0.016 0.029 0.011 0.003 0.007
Notes: The dependent variable equals the year of passage minus 1995, i.e. the lag from the first state that passed the law. Each estimate is the
parameter of the variable of interest in a separate regression of the dependent variable on the state-level characteristics of interest. The number of
observation is 51 in panel A and B, and 50 in panel C (D.C. is excluded). All regressions are weighted by the population weights. The F-statistics of
the regression of the passage on all characteristics is 1.38. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: 1990 Census. Berry et al. (1998).
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Table A4: Summary Statistics of the National Immunization Survey Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Control states Treated states: before law Treated states: after law
VARIABLES Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Ever breastfeed 0.734 0.442 0.766 0.423 0.793 0.405
Male Child 0.513 0.500 0.513 0.500 0.511 0.500
Married 0.731 0.444 0.766 0.423 0.740 0.439
Hispanic 0.144 0.351 0.154 0.361 0.264 0.441
White 0.628 0.483 0.680 0.466 0.519 0.500
Black 0.142 0.349 0.0892 0.285 0.103 0.304
Other race 0.0860 0.280 0.0770 0.267 0.114 0.318
Non white 0.372 0.483 0.320 0.466 0.481 0.500
High School Dropouts 0.107 0.309 0.102 0.303 0.131 0.338
High School Graduates 0.222 0.416 0.237 0.425 0.199 0.399
Some College 0.238 0.426 0.226 0.418 0.232 0.422
College Graduates 0.433 0.495 0.435 0.496 0.438 0.496
First born 0.426 0.494 0.424 0.494 0.429 0.495
Number of children 1.888 0.614 1.888 0.620 1.887 0.612
Income poverty ratio (topcoded at 3) 1.939 1.104 1.918 1.076 1.886 1.127
Child Ever Received WIC 0.428 0.495 0.435 0.496 0.448 0.497
Child Receiving WIC 0.246 0.431 0.243 0.429 0.273 0.445
Mother Age≤19 0.0201 0.140 0.0197 0.139 0.0204 0.141
Mother 19<Age< 30 0.361 0.480 0.396 0.489 0.337 0.473
Mother Age≥30 0.619 0.486 0.585 0.493 0.643 0.479
Number of observations 115,522 25,923 111,689
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Table A5: Effects of Workplace Breastfeeding Benefits on Breastfeeding Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A: ever breastfeed
Mean of dependent var 0.76
Workplace Law 0.0121 0.0143 0.0115 0.0128 0.00579
(0.0110) (0.0108) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.00625)
One Year Before Law -0.00704
(0.0107)
Indecency Law -0.00846
(0.0143)
Jury Law 0.0191**
(0.00753)
Any-place Law -0.00580
(0.0103)
Observations 253,134 253,134 253,134 253,134 253,134
R-squared 0.121 0.121 0.121 0.121 0.119
B: log weeks of breastfeeding
Mean of dependent var (censored) 3.01
Workplace Law 0.0434** 0.0423* 0.0407** 0.0428** 0.0455*
(0.0208) (0.0233) (0.0191) (0.0186) (0.0248)
One Year Before Law 0.00338
(0.0183)
Indecency Law 0.0640
(0.0549)
Jury Law 0.00768
(0.0532)
Any-place Law -0.0244
(0.0430)
Observations 193,142 193,142 193,142 193,142 193,142
Statetrend Y Y Y Y Y
Other Policies Y
Region by Year FE Y
Unweighted Y
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A6: Hazard Model Estimates of the Effects of Workplace Breastfeeding Benefits on
the Duration of Breastfeeding
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES exponential Weibull Gompertz Cox
Workplace law -0.0359* -0.0389** -0.0387** -0.0408**
(0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0188)
Observations 193,174 193,174 193,174 193,174
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A7: Subsample Effects of Workplace Breastfeeding Benefits on the Initiation of Breastfeeding
ever bf (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES high dropout high grad some college college + age≤19 19-30 age≥30
Workplace law 0.0535 0.0268 -0.00926 -0.0121 0.126 0.0237* 0.00209
(0.0322) (0.0225) (0.0104) (0.0159) (0.110) (0.0140) (0.0140)
Observations 29,666 53,997 59,307 110,164 5,109 89,603 158,422
R-squared 0.164 0.094 0.063 0.036 0.163 0.118 0.098
VARIABLES married single White Black Hispanic other race
Workplace law -0.00578 0.0561*** 0.00895 0.0269 0.0162 0.0217
(0.0100) (0.0204) (0.0122) (0.0222) (0.0167) (0.0208)
Observations 186,862 66,272 148,156 30,232 50,109 24,637
R-squared 0.069 0.111 0.129 0.150 0.036 0.138
VARIABLES 1st inc decile 2nd decile 3rd decile 4th decile 5th decile top 50% inc dist miss inc info
Workplace law 0.0361 0.0275 0.00575 -0.00398 0.0435 -0.0125 0.0372
(0.0278) (0.0281) (0.0391) (0.0244) (0.0416) (0.0177) (0.0340)
Observations 22,899 22,916 22,892 22,912 22,941 114,406 24,168
R-squared 0.157 0.128 0.122 0.103 0.096 0.077 0.135
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A8: Subsample Effects of Workplace Breastfeeding Benefits on the Duration of Breastfeeding
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES high dropout high grad some college college + age≤19 19-30 age≥30
Workplace law 0.206*** 0.0885 -0.137*** 0.0558 -0.188 0.136*** -0.00221
(0.0748) (0.0580) (0.0493) (0.0438) (0.191) (0.0421) (0.0262)
Observations 18,765 34,419 44,951 95,007 2,704 63,147 127,291
VARIABLES married single White Black Hispanic other race
Workplace law 0.0370* 0.0588 -0.00191 -0.129 0.223*** 0.0381
(0.0190) (0.0536) (0.0355) (0.164) (0.0554) (0.0541)
Observations 153,164 39,978 117,447 17,040 39,621 19,034
VARIABLES 1st inc decile 2nd decile 3rd decile 4th decile 5th decile top 50% inc dist miss inc info
Workplace law 0.163 0.00781 0.0586 0.0283 -0.108 0.0645** 0.00725
(0.109) (0.125) (0.106) (0.0607) (0.0666) (0.0298) (0.0911)
Observations 13,582 15,445 16,208 16,814 17,690 95,407 17,996
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
124
Table A9: Summary Statistics of the Covariate Variables, the Current Population Survey, 1990-2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat: Females with infant children Control: Males
Workplace law=0 Workplace law=1 Workplace law=0 Workplace law=1
VARIABLES Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Individual covariates:
Age 28.55 5.724 28.98 5.880 31.71 7.826 31.58 7.940
Married 0.817 0.386 0.792 0.406 0.607 0.488 0.576 0.494
Non white 0.166 0.372 0.202 0.401 0.151 0.358 0.214 0.410
High school dropout 0.205 0.404 0.179 0.383 0.202 0.401 0.188 0.391
High school graduates 0.264 0.441 0.260 0.438 0.303 0.459 0.301 0.459
Some college 0.287 0.452 0.266 0.442 0.293 0.455 0.282 0.450
College plus 0.244 0.429 0.296 0.456 0.202 0.402 0.229 0.420
Having one child 0.370 0.483 0.357 0.479 0.151 0.358 0.148 0.355
log real hh income last year 10.33 1.161 10.38 1.215 10.62 0.908 10.65 0.957
Jury exemption law 0.0662 0.249 0.375 0.484 0.0565 0.231 0.387 0.487
Indecency exemption law 0.264 0.441 0.374 0.484 0.261 0.439 0.366 0.482
Any-place law 0.360 0.480 0.892 0.311 0.359 0.480 0.890 0.313
N 34,392 10,864 493,318 151,748
Spouse characteristics:
Spouse age 31.84 6.242 32.37 6.596 33.68 6.876 33.90 7.036
Spouse married* 0.943 0.231 0.910 0.287 0.948 0.223 0.916 0.277
Spouse nonwhite 0.115 0.320 0.163 0.369 0.114 0.318 0.171 0.376
Spouse high school droupout 0.171 0.376 0.174 0.379 0.154 0.361 0.144 0.352
Spouse high school graduate 0.274 0.446 0.263 0.440 0.288 0.453 0.262 0.440
Spouse some college 0.269 0.444 0.241 0.428 0.304 0.460 0.285 0.451
Spouse college plus 0.286 0.452 0.322 0.467 0.254 0.435 0.309 0.462
Spouse in labor force 0.961 0.193 0.960 0.196 0.736 0.441 0.704 0.457
N 27,257 8,668 274,873 84,013
Notes: *The CPS links a person’s spouse/partner as the “spouse” used here. Thus, a person who is not married can have a “spouse”.
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Table A10: Summary Statistics of the Outcome Variables, the Current Population Survey, 1990-2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD
Treat: Females with infant children Control: Males
Workplace law=0 Workplace law=1 Workplace law=0 Workplace law=1
Outcomes in the reference week:
In labor force 34,392 0.569 0.495 10,864 0.550 0.497 493,318 0.886 0.318 151,748 0.872 0.334
Employed (if in labor force) 19,584 0.926 0.262 5,979 0.916 0.278 437,018 0.931 0.253 132,371 0.925 0.264
At work (if employed) 18,129 0.852 0.355 5,475 0.851 0.356 406,863 0.973 0.161 122,416 0.974 0.158
Part time (if at work) 15,444 0.430 0.495 4,658 0.410 0.492 396,017 0.162 0.369 119,288 0.176 0.380
log hours work (if at work) 15,444 3.351 0.625 4,658 3.375 0.624 396,017 3.677 0.431 119,288 3.651 0.448
Paid hourly (if at work) 15,444 0.144 0.351 4,658 0.137 0.344 396,017 0.129 0.336 119,288 0.126 0.332
log hourly wage if paid hourly 1,973 2.233 0.508 438 2.278 0.521 46,962 2.375 0.472 11,072 2.380 0.488
Treat: Females with 1-year-old children Control: Males
Workplace law=0 Workplace law=1 Workplace law=0 Workplace law=1
Outcomes in the previous year:
Employed last year 35,287 0.647 0.478 11,481 0.619 0.486 493,318 0.906 0.291 151,748 0.881 0.324
Full time last year (if employed) 22,819 0.643 0.479 7,108 0.672 0.469 447,171 0.885 0.319 133,718 0.879 0.326
log hourly wage last year 21,348 2.349 0.727 6,702 2.437 0.753 419,006 2.530 0.693 125,934 2.570 0.726
Notes: The table provides the summary statistics of the outcome variables for the treated and control groups, before and after the law, using the 1990-
2010 Current Population Survey. The sample includes people aged 18-44. The dummy variable “In labor force” equals 1 if the individual participates
in the labor force; otherwise it is 0. The dummy variable “Employed” is defined as individuals who are employed during the reference week of the
survey, and it equals 1 if the individual works during the reference week, and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable “At work” is defined for individuals
who are employed in the reference week, and it equals 1 if the individual works during the reference week, and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable “Part
time” is defined for individuals who worked during the reference week (last week), and it equals 1 if the individual works part-time (less than 35 hours)
during the reference week, and 0 otherwise. The variable “log hrs work” is defined for individuals who worked during the reference week. The variable
“Paid hourly” is defined for individuals who worked in the reference week, and it equals 1 if the wage is paid by hour, and 0 otherwise. The variable
“log hourly wage if paid hourly” is defined for individuals who received hourly paid wage in the reference week, and the wage is adjusted by the CPI
variable in the CPS. The variable “Employed last year” equals 1 if the individual is employed, and 0 otherwise; note that it is not conditional on being
in the labor force last year. The variable “Full time last year” is defined for individuals who were employed last year, and it equals 1 if the individual
works full time, and 0 otherwise. The variable “log hourly wage last year” is the log real hourly wage last year (both hourly and non-hourly paid)
adjusted by the CPI.
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Table A11 – Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All Single Married Married All Single Married Married
Spouse characteristics Y Y
Observations 535,400 177,537 357,863 316,077 51,975 5,791 46,184 44,665
R-squared 0.140 0.179 0.077 0.083 0.162 0.163 0.167 0.173
Panel E: Dependent variable =part time (less than 35h) if working last week
Law X mom of infants (control=males) -0.0313* 0.0395* -0.0459*** -0.0470***
(0.0158) (0.0228) (0.0139) (0.0137)
Law X mom of infants (control=fathers of infants) -0.0413** 0.0246 -0.0500*** -0.0509***
(0.0158) (0.0304) (0.0147) (0.0141)
Spouse characteristics Y Y
Observations 535,400 177,537 357,863 316,077 51,975 5,791 46,184 44,665
R-squared 0.143 0.190 0.067 0.072 0.158 0.183 0.157 0.161
Panel F: Dependent variable =paid hourly wage, if working last week
Law X mom of infants (control=males) -0.00800 -0.00227 -0.00993 -0.0106
(0.00836) (0.0198) (0.00929) (0.00947)
Law X mom of infants (control=fathers of infants) -0.0106* -0.0363 -0.0101 -0.0113
(0.00623) (0.0269) (0.00707) (0.00770)
Spouse characteristics Y Y
Observations 535,400 177,537 357,863 316,077 51,975 5,791 46,184 44,665
R-squared 0.035 0.028 0.036 0.038 0.051 0.076 0.052 0.054
Panel G: Dependent variable =log real hourly wage, if paid hour last week
Law X mom of infants (control=males) 0.0373 0.0354 0.0465 0.0667
(0.0307) (0.0330) (0.0382) (0.0405)
Law X mom of infants (control=fathers of infants) 0.0327 0.0513 0.0213 0.0469
(0.0400) (0.0768) (0.0428) (0.0368)
Spouse characteristics Y Y
Observations 60,445 25,491 34,954 29,781 5,506 930 4,576 4,356
R-squared 0.425 0.380 0.338 0.348 0.455 0.567 0.430 0.435
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A12: Effects of Workplace Breastfeeding Benefits on Labor Market Outcomes During the Previous Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All Single Married Married All Single Married Married
Panel A: Dependent variable =Employed last year (not conditional on in the labor force)
Law last year X mom of 1-yr-old (control=males) -0.00545 0.0206 -0.0164*** -0.0204***
(0.00511) (0.0149) (0.00508) (0.00514)
Law last year X mom of 1-yr-old (control=fathers of 1-yr-old) -0.0151** -0.00827 -0.0185*** -0.0197***
(0.00568) (0.0187) (0.00558) (0.00500)
Spouse characteristics Y Y
Observations 691,825 266,403 425,422 370,671 83,154 10,858 72,296 67,975
R-squared 0.512 0.459 0.574 0.585 0.610 0.488 0.637 0.649
Panel B: Dependent variable =Full time last year, if employed last year
Law last year X mom of 1-yr-old (control=males) 0.0385** 0.00428 0.0445*** 0.0426**
(0.0168) (0.0220) (0.0152) (0.0161)
Law last year X mom of 1-yr-old (control=fathers of 1-yr-old) 0.0431** 0.000341 0.0480*** 0.0461**
(0.0167) (0.0262) (0.0163) (0.0174)
Spouse characteristics Y Y
Observations 610,807 216,630 394,177 345,880 65,045 7,591 57,454 54,665
R-squared 0.221 0.222 0.129 0.145 0.217 0.189 0.229 0.239
Panel C: Dependent variable =log real hourly wage last year
Law last year X mom of 1-yr-old (control=males) 0.0183* -0.0379* 0.0339*** 0.0456***
(0.0106) (0.0220) (0.0111) (0.0110)
Law last year X mom of 1-yr-old (control=fathers of 1-yr-old) 0.0193** -0.0627** 0.0312*** 0.0468***
(0.00900) (0.0306) (0.0107) (0.00955)
Spouse characteristics Y Y
Observations 572,983 206,925 366,058 321,120 60,887 7,310 53,577 50,949
R-squared 0.361 0.259 0.319 0.336 0.400 0.244 0.381 0.386
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A13 – Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
baseline unweighted state cov state trends region by year FE no CA add gender wage gap other bf law
(0.00535)
Any place last year × mom of 1 year old -0.0136***
(0.00440)
Observations 370,671 370,675 370,675 370,671 370,671 335,856 237,369 370,671
R-squared 0.585 0.585 0.585 0.586 0.586 0.585 0.585
Panel I: Dependent variable = full time last year, if employed
Workplace last year × mom of 1 year old 0.0426** 0.0367** 0.0368** 0.0426** 0.0427** 0.0442** 0.0423** 0.0221
(0.0161) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0160) (0.0199) (0.0175) (0.0173)
Jury last year × mom of 1 year old -0.0284
(0.0188)
Indecency last year × mom of 1 year old -0.00831
(0.0155)
Any place last year × mom of 1 year old 0.0519***
(0.0152)
Observations 345,880 345,884 345,884 345,880 345,880 314,174 237,369 345,880
R-squared 0.145 0.150 0.150 0.145 0.145 0.151 0.164 0.145
Panel J: Dependent variable = log real hourly wage last year
Workplace last year × mom of 1 year old 0.0456*** 0.0387*** 0.0388*** 0.0453*** 0.0454*** 0.0414*** 0.0118 0.0238
(0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0108) (0.0112) (0.0111) (0.0165)
Jury last year × mom of 1 year old 0.00632
(0.0161)
Indecency last year × mom of 1 year old -0.00809
(0.0126)
Any place last year × mom of 1 year old 0.0342**
(0.0170)
Observations 321,120 321,123 321,123 321,120 321,120 291,927 237,369 321,120
R-squared 0.336 0.336 0.336 0.337 0.337 0.332 0.566 0.336
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A14 – Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Workplace Law 0.220 0.00892 -0.0192** -0.00186 0.0149 0.00618 0.00142 0.00551
(0.150) (0.00981) (0.00858) (0.0114) (0.0126) (0.0123) (0.0102) (0.0134)
Observations 20,102 20,102 20,102 20,102 20,102 20,102 20,102 20,102
R-squared 0.034 0.098 0.121 0.037 0.014 0.056 0.023 0.008
VARIABLES log hh inc sp age sp nonwhite sp married sp hgrad sp somecol sp colgrad sp in lab force
Workplace Law 0.0777*** -0.00121 0.00249 0.00294 -0.0148 0.0210 -0.000273 0.00597
(0.0270) (0.182) (0.00999) (0.00736) (0.0129) (0.0136) (0.0137) (0.00614)
Observations 19,955 16,459 16,459 16,459 16,459 16,459 16,459 16,459
R-squared 0.033 0.033 0.083 0.032 0.039 0.016 0.039 0.008
Panel D: hourly wage (paid by hour) known
VARIABLES age nonwhite hdropout hgrad somecol colgrad married firstchild
Workplace Law 0.230 0.0683** -0.0356 0.0181 -0.00607 0.0236 -0.00789 -0.00597
(0.464) (0.0314) (0.0290) (0.0375) (0.0385) (0.0295) (0.0348) (0.0403)
Observations 2,411 2,411 2,411 2,411 2,411 2,411 2,411 2,411
R-squared 0.060 0.176 0.177 0.064 0.043 0.050 0.070 0.033
VARIABLES log hh inc sp age sp nonwhite sp married sp hgrad sp somecol sp colgrad sp in lab force
Workplace Law 0.0113 0.252 0.110*** 0.0306 0.0423 0.0770* -0.0636* -0.00582
(0.0845) (0.586) (0.0346) (0.0266) (0.0445) (0.0444) (0.0373) (0.0182)
Observations 2,390 1,804 1,804 1,804 1,804 1,804 1,804 1,804
R-squared 0.074 0.064 0.158 0.091 0.090 0.056 0.063 0.055
Notes: The table shows estimates of β in equation (1.6): whether each individual’s characteristics differs according to the workplace breastfeeding
benefits status, for females with infant children. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A15 – Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Workplace Law 0.0765 0.00633 -0.0206*** -0.0180* 0.0232** 0.0154 0.00191 0.0246**
(0.128) (0.00832) (0.00740) (0.00950) (0.0104) (0.00997) (0.00843) (0.0111)
Observations 29,927 29,927 29,927 29,927 29,927 29,927 29,927 29,927
R-squared 0.034 0.105 0.124 0.037 0.009 0.048 0.022 0.005
VARIABLES log hh inc sp age sp nonwhite sp married sp hgrad sp somecol sp colgrad sp in lab force
Workplace Law 0.0487** 0.303* -0.00186 0.00340 0.00550 -0.0103 0.0187 -0.00538
(0.0224) (0.156) (0.00862) (0.00585) (0.0109) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.00505)
Observations 29,905 23,666 23,666 23,666 23,666 23,666 23,666 23,666
R-squared 0.035 0.031 0.090 0.025 0.035 0.014 0.036 0.006
Panel D: hourly wage last year known
VARIABLES age nonwhite hdropout hgrad somecol colgrad married firstchild
Workplace Law 0.0310 0.00534 -0.0223*** -0.0178* 0.0275** 0.0126 -0.000217 0.0272**
(0.132) (0.00869) (0.00768) (0.00986) (0.0107) (0.0103) (0.00880) (0.0115)
Observations 28,050 28,050 28,050 28,050 28,050 28,050 28,050 28,050
R-squared 0.034 0.107 0.124 0.038 0.009 0.047 0.021 0.005
VARIABLES log hh inc sp age sp nonwhite sp married sp hgrad sp somecol sp colgrad sp in lab force
Workplace Law 0.0412* 0.319** -0.00181 0.00293 0.00892 -0.0113 0.0170 -0.00554
(0.0229) (0.161) (0.00903) (0.00615) (0.0113) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.00532)
Observations 28,040 22,036 22,036 22,036 22,036 22,036 22,036 22,036
R-squared 0.035 0.032 0.091 0.026 0.036 0.013 0.036 0.007
Notes: The table shows estimates of β in equation (1.6): whether each individual’s characteristics differs according to the workplace breastfeeding
benefits status, for females whose youngest child is 1 year old. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A16 – Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
no discrimination× mom of 1 yr old 0.0119
(0.0389)
protection last yr× mom of 1 yr old 0.0382
(0.0401)
encourage last yr× mom of 1 yr old 0.0618**
(0.0238)
Observations 207,256 188,514 218,350 206,544 210,614
R-squared 0.156 0.160 0.158 0.153 0.151
Panel J: Dependent variable = log real hourly wage last year
longer break last yr× mom of 1 yr old 0.0812***
(0.0262)
bf and pump last yr× mom of 1 yr old 0.0703***
(0.0134)
no discrimination× mom of 1 yr old 0.0640***
(0.0189)
protection last yr× mom of 1 yr old 0.0533**
(0.0201)
encourage last yr× mom of 1 yr old 0.0325***
(0.00838)
Observations 192,721 175,437 202,857 191,945 195,810
R-squared 0.326 0.330 0.327 0.326 0.337
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A17: Occupational Characteristics of Temporal Flexibility, the CPS Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Workplace= 0 Workplace =1 Workplace =0 Workplace =1
VARIABLES N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD
Females with youngest child of 0 year old 34,392 1 0 10,864 1 0 493,318 0 0 151,748 0 0
Less Flexibility (average of the five characteristics) 20,630 0.0725 1.026 6,142 0.137 0.980 439,670 -0.0503 0.984 132,598 -0.0353 0.981
Time pressure 20,630 -0.190 1.093 6,142 -0.166 1.063 439,670 0.163 0.884 132,598 0.143 0.898
Contact with others 20,630 0.240 0.927 6,142 0.311 0.859 439,670 -0.223 1.018 132,598 -0.168 1.009
Establishing and maintaining interpersonal relationships 20,630 0.226 0.923 6,142 0.296 0.873 439,670 -0.210 1.013 132,598 -0.160 1.029
Structured vs. unstructured work 20,630 0.0863 1.008 6,142 0.124 0.955 439,670 -0.0475 1.003 132,598 -0.0533 1.001
Freedom to make decisions 20,630 -0.0709 1.061 6,142 -0.0662 1.034 439,670 0.107 0.949 132,598 0.0828 0.950
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Workplace= 0 Workplace =1
VARIABLES N Mean SD N Mean SD
Females with youngest child of 1 year old 35,287 1 0 11,481 1 0
Less Flexibility (average of the five characteristics) 22,252 0.0553 1.023 6,965 0.103 0.997
Time pressure 22,252 -0.195 1.095 6,965 -0.203 1.061
Contact with others 22,252 0.213 0.941 6,965 0.263 0.885
Establishing and maintaining interpersonal relationships 22,252 0.208 0.931 6,965 0.279 0.896
Structured vs. unstructured work 22,252 0.0820 1.008 6,965 0.111 0.973
Freedom to make decisions 22,252 -0.0726 1.054 6,965 -0.0566 1.046
Notes: The definitions for the five characteristics are: 1. Time pressure: How often does this job require the worker to meet strict deadlines? 2. Contact with others:
How much does this job require the worker to be in contact with others (face-to-face, by telephone, or otherwise) in order to perform it? 3. Establishing and maintaining
interpersonal relationships: Developing constructive and cooperative working relationships with others and maintaining them over time. 4. Structured versus unstructured
work: To what extent is this job structured for the worker, rather than allowing the worker to determine tasks, priorities, and goals? 5. Freedom to make decisions: How much
decision making freedom, without supervision, does the job offer. The variable LessFlexibilityi is defined as the average of the five characteristics for each occupation. I
merge the occupational characteristics for individual with occupational information in the CPS sample. The occupation variable in the CPS is “occ2010”; I use the crosswalk
between occ2010 and the 2010 SOC to link the occupation to its characteristics in the O*NET. Because the O*NET occupations are cross-referenced by the industry, I
weigh the detailed occupation characteristics by the number of observations in each occupations, so that the characteristics can be matched to the CPS occupations. I then
normalize the characteristics to have a mean zero and a standard deviation of 1, a` la the approach in (Goldin, 2014).
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Table A18 – Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0.0177) (0.0169) (0.0165) (0.0183) (0.0179) (0.0174)
workplace last year X mom of 1 year old X non-flexible 0.00964
(0.00657)
workplace last year × mom of 1 year old X time pressure 0.00554
(0.0103)
workplace last year × mom of 1 year old X contact others -0.00382
(0.00786)
workplace last year × mom of 1 year old X establish relationship 0.0192***
(0.00572)
workplace last year × mom of 1 year old X structured workplace 0.00728
(0.00613)
workplace last year × mom of 1 year old X freedom making decisions 0.00395
(0.00586)
Observations 339,029 339,029 339,029 339,029 339,029 339,029
R-squared 0.129 0.132 0.127 0.127 0.128 0.128
Panel H: Dependent variable = log real hourly wage last year
workplace last year × mom of 1 year old 0.0379*** 0.0380*** 0.0447*** 0.0321*** 0.0369*** 0.0438***
(0.00929) (0.0123) (0.0114) (0.00728) (0.00862) (0.0105)
workplace last year X mom of 1 year old X non-flexible 0.00496
(0.0120)
workplace last year × mom of 1 year old X time pressure 0.0161
(0.0119)
workplace last year × mom of 1 year old X contact others -0.00425
(0.00670)
workplace last year × mom of 1 year old X establish relationship -0.0124
(0.0160)
workplace last year × mom of 1 year old X structured workplace 0.00438
(0.0144)
workplace last year × mom of 1 year old X freedom making decisions 0.0224**
(0.0107)
Observations 314,880 314,880 314,880 314,880 314,880 314,880
R-squared 0.349 0.338 0.339 0.346 0.350 0.347
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A19 – Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0.0568)
workplace last year × mom of 1 year old × central city -0.00908
(0.0203)
Observations 321,120 321,120 277,582 321,120 264,748
R-squared 0.336 0.336 0.352 0.342 0.341
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A.3 ADDITIONAL TABLES
Table A20: Years of Other State Laws on Breastfeeding
State Name Any Place Jury Indecency
ALABAMA 2006
ALASKA 1998
ARIZONA 2006 2005
ARKANSAS 2007 2007
CALIFORNIA 1997 2000
COLORADO 2004
CONNECTICUT 1997 2012*
DELAWARE 1997
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 2007 2007
FLORIDA 1993 1993
GEORGIA 1999
HAWAII 2000
IDAHO 2002
ILLINOIS 2004 2006 1995
INDIANA 2003
IOWA 2002 1994
KANSAS 2006 2006
KENTUCKY 2006 2007
LOUISIANA 2001
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table A20 – Continued
State Name Any Place Jury Indecency
MAINE 2001
MARYLAND 2003
MASSACHUSETTS 2008 2008
MICHIGAN 2012* 1994
MINNESOTA 1998 1998 1998
MISSISSIPPI 2006 2006 2006
MISSOURI 1999 2014* 1999
MONTANA 1999 2009 1999
NEBRASKA 2011* 2003
NEVADA 1995 1995
NEW HAMPSHIRE 1999
NEW JERSEY 1997
NEW MEXICO 1999
NEW YORK 1994 2002
NORTH CAROLINA 1993 1993
NORTH DAKOTA 2009 2009
OHIO 2005
OKLAHOMA 2004 2004 2004
OREGON 1999 1999
PENNSYLVANIA 2007 2007
RHODE ISLAND 2008 1998
SOUTH CAROLINA 2005 2005
SOUTH DAKOTA 2012 2002
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table A20 – Continued
State Name Any Place Jury Indecency
TENNESSEE 2006 2006
TEXAS 1995
UTAH 1995 1995
VERMONT 2002
VIRGINIA 2002 2005 1994
WASHINGTON 2009 2001
WEST VIRGINIA 2014*
WISCONSIN 2009 1995
WYOMING 2007 2007
Notes: * denotes years later than 2010, and in this paper’s data sample these states are considered without
the law. Column (1) is the “Any place” law, which summarizes the state laws that allow women to breastfeed
in any public and private place. Column (2) is the “Jury” exemption law, which exempts nursing women
from jury duty. Column (3) is the “Indecency” exemption law, which allows breastfeeding in public to be
exempted from public indecency laws.
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Table A21 – Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Single Married Married
Law last year X mom of 1-yr-old (control=females without children) 0.0422*** 0.00710 0.0377** 0.0320**
(0.0146) (0.0211) (0.0146) (0.0156)
Spouse characteristics Y
Observations 246,271 141,718 104,553 81,248
R-squared 0.245 0.293 0.129 0.137
Dependent variable = hourly wage last year
Law last year X mom of 1-yr-old (control=females without children) -0.00101 -0.0357* 0.00611 0.0131
(0.0119) (0.0202) (0.0144) (0.0121)
Spouse characteristics Y
Observations 237,764 138,263 99,501 77,124
R-squared 0.332 0.304 0.318 0.329
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A22 – Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Single Married Married + sp cov
workplace X mom of infant -0.0216*** -0.0296 -0.0206* -0.0210*
(0.00701) (0.0202) (0.0103) (0.0114)
Observations 424,440 137,943 286,497 252,304
R-squared 0.035 0.028 0.036 0.039
Dependent variable =log hourly wage if paid hourly last week
workplace X mom of infant 0.0350 0.0747 0.0298 0.0348
(0.0396) (0.0542) (0.0427) (0.0461)
Observations 51,287 20,907 30,380 25,929
R-squared 0.431 0.388 0.342 0.351
(1) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable = employed last year
workplace last year X mom of 1 yr old -0.00981* 0.0182 -0.0186** -0.0235***
(0.00562) (0.0130) (0.00708) (0.00618)
Observations 580,321 218,948 361,373 314,401
R-squared 0.506 0.450 0.573 0.583
Dependent variable = full time last year
workplace last year X mom of 1 yr old 0.0360 0.0176 0.0365* 0.0366*
(0.0219) (0.0253) (0.0195) (0.0207)
Observations 516,022 180,304 335,718 294,064
R-squared 0.223 0.225 0.135 0.152
Dependent variable = hourly wage last year
workplace last year X mom of 1 yr old 0.0239** -0.0327 0.0388** 0.0471***
(0.0119) (0.0255) (0.0150) (0.0139)
Observations 483,509 172,190 311,319 272,602
R-squared 0.361 0.260 0.318 0.336
Notes: For the flow outcomes, the years are 1990-2006. For the stock outcomes, the years are 1990-2007. Standard errors in parentheses and are
clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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CHAPTER 2 APPENDIX
B.1 FIGURES
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Figure B1: Variation of the AWV Take-up Rates at HRR Level
Notes: The sample consists of beneficiaries who are at least 65, have 0 months of HMO, have continuous enrollment of Part A and Part
B, and who do not move between HRRs, during 2008-2013. The take-up rate of AWV is defined as the percentage of beneficiaries in
each HRR who used the initial Annual Wellness Visit Service during 2011. The number of observations is 306. The mean is 0.07262; the
standard deviation is 0.043999; the min is 0.003531 and the max is 0.242652.
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Figure B2: Distribution of the AWV Take-up Rates at HRR Level
Notes: The sample consists of beneficiaries who are at least 65, have 0 months of HMO, have continuous enrollment of Part A and Part
B, and who do not move between HRRs, during 2008-2013. The take-up rate of AWV is defined as the percentage of beneficiaries in each
HRR who used the initial Annual Wellness Visit Service during 2011. The geographical information is from the Dartmouth Atlas of Health
Care.
162
Figure B3: Effects of Removing Costs on Usage of Abdominal Aortic Aneurysm (AAA)
Screening
Notes: The figure plots an event-study of the usage of AAA among all non-movers who live in the 1st, 5th,
and 10th decile of the AWV take-up rate at HRR distribution. The y-axis plots the residual of a regression
of the usage of AAA on the gender, race categories, birth year fixed effects, and monthly dummies.
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Figure B4: Effects of Removing Costs on Usage of Bone Mass Measurement
Notes: The figure plots an event-study of the usage of bone mass measurement among all non-movers who
live in the 1st, 5th, and 10th decile of the AWV take-up rate at HRR distribution. The y-axis plots the
residual of a regression of the usage of bone mass measurement on the gender, race categories, birth year
fixed effects, and monthly dummies.
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Figure B5: Effects of Removing Costs on Usage of Medical Nutritional Therapy
Notes: The figure plots an event-study of the usage of bone mass measurement among all non-movers who
live in the 1st, 5th, and 10th decile of the AWV take-up rate at HRR distribution. The y-axis plots the
residual of a regression of the usage of medical nutritional therapy on the gender, race categories, birth year
fixed effects, and monthly dummies.
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Figure B6: Effects of Removing Costs on Usage of Hepatitis B Vaccine
Notes: The figure plots an event-study of the usage of bone mass measurement among all non-movers who
live in the 1st, 5th, and 10th decile of the AWV take-up rate at HRR distribution. The y-axis plots the
residual of a regression of the usage of Hepatitis B vaccine on the gender, race categories, birth year fixed
effects, and monthly dummies.
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Figure B7: Effects of Removing Costs on Usage of Pap Tests
Notes: The figure plots an event-study of the usage of bone mass measurement among all non-movers who
live in the 1st, 5th, and 10th decile of the AWV take-up rate at HRR distribution. The y-axis plots the
residual of a regression of the usage of pap test on race categories, birth year fixed effects, and monthly
dummies.
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Figure B8: Effects of Removing Costs on Usage of Pelvic Tests
Notes: The figure plots an event-study of the usage of bone mass measurement among all non-movers who
live in the 1st, 5th, and 10th decile of the AWV take-up rate at HRR distribution. The y-axis plots the
residual of a regression of the usage of pelvic test on race categories, birth year fixed effects, and monthly
dummies.
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Figure B9: Effects of removing costs on usage of Screening Mammography
Notes: The figure plots an event-study of the usage of bone mass measurement among all non-movers who
live in the 1st, 5th, and 10th decile of the AWV take-up rate at HRR distribution. The y-axis plots the
residual of a regression of the usage of screening Mammography on race categories, birth year fixed effects,
and monthly dummies.
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Figure B10: Effects of Removing Costs on Usage of Colonoscopy by Beneficiaries with Low
Risks of Colorectal Cancer for Colorectal Screening
Notes: The figure plots an event-study of the usage of bone mass measurement among all non-movers
who live in the 1st, 5th, and 10th decile of the AWV take-up rate at HRR distribution. The y-axis plots
the residual of a regression of the usage of screening colonoscopy (low risk of colorectal cancer) on race
categories, birth year fixed effects, and monthly dummies.
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Figure B11: Effects of removing costs on usage of colonoscopy by beneficiaries with high
risks of colorectal cancer for colorectal screening
Notes: The figure plots an event-study of the usage of bone mass measurement among all non-movers
who live in the 1st, 5th, and 10th decile of the AWV take-up rate at HRR distribution. The y-axis plots
the residual of a regression of the usage of screening colonoscopy (high risk of colorectal cancer)on race
categories, birth year fixed effects, and monthly dummies.
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B.2 TABLES
Table B1: Summary Statistics of Non-Movers (same HRR during 2008-2013)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
#beneficiaries in each HRR 801,752 4,881 3,659 369 15,428
Year of birth 801,752 1,933 6.794 1,868 1,946
Male 801,752 0.374 0.484 0 1
Female 801,752 0.626 0.484 0 1
Race unknown 801,752 0.000819 0.0286 0 1
White 801,752 0.887 0.317 0 1
Black 801,752 0.0670 0.250 0 1
Other 801,752 0.0135 0.115 0 1
Asian 801,752 0.0150 0.121 0 1
Hispanic 801,752 0.0128 0.112 0 1
North American natives 801,752 0.00409 0.0638 0 1
Notes: The sample consists of all fee-for-services Medicare beneficiaries who are at least 65, have 0 months of
HMO, and have continuous enrollment of Part A and Part B during 2008-2013; in addition, the beneficiaries
stay in the same HRR during 2008-2013.
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Table B2: Summary Statistics of Movers (Same HRR in 2011-2012, and Another HRR in
2013)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Initial AWV IN 2011 15,225 0.0756 0.264 0 1
Initial AWV IN 2012 15,225 0.0598 0.237 0 1
Initial AWV IN 2013 15,225 0.0756 0.264 0 1
Initial or subsequent AWV in 2011 15,225 0.0884 0.284 0 1
Initial or subsequent AWV in 2012 15,225 0.114 0.318 0 1
Initial or subsequent AWV in 2013 15,225 0.134 0.340 0 1
Change of AWV use during 2012-2013 15,225 0.0191 0.359 -1 1
Change of decile during 2012-2013 15,225 0.130 3.337 -9 9
Year of birth 15,225 1,932 7.139 1,892 1,943
Male 15,225 0.347 0.476 0 1
Female 15,225 0.653 0.476 0 1
Race unknown 15,225 0.000920 0.0303 0 1
White 15,225 0.910 0.286 0 1
Black 15,225 0.0497 0.217 0 1
Other 15,225 0.0103 0.101 0 1
Asian 15,225 0.0118 0.108 0 1
Hispanic 15,225 0.0128 0.112 0 1
North American natives 15,225 0.00460 0.0677 0 1
Notes: The sample consists of all fee-for-services Medicare beneficiaries who are at least 65, have 0 months of
HMO, and have continuous enrollment of Part A and Part B during 2008-2013; in addition, the beneficiaries
stay in the same HRR during 2011 and 2012, but move to a different HRR in 2013. The decile of the AWV
take-up rates is assigned to HRRs.
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Table B3 – Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VAR ∆ use ∆ use ∆ use awv12 awv12 awv12 awv13 awv13 awv13
(0.0107) (0.0108) (0.00964) (0.00962) (0.0102) (0.0102)
7th -0.00197 -0.00231 -0.000367 1.68e-06 -0.00234 -0.00230
(0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0111) (0.0111)
8th -0.0358*** -0.0359*** -0.000491 0.00122 -0.0363*** -0.0347***
(0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0108) (0.0108)
9th -0.00797 -0.00747 -0.0216** -0.0204* -0.0296** -0.0278**
(0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0118) (0.0118)
Cov Y Y Y
Obs 15,225 15,225 15,225 15,225 15,225 15,225 15,225 15,225 15,225
R-sq 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.021 0.028 0.001 0.023 0.029
Notes: The sample consists of beneficiaries who lives in the same HRR in 2011 and 2012, but moves to a different HRR in 2013. The
variable “change of AWV use” denotes the dummy variable of AWV use in 2013 minus dummy variable of AWV use in 2012. ∆Decilei
denotes the decile of AWV rate in the destination HRR (in 2013) minus the decile in the origin HRR (in 2012). The “2012 Deciles” and
“2013 Deciles” are the origin and destination fixed effects, respectively (note that the omitted category is living in the first decile in 2012).
The vector of individual covariates includes gender, race categories (White, Black, Asian, Hispanics, North American natives, other races,
and the omitted category is the unknown), and year-of-birth fixed effects.
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Table B4 – Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year Mean S.D. Year Mean S.D.
2009 0.048 0.214 2012 0.0396 0.195
2010 0.0489 0.216 2013 0.0346 0.183
AAA (Abdominal aortic aneurysm screening) 2008 0.000510 0.0226 2011 0.0017 0.0411
2009 0.000615 0.0248 2012 0.00206 0.0453
2010 0.000854 0.0292 2013 0.0021 0.0458
Bone mass measurement 2008 0.103 0.304 2011 0.103 0.304
2009 0.101 0.301 2012 0.0908 0.287
2010 0.108 0.311 2013 0.0841 0.278
Medical nutritional therapy 2008 0.00211 0.0458 2011 0.00248 0.0497
2009 0.00214 0.0462 2012 0.00257 0.0506
2010 0.00239 0.0488 2013 0.00256 0.0506
Hepatitis B vaccination 2008 0.000772 0.0278 2011 0.000664 0.0258
2009 0.000589 0.0243 2012 0.000736 0.0271
2010 0.000591 0.0243 2013 0.000780 0.0279
Panel B: Copayment/coinsurance applies, but deductible waived
Colotrectal cancer screening, flexible sigmoidoscopy, Barium Enema 2008 1.62e-05 0.00403 2011 8.73e-06 0.00295
2009 1.12e-05 0.00335 2012 6.24e-06 0.00250
2010 9.98e-06 0.00316 2013 2.49e-06 0.00158
Colotrectal cancer screening, screening colonoscopy Barium Enema 2008 7.48e-06 0.00274 2011 4.99e-06 0.00223
2009 8.73e-06 0.00295 2012 2.49e-06 0.00158
2010 8.73e-06 0.00295 2013 1.25e-06 0.00112
Notes: The table shows the average usage rates of the preventive services that are affected by the MPB, starting from Jan 1, 2011. The
number of the observations is 801,752. The sample consists of all fee-for-services Medicare beneficiaries who are at least 65, have 0 months
of HMO, and have continuous enrollment of Part A and Part B during 2008-2013; in addition, the beneficiaries stay in the same HRR
during 2008-2013. The definitions of the usages are shown in Appendix C.
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Table B5: Summary Statistics of Usages of Preventive Services Not Affected by MPB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year Mean S.D. Year Mean S.D.
Panel B: Always free
Flu vaccination 2008 0.406 0.491 2011 0.512 0.500
2009 0.403 0.490 2012 0.509 0.500
2010 0.505 0.500 2013 0.513 0.500
Pneumonia shots 2008 0.0478 0.213 2011 0.0414 0.199
2009 0.0379 0.191 2012 0.0416 0.200
2010 0.0406 0.197 2013 0.0418 0.200
Cardiovascular disease screening 2008 0.416 0.493 2011 0.451 0.498
2009 0.416 0.493 2012 0.437 0.496
2010 0.457 0.498 2013 0.430 0.495
Diabetes screening 2008 0.0484 0.215 2011 0.0416 0.200
2009 0.0441 0.205 2012 0.0386 0.193
2010 0.0451 0.208 2013 0.0366 0.188
Panel B: Always have patient costs
Glaucoma tests 2008 2.37e-05 0.00487 2011 1.87e-05 0.00433
2009 3.24e-05 0.00569 2012 4.12e-05 0.00642
2010 2.62e-05 0.00512 2013 3.99e-05 0.00632
Diabetes self management training 2008 0.00143 0.0378 2011 0.00162 0.0402
2009 0.00151 0.0388 2012 0.00154 0.0392
2010 0.00158 0.0397 2013 0.00161 0.0400
Prostate cancer screening 2008 0.0606 0.239 2011 0.0511 0.220
2009 0.0573 0.232 2012 0.0433 0.204
2010 0.0533 0.225 2013 0.0394 0.195
Colonoscopy for diagnostic purposes 2008 0.0805 0.272 2011 0.0716 0.258
2009 0.0735 0.261 2012 0.0656 0.248
2010 0.0764 0.266 2013 0.0613 0.240
Notes: The table shows the average usage rates of the preventive not affected by the MPB. The number of
the observations is 801,752. The sample consists of all fee-for-services Medicare beneficiaries who are at
least 65, have 0 months of HMO, and have continuous enrollment of Part A and Part B during 2008-2013;
in addition, the beneficiaries stay in the same HRR during 2008-2013. The definitions of the usages are
shown in Appendix C.
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Table B6 – Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
postXawv -0.000140 -3.85e-05 -0.000200
(0.000298) (0.000437) (0.000397)
Observations 4,810,512 4,810,512 1,799,202 3,011,310
R-squared 0.180 0.180 0.181 0.178
Colorectal screening: sig, barium Colorectal screening: col, barium
post -1.37e-05** -2.41e-05*** -3.08e-05** -2.01e-05* -6.24e-06 -1.53e-05 -3.25e-05** -5.19e-06
(5.64e-06) (9.01e-06) (1.37e-05) (1.04e-05) (4.96e-06) (1.04e-05) (1.48e-05) (1.06e-05)
postXawv 0.000136* 0.000141 0.000133 0.000118 0.000338** -1.03e-05
(7.00e-05) (9.92e-05) (8.73e-05) (8.49e-05) (0.000137) (8.47e-05)
Observations 4,810,512 4,810,512 1,799,202 3,011,310 4,810,512 4,810,512 1,799,202 3,011,310
R-squared 0.189 0.189 0.198 0.181 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167
Notes: The table shows the estimates of the regressions using equation (2.6) for preventive services that are affected by the MPB.
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Table B7 – Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Prostate cancer screening Diagnostic colonoscopy
post -0.0212*** -0.0210*** -0.0560*** -3.63e-05 -0.0192*** -0.0172*** -0.0220*** -0.0143***
(0.00104) (0.00170) (0.00451) (3.10e-05) (0.000702) (0.000919) (0.00139) (0.000923)
postXawv -0.00151 -0.00610 -0.000306 -0.0257*** -0.0347** -0.0207**
(0.0156) (0.0409) (0.000328) (0.00989) (0.0157) (0.00994)
Observations 4,810,512 4,810,512 1,799,202 3,011,310 4,810,512 4,810,512 1,799,202 3,011,310
R-squared 0.479 0.479 0.430 0.171 0.192 0.192 0.195 0.189
Notes: The table shows the estimates of the regressions using equation (2.6) for preventive services that are not affected by the MPB.
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B.3 DATA APPENDIX: DEFINITIONS OF USAGES
Treated (copayment/coinsurance waived, and deductible waived):
• AAAizt: HCPCS code is ‘G0389’.
• Hbvizt: HCPCS codes are: ‘90739’, ‘90740’, ‘90743’, ‘90744’, ‘90746’, ‘90747’, ‘G0010’.
• Mntizt: HCPCS codes: ‘97802’, ‘97803’, ‘97804’, ‘G0270’, ‘G0271’.
• Papizt: HCPCS codes are: ‘G0123’, ‘G0124’, ‘G0141’, ‘G0143’, ‘G0144’, ‘G0145’, ‘G0147’, ‘G0148’,
‘P3000’, ‘P3001’, ‘Q0091’.
• Pelvizt: HCPCS code: ’G0101’.
• Mammizt: HCPCS codes: ‘77052’, ‘77057’, ‘77063’, ‘G0202’;.
• Bnmssizt: HCPCS codes are:‘76977’, ‘77078’, ‘77080’, ‘77081’, ‘G0130’.
• ClrctLowRiskizt: HCPCS code is ’G0121’.
• ClrctHighRiskizt: HCPCS code is ’G0105’.
• Sigizt: HCPCS code is ‘G0104’.
• Fobtizt: HCPCS code is ‘G0328’.
• Bloodizt:HCPCS code is ‘82270’.
Somewhat treated (copayment/coinsurance applies, but deductible waived):
• SigBariumizt: HCPCS code is ‘G0106’; alternative to G0104.
• ColBariumizt: HCPCS code is ‘G0120’; alternative to G0105.
Placebo services (not affected by the MPB):
• ClrctDiagnosticizt: HCPCS code is ‘44388’, ‘44389’, ‘44390’, ‘44391’, ‘44392’, ‘44393’, ‘44394’, ‘44397’,
‘45355’, ‘45378’, ‘45379’, ‘45380’, ‘45381’, ‘45382’, ‘45383’, ‘45384’, ‘45385’, ‘45386’, ‘45387’, ‘45391’,
and ‘45392’.
• Prsttizt: HCPCS code is ‘G0103’, and ‘G0102’.
• Cardizt: HCPCS code is ‘80061’, ‘82465’, ‘83718’, and ‘84478’.
• Glucmizt: HCPCS code is ‘G0117’, and ‘G0118’.
• Dbtsscrnizt: HCPCS code is ‘82947’, ‘82950’, and ‘82951’.
• Dbtsslfmgmtizt: HCPCS code is ‘G0108’, and ‘G0109’.
• Fluizt: HCPCS code is ‘90653’, ‘90654’, ‘90655’, ‘90656’, ‘90657’, ‘90660’, ‘90661’, ‘90662’, ‘90672’,
‘90673’, ‘90685’, ‘90686’, ‘90687’, ‘90688’, ‘Q2034’, ‘Q2035’, ‘Q2036’, ‘Q2037’, ‘Q2038’, ‘Q2039’, and
‘G0008’.
• Pneumizt: HCPCS code is ‘90670’, ‘90732’, and ‘G0009’.
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APPENDIX C
CHAPTER 3 APPENDIX
C.1 FIGURES
185
Figure C1: BMI Profile of Percentage Change of BMI
Notes: The y-axis is the percentage change of BMI during the first and the final observation of BMI.
The x-axis is the first BMI observed since the start of the IBT program. The fitted line is drawn controlling
for the polynomials up to the fourth order.
186
Figure C2: BMI Profile of Age
Notes: The y-axis is age. The x-axis is the first BMI observed since the start of the IBT program. The
fitted line is drawn controlling for the polynomials up to the fourth order.
187
Figure C3: BMI Profile of co-morbidity Index
Notes: The y-axis is co-morbidity index. The x-axis is the first BMI observed since the start of the
IBT program. The fitted line is drawn controlling for the polynomials up to the fourth order.
188
Figure C4: BMI profile of Percentage of females
Notes: The y-axis is a dummy variable for being female. The x-axis is the first BMI observed since the
start of the IBT program. The fitted line is drawn controlling for the polynomials up to the fourth order.
189
Figure C5: Distribution of the Number of Weeks Between Observed BMIs
Notes: The variable equals the number of weeks between the first and last observed BMI, for each
beneficiary in the sample.
190
C.2 TABLES
191
Table C1: Summary Statistics by Qualification Status (BMI<30 and BMI≥30)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max N mean sd min max
First observed BMI<30 First observed BMI≥30
First BMI since policy 6,712 27.52 1.427 25.45 29.45 6,401 33.42 2.573 30.45 39.45
Last BMI 6,712 27.68 1.755 25.45 39.45 6,401 33.03 2.879 25.45 39.45
Pct change of BMI 6,712 0.00624 0.0484 -0.136 0.55 6,401 -0.0109 0.054 -0.338 0.296
Ever use IBT 6,712 0 0 0 0 6,401 0.0892 0.285 0 1
# IBT use 6,712 0 0 0 0 6,401 0.356 1.626 0 51
# co-morbidity 6,712 8.304 3.482 0 19 6,401 8.435 3.426 0 21
Female 6,712 0.571 0.495 0 1 6,401 0.588 0.492 0 1
Unknown 6,712 0.00164 0.0405 0 1 6,401 0.00219 0.0467 0 1
White 6,712 0.858 0.349 0 1 6,401 0.844 0.363 0 1
Black 6,712 0.0766 0.266 0 1 6,401 0.103 0.304 0 1
Other 6,712 0.0182 0.134 0 1 6,401 0.0133 0.114 0 1
Asian 6,712 0.0164 0.127 0 1 6,401 0.00859 0.0923 0 1
Hispanic 6,712 0.0283 0.166 0 1 6,401 0.0258 0.158 0 1
Native 6,712 0.00119 0.0345 0 1 6,401 0.00328 0.0572 0 1
Age 22-64 6,712 0.1 0.3 0 1 6,401 0.161 0.367 0 1
Age 65-69 6,712 0.213 0.41 0 1 6,401 0.233 0.423 0 1
Age 70-74 6,712 0.231 0.421 0 1 6,401 0.238 0.426 0 1
Age 75-79 6,712 0.199 0.4 0 1 6,401 0.191 0.393 0 1
Age 80-84 6,712 0.148 0.355 0 1 6,401 0.117 0.321 0 1
Age 85 and over 6,712 0.108 0.31 0 1 6,401 0.0603 0.238 0 1
192
Table C2: Summary Statistics by IBT Usage Among the Eligible Sample (BMI≥30)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max N mean sd min max
Never used IBT Ever used IBT
First BMI since policy 5,830 33.41 2.568 30.45 39.45 571 33.5 2.629 30.45 39.45
Last BMI 5,830 33 2.904 25.45 39.45 571 33.34 2.588 25.45 39.45
Pct change of BMI 5,830 -0.0116 0.0541 -0.338 0.296 571 -0.00336 0.0529 -0.203 0.263
Ever use IBT 5,830 0 0 0 0 571 1 0 1 1
# IBT use 5,830 0 0 0 0 571 3.991 3.892 1 51
# co-morbidity 5,830 8.368 3.419 0 21 571 9.119 3.422 1 20
Female 5,830 0.587 0.492 0 1 571 0.594 0.492 0 1
Unknown 5,830 0.00172 0.0414 0 1 571 0.00701 0.0835 0 1
White 5,830 0.847 0.36 0 1 571 0.816 0.388 0 1
Black 5,830 0.102 0.302 0 1 571 0.114 0.318 0 1
Other 5,830 0.0129 0.113 0 1 571 0.0175 0.131 0 1
Asian 5,830 0.00909 0.0949 0 1 571 0.0035 0.0591 0 1
Hispanic 5,830 0.0245 0.155 0 1 571 0.0385 0.193 0 1
Native 5,830 0.00326 0.057 0 1 571 0.0035 0.0591 0 1
Age 22-64 5,830 0.16 0.367 0 1 571 0.166 0.373 0 1
Age 65-69 5,830 0.231 0.422 0 1 571 0.249 0.433 0 1
Age 70-74 5,830 0.237 0.425 0 1 571 0.252 0.435 0 1
Age 75-79 5,830 0.192 0.394 0 1 571 0.186 0.389 0 1
Age 80-84 5,830 0.119 0.324 0 1 571 0.0928 0.29 0 1
Age 85 and over 5,830 0.0609 0.239 0 1 571 0.0543 0.227 0 1
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Table C3: Impact of Intensive Behavioral Therapy on Obesity: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Reduced OLS IV IV Reduced OLS IV IV
qualification 0.00857** 0.00858**
-0.00384 -0.00405
Use IBT 0.00879*** 0.0902** 0.00663*** 0.0976**
-0.00223 -0.0411 -0.00241 -0.0462
# IBT use 0.0231** 0.0268**
-0.0107 -0.0131
COV Y Y Y Y
HRR FE Y Y Y Y
co-morbidity index Y Y Y Y
Ever diag of chronic cond Y Y Y Y
New diag of chronic cond Y Y Y Y
#weeks elapsed FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 13,113 13,113 13,113 13,113 13,113 13,113 13,113 13,113
R-squared 0.061 0.062 0.108 0.108
T-stat of instrument 10.45 7.01 9.43 5.06
Notes: The dependent variable equals the percentage change of the body weight during November 29, 2011 and December 31, 2013. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table C4: Sub-Sample Impacts (IV): By Gender and Race
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Female Female Male Male White White Black Black Asian Asian Hispanic Hispanic
Use IBT 0.0601 0.137** 0.110** 0.0583 -6.251 -2.279
(0.0518) (0.0679) (0.0438) (0.128) )18.49) (16.83)
# IBT use 0.014 0.0423* 0.0282** 0.014 3.748 -0.0895
(0.0122) (0.0225) (0.0116) (0.0306) (20) (0.143)
Observations 7,596 7,596 5,517 5,517 11,161 11,161 1,171 1,171 165 165 355 355
Notes: The dependent variable equals the percentage change of the body weight during November 29, 2011 and December 31, 2013. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.195
Table C5: Sub-Sample Impacts (IV): By Age Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
22-64 22-64 65-69 65-69 70-74 70-74 75-79 75-79 80-84 80-84 85over 85over
Use IBT 0.154 0.169* 0.146 0.00578 0.118 0.0115
(0.148) (0.0903) (0.111) (0.0736) (0.117) (0.109)
# IBT use 0.0419 0.0363* 0.0399 0.00141 0.0324 0.00381
(0.0421) (0.0204) (0.0319) (0.018) (0.0332) (0.0361)
Observations 1,701 1,701 2,922 2,922 3,074 3,074 2,562 2,562 1,744 1,744 1,110 1,110
Notes: The dependent variable equals the percentage change of the body weight during November 29, 2011 and December 31, 2013. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.196
Table C6: Effects of IBT and Smoking Counseling
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SAMPLES no smk counseling no smk counseling smk counseling smk counseling
IBT use 0.0772*** 0.0671
(0.0236) (0.0519)
IBT num 0.0220*** 0.0146
(0.00718) (0.0112)
Observations 12,829 12,829 284 284
Notes: The dependent variable equals the percentage change of the body weight during November 29, 2011
and December 31, 2013. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table C7: Effects of IBT and Smoking
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SAMPLES non-smokers non-smokers smokers smokers
IBT use 0.0800*** 0.0406
(0.0233) (0.0715)
IBT num 0.0234*** 0.00764
(0.00737) (0.0133)
Observations 12,077 12,077 1,036 1,036
Notes: The dependent variable equals the percentage change of the body weight during November 29, 2011
and December 31, 2013. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table C8: Effects of IBT and Massage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SAMPLES no massage no massage massage massage
IBT use 0.0769*** 0.0297
(0.0223) (0.175)
IBT num 0.0221*** 0.00189
(0.00683) (0.0109)
Observations 13,039 13,039 74 74
Notes: The dependent variable equals the percentage change of the body weight during November 29, 2011
and December 31, 2013. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table C9: Effects of IBT and the Psychological Therapy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SAMPLES no psytherapy no psytherapy psytherapy psytherapy
IBT use 0.0781*** -0.0977
(0.0221) (0.259)
IBT num 0.0220*** -0.0145
(0.00666) (0.0405)
Observations 12,841 12,841 272 272
Notes: The dependent variable equals the percentage change of the body weight during November 29, 2011
and December 31, 2013. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table C10: Effects of IBT and the Bariatric Procedures
(1) (2)
SAMPLES no bariatric no bariatric
IBT use 0.0772***
(0.0221)
IBT num 0.0215***
(0.00654)
Observations 13,109 13,109
Notes: The dependent variable equals the percentage change of the body weight during November 29, 2011
and December 31, 2013. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table C11: Effects of IBT Among Beneficiaries who Took No Alternative Procedures
(1) (2)
SAMPLES none of the other procedures none of the other procedures
IBT use 0.0816***
(0.0237)
IBT num 0.0252***
(0.00799)
Observations 11,785 11,785
Notes: The dependent variable equals the percentage change of the body weight during November 29, 2011
and December 31, 2013. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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C.3 ADDITIONAL TABLES
Table C12: ICD-9 Codes with BMI information
ICD-9 Code Description Assigned BMI
V8521 BMI of 25.0-25.9 25.45
V8522 BMI of 26.0-26.9 26.45
V8523 BMI of 27.0-27.9 27.45
V8524 BMI of 28.0-28.9 28.45
V8525 BMI of 29.0-29.9 29.45
V8530 BMI of 30.0-30.9 30.45
V8531 BMI of 31.0-31.9 31.45
V8532 BMI of 32.0-32.9 32.45
V8533 BMI of 33.0-33.9 33.45
V8534 BMI of 34.0-34.9 34.45
V8535 BMI of 35.0-35.9 35.45
V8536 BMI of 36.0-36.9 36.45
V8537 BMI of 37.0-37.9 37.45
V8538 BMI of 38.0-38.9 38.45
V8539 BMI of 39.0-39.9 39.45
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HCPCS/CPT Pct. of Lines Cum Pct. Description
The documentation for this encounter requires THREE out of THREE of the following:
1) Comprehensive History
2) Comprehensive Exam
3) Moderate Complexity Medical Decision-Making
Or 45 minutes spent face-to-face with the patient if coding based on time. The appropriate
documentation must be included.
G0283 0.55 42.06 Electrical Stimulation (Unattended), To One Or More Areas For Indication(S) Other Than
Wound Care, As Part Of A Therapy Plan Of Care
99215 0.54 42.6 Level 5 Office Visit (99215)
The 99215 represents the highest level of care for established patients being seen in the office.
Internists selected the 99215 level of care for only about 9% of established office patients in
2012. The Medicare allowable reimbursement for this level of care is approximately $144 and
it is worth 2.11 work RVUs. Usually the problems are of moderate to high severity.
The documentation for this encounter requires TWO out of THREE of the following:
1) Comprehensive History
2) Comprehensive Exam
3) High Complexity Medical Decision-Making
Or 40 minutes spent face-to-face with the patient if coding based on time. The appropriate
documentation must be included.
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ICD-9 Codes Pct. of All Diagnoses Cum. Pct. Description
71941 0.52 36.02 Joint pain-shlder (Pain in joint, shoulder region)
7393 0.52 36.54 Somat dysfunc lumbar reg (Nonallopathic lesions, lumbar region)
7823 0.5 37.04 Edema (a condition characterized by an excess of watery fluid collecting in the cavities or
tissues of the body.)
36616 0.47 37.51 Senile nuclear cataract (Senile nuclear sclerosis)
72252 0.47 37.99 Lumb/lumbosac disc degen (Degeneration of lumbar or lumbosacral intervertebral disc)
71516 0.44 38.42 Loc prim osteoart-l/leg (Osteoarthrosis, localized, primary, lower leg)
7231 0.42 38.85 Cervicalgia (Neck pain)
5853 0.42 39.26 Chr kidney dis stage III (Chronic kidney disease, Stage III (moderate))
25060 0.41 39.67 DMII neuro nt st uncntrl (Diabetes with neurological manifestations, type II or unspecified
type, not stated as uncontrolled)
7812 0.4 40.07 Abnormality of gait
4439 0.39 40.46 Periph vascular dis NOS (Peripheral vascular disease, unspecified)
7862 0.38 40.85 Cough
2662 0.38 41.22 B-complex defic NEC (Other B-complex deficiencies)
V8530 0.37 41.6 BMI 30.0-30.9,adult (Body Mass Index 30.0-30.9, adult)
78900 0.36 41.96 Abdmnal pain unspcf site (Abdominal pain, unspecified site)
7197 0.36 42.31 Difficulty in walking
27801 0.35 42.67 Morbid obesity
71596 0.35 43.02 Osteoarthros NOS-l/leg (Osteoarthrosis, unspecified whether generalized or localized, lower
leg)
7804 0.35 43.37 Dizziness and giddiness
7291 0.34 43.71 Myalgia and myositis NOS (Myalgia and myositis, unspecified)
7020 0.34 44.05 Actinic keratosis (A rough, scaly patch on the skin caused by years of sun exposure.)
7391 0.34 44.39 Somat dysfunc cervic reg (Nonallopathic lesions, cervical region)
78609 0.34 44.72 Respiratory abnorm NEC (Other respiratory abnormalities)
40210 0.33 45.05 Benign hyp ht dis w/o hf (Benign hypertensive heart disease without heart failure)
32723 0.33 45.38 Obstructive sleep apnea (A potentially serious sleep disorder in which breathing repeatedly
stops and starts.)
71945 0.32 45.7 Joint pain-pelvis (Pain in joint, pelvic region and thigh)
185 0.31 46.01 Malign neopl prostate (Malignant neoplasm of prostate)
71590 0.31 46.32 Osteoarthros NOS-unspec (Osteoarthrosis, unspecified whether generalized or localized, site
unspecified)
V7612 0.31 46.63 Screen mammogram NEC (Other screening mammogram)
73300 0.3 46.93 Osteoporosis NOS (Osteoporosis, unspecified)
7906 0.29 47.23 Abn blood chemistry NEC (Other abnormal blood chemistry)
7243 0.29 47.51 Sciatica (Pain radiating along the sciatic nerve, which runs down one or both legs from the
lower back.)
7392 0.29 47.8 Somat dysfunc thorac reg (Nonallopathic lesions, thoracic region)
72402 0.29 48.09 Spin sten,lumbr wo claud (Spinal stenosis, lumbar region, without neurogenic claudication)
7213 0.27 48.35 Lumbosacral spondylosis (Lumbosacral spondylosis without myelopathy)
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Table C15: Provider Specialty of the IBT Services with Non-zero Payments from Medicare
Provider Specialty Pct. of all IBT lines Cum. Pct. Description
11 62.5 62.5 11 = Internal medicine
8 28.49 90.99 08 = Family practice
50 4.64 95.63 50 = Nurse practitioner
1 1.67 97.3 01 = General practice
97 1.03 98.33 97 = Physician assistant (eff 5/92)
16 0.61 98.94 16 = Obstetrics/gynecology
39 0.36 99.3 39 = Nephrology
38 0.32 99.62 38 = Geriatric medicine
10 0.13 99.75 10 = Gastroenterology
37 0.1 99.85 37 = Pediatric medicine
46 0.04 99.89 46 = Endocrinology (eff 5/92)
6 0.02 99.9 06 = Cardiology
13 0.02 99.92 13 = Neurology
22 0.02 99.94 22 = Pathology
29 0.02 99.96 29 = Pulmonary disease
71 0.02 99.98 71 = Registered Dietician/Nutrition Professional (eff. 1/1/02)
84 0.02 100 84 = Preventive medicine (eff 5/92)
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Table C16: Top 20 States of IBT Usage, 2011-2013
Rank Pct. of IBT lines Cum. Pct. State
1 13.58 13.58 Florida
2 11.19 24.77 New York
3 8.98 33.75 California
4 7.75 41.5 Texas
5 7.0 48.5 New Jersey
6 6.05 54.55 North Carolina
7 4.49 59.04 Illinois
8 3.73 62.77 Tennessee
9 3.71 66.49 Michigan
10 3.6 70.08 Georgia
11 3.49 73.58 Indiana
12 3.33 76.91 South Carolina
13 1.93 78.84 Alabama
14 1.92 80.76 Arizona
15 1.84 82.6 Pennsylvania
16 1.74 84.34 Maryland
17 1.65 85.99 Massachusetts
18 1.36 87.35 Ohio
19 1.36 88.71 Oklahoma
20 1.18 89.9 Louisiana
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